## 䭄

## REDWOOD TRUST

The Redwood Review

1st Quarter 2007
INTRODUCTION ..... 2
SHAREHOLDER LETTER ..... 3
REDWOOD BUSINESS AND STRATEGY ..... 7
FINANCIAL MODULES

- Financial ..... 14
- Residential ..... 28
- Commercial ..... 49
- CDO ..... 57
- Capital ..... 61
- Debt ..... 63
- ABS Issued ..... 65
APPENDIX
- Glossary ..... 71
- Financial Tables ..... 79

INTRODUCTION

## The Redwood Review

| Quarter:Year | {ff755579a-73e0-42ee-bb4b-711d275e37d5} GAAP  <br>  Earnings per }$\underline{\text { Share }}$ | $\frac{\begin{array}{c} \text { Core } \\ \text { Earnings per } \end{array}}{\underline{\text { Share }}}$ | Total Taxable Earnings per Share | Adjusted Return on Equity | Book Value per Share | Dividends per Share |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Q1:04 | \$2.49 | \$1.71 | \$2.57 | 40\% | \$31 | \$1.17 |
| Q2:04 | \$2.58 | \$1.74 | \$3.35 | 38\% | \$35 | \$0.67 |
| Q3:04 | \$3.18 | \$2.29 | \$2.53 | 42\% | \$39 | \$0.67 |
| Q4:04 | \$2.22 | \$1.86 | \$2.44 | 28\% | \$36 | \$6.17 |
| Q1:05 | \$2.42 | \$1.82 | \$1.89 | 30\% | \$39 | \$0.70 |
| Q2:05 | \$1.62 | \$1.50 | \$1.66 | 19\% | \$40 | \$0.70 |
| Q3:05 | \$2.21 | \$1.22 | \$2.23 | 25\% | \$41 | \$0.70 |
| Q4:05 | \$1.68 | \$0.97 | \$1.65 | 19\% | \$37 | \$3.70 |
| Q1:06 | \$1.09 | \$1.16 | \$1.44 | 13\% | \$38 | \$0.70 |
| Q2:06 | \$1.20 | \$0.97 | \$1.91 | 14\% | \$39 | \$0.70 |
| Q3:06 | \$1.22 | \$1.20 | \$1.96 | 14\% | \$40 | \$0.70 |
| Q4:06 | \$1.32 | \$1.12 | \$1.42 | 15\% | \$38 | \$3.70 |
| Q1:07 | \$0.66 | \$1.08 | \$1.48 | 8\% | \$34 | \$0.75 |

We file quarterly reports on Form 10-Q and annual reports on Form 10-K with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Those filings and our earnings press releases provide information about our financial results from the perspective of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). These documents are available on our website, www.redwoodtrust.com. We urge you to study them, as there is much to learn about Redwood Trust there.

In the Redwood Review, you have the opportunity to learn more about Redwood Trust through a discussion of GAAP results and also a discussion of core earnings, tax results, and other non-GAAP measures. You will first find a letter to our shareholders, and then a strategy section on Redwood Trust that highlights the key aspects of our business. Following that is a review of various financial indicators for our business, each of the asset classes and types of liabilities that are included in our GAAP balance sheets, a glossary explaining some of the specialized terms we use, and then tables that provide supplementary financial data.

We hope that the Redwood Review provides some insight and serves as a useful tool for better understanding your investment in Redwood Trust.

We expect that the form and content of the Redwood Review will evolve over time. We welcome your input during this process.

CAUTIONARY STATEMENT: This Redwood Review contains forward-looking statements within the safe harbor provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Statements that are not historical in nature, including the words "anticipated," "estimated," "should," "expect," "believe," "intend," and similar expressions, are intended to identify forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements are subject to risks and uncertainties, including, among other things, those described in our 2006 Annual Report on Form 10-K under Item 1A "Risk Factors." Other risks, uncertainties, and factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those projected are detailed from time to time in reports filed by us with the Securities and Exchange Commission, including Forms 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K. Important factors that may impact our actual results include changes in interest rates and market values; changes in prepayment rates; general economic conditions, particularly as they affect the price of earning assets and the credit status of borrowers; the level of liquidity in the capital markets as it affects our ability to finance our real estate asset portfolio; and other factors not presently identified. In light of these risks, uncertainties, and assumptions, the forward-looking events mentioned in, discussed in, or incorporated by reference into this Review might not occur. Accordingly, our actual results may differ from our current expectations, estimates, and projections. We undertake no obligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events, or otherwise.

# SHAREHOLDER LETTER 

## 1st Quarter 2007

## Dear Fellow Shareholders:

We believe real estate to be a cyclical business. We have been warning about and expecting a correction in residential real estate, and now, the recessionary part of the cycle is here. We expect it to go on for a while, without a quick recovery. We have been preparing for this downturn for almost two years, and as a result, we believe we are in good shape to profit from these cyclical developments.

If growing this company were like flying a plane, we might describe the situation this way: we have for some time been flying into a headwind that has been slowing us down. The weather is now changing, and we are experiencing some turbulence. On the other side of this turbulent short-term weather pattern, however, we foresee smooth flying, and we may benefit from a tailwind to help our progress.

The headwind was a deterioration of residential real estate underwriting standards that reduced overall asset quality, combined with an increase in global liquidity that led to an investment environment where it was difficult to get paid to take risk.

The current turbulent situation in residential real estate has resulted in reduced prices for residential real estate assets. While we've had to take mark-to-market charges on some of our assets and reduced our GAAP earnings and reported book value, the turbulence has had little effect on our core earnings, cash flows, or net interest income. Over the next year or two, the realization of actual credit losses, and the resulting effects on markets and liquidity, may create additional challenges.

After this turbulent period, we expect underwriting standards and asset quality to be substantially improved. With a new respect for risk among market participants, we expect asset pricing to be more favorable. This is the tailwind that should create new opportunities, helping us to further expand and develop our U.S. residential real estate business and grow our company.

Results for the current quarter were not bad, although the headline GAAP earnings number of $\$ 0.66$ per share was lower than expected, as a result of asset mark-to-market charges of \$10 million as well as increased operating expenses of $\$ 5$ million. The mark-to-market charges reflect the overall market decline in prices during the quarter for real estate securities. The increase in operating expenses included $\$ 2$ million in severance charges, and $\$ 3$ million in personnel and systems costs associated with the diversification and growth of our business.

At $\$ 1.08$ per share, core income, which excludes mark-to-market charges and some extraordinary severance costs, was in line with the previous eight quarters. Taxable income, at $\$ 1.48$ per share, remained strong.

Net interest income of $\$ 47$ million was $\$ 2$ million more than net interest income in the first quarter of 2006 and exceeded most other recent quarters. Adjusted ROE based on our GAAP results was $8 \%$. On a core basis (core earnings divided by core equity), ROE was $13 \%$. During the quarter, we also declared an increase in our quarterly dividend to $\$ 0.75$ per share.

## SHAREHOLDER LETTER

## 1st Quarter 2007

Accounting standards are moving in the direction of increased use of mark-to-market accounting. As we have mentioned in the past, on balance we think this is a good thing. It does require investors to sort out how they want to think about the mark-to-market adjustments that will increasingly create substantial volatility in headline GAAP results and book value.

In general, we believe that analysis of market value changes can provide some valuable insights. It is important to remember, however, that market value changes for our existing assets may have very little impact on the real economics of our business. By contrast, changes in cash flow are of vital importance to our business. Therefore, if market values go up or down but actual credit losses don't change, not much has really happened, in our view.

We believe the current state of affairs with respect to mark-to-market accounting is unsatisfactory. None of our liabilities are marked-to-market. Only some of our assets and derivatives are marked-to-market. Some of these marks go though the income statement, others through the balance sheet. In many cases, an asset and a derivative are marked-to-market whereas the paired liability is not. For instance, this quarter our assets declined in value while our liabilities increased in value, but we were only allowed to write down the assets. Some new accounting standards are coming in 2008 that will improve the situation, however, the volatility of GAAP earnings will continue to increase.

For us, there is one very real economic effect related to changes in asset prices, and it is a good thing. When asset prices go down, as they have recently, we can buy new assets more cheaply. Although we remain cautious, we are finding some occasional extraordinary investment opportunities in this difficult environment of falling prices. On average, however, we expect we will benefit far more from slightly better pricing and much better asset quality in our ongoing core business than we will from buying distressed assets at cents on the dollar.

Last quarter, we gave you some insight into our asset acquisition plans, and we wanted to provide you with an update. We ended the quarter with $\$ 114$ million excess capital. Our plans for raising additional capital this year are uncertain and will largely depend on the level of our investment opportunities. In the near-term, we expect to continue to raise equity capital through our direct stock purchase plan (or, potentially through an equity offering) and we may issue additional trust preferred securities, junior subordinated notes, or other long-term debt. We previously stated that we expected to deploy between $\$ 200$ million and $\$ 400$ million of net new capital to acquire permanent assets during 2007. Given the turbulence in the market, it is even harder now than it was earlier in the year to predict how much we will buy. Given our current acquisition plans, it is possible that we will wind up the year on the low end of that range.

We are happy to report that so far our actual credit results remain excellent. Nearly all of the serious credit problems in the market to date have been in the subprime sector, where Redwood has minimal exposure. To reiterate Redwood's long-term strategy, the vast majority of our residential assets are backed by loans made to higher-quality prime and alt-a borrowers. Actual principal value credit losses in the $\$ 237$ billion loans underlying the residential credit-enhancement securities (CES) we own were $\$ 4$ million for the quarter, which is far lower than our forecast and below the level of reserves we have set aside to deal with anticipated losses. As the recessionary

## SHAREHOLDER LETTER

## 1st Quarter 2007

cycle plays itself out, we anticipate an increase in real credit losses, but so far, that is still somewhat over the horizon. Prepayments have continued to perform as expected, or better, as well.

At the beginning of the second quarter, the turbulence in the residential mortgage markets spread to the CDO market. Many CDOs completed beginning in 2006 and those marketed in the first quarter of 2007 had a high concentration of securities backed by BBB and BBB- rated subprime securities from the 2006 vintage. The volume of CDO activity has now slowed and CDO debt spreads, especially for securities rated below AAA, have widened significantly.

Consequently, the level of our CDO activity in the second half of the year will largely depend on market conditions and debt spreads. Although we believe the likelihood is low, there may be a period of time where the CDO market temporarily shuts down as a financing option or debt spreads make financing through a CDO structure unattractive. If the CDO market becomes unavailable or unattractive, we will look to other sources of financing, such as Redwood debt, to fund acquisitions of investment-grade securities, or else we may slow our pace of acquisitions.

In April, we priced on a profitable basis a $\$ 500$ million Acacia CDO backed by investment-grade option ARM residential securities. The transaction is scheduled to close in May. We have an additional $\$ 500$ million Acacia CDO planned for the second quarter. We believe we will complete this transaction profitably, although it is possible that the transaction could be delayed or even cancelled due to unfavorable market conditions.

We believe that over the long term, our CDO business will likely benefit from recent market developments. We believe that our successful track record as a CDO manager and our willingness to invest in the equity of our CDO transactions will give us a competitive advantage. Additionally, we believe that lenders will change the terms of the non-recourse warehouse facilities used during the two-to-six month ramp-up phase of a CDO issuance, requiring issuers such as Redwood to assume more risk during the aggregation period. Consequently, the competitive advantage will go to CDO managers, like Redwood, with strong balance sheets and the hedging expertise necessary to bear this risk. Over the long term, we believe the likely result will be decreased competition and increased margins in our CDO business.

Commercial real estate in the U.S. is healthy, as is our commercial business. In a manner similar to residential real estate, however, both underwriting standards and respect for risk have been deteriorating in recent years. We thought that the downturn in residential, when it hit, might slow or halt aggressiveness in the financing markets for commercial real estate. At least in some respects, this seems to be happening. For instance, the rating agencies are increasing capital requirements for commercial securitizations, spreads have widened, and some B-piece buyers have been unwilling to meet their purchase commitments. We believe these are good signs for our commercial business for the future. In the meantime, we are moving ahead slowly and cautiously.

In summary, we continue to feel positive about our prospects for 2007 and beyond. We structured Redwood Trust to serve as an attractive long-term generator of earnings and dividends under a variety of market conditions, and we feel that both the company and our strategy are holding up

1st Quarter 2007
well given the volatility in the marketplace. While our actual investment decisions will depend largely on market conditions and opportunities, we have no plans to change our approach to acquiring high-quality real estate assets and creating high-quality securitization products.

We thank you for your continued support of Redwood Trust, especially in these uncertain times. We are working hard everyday to continue to earn your trust, and we look forward to reporting to you on our progress in future editions of the Redwood Review.

Yours truly,


George E. Bull, III Chairman and CEO


Douglas B. Hansen
President ABOUT REDWOOD TRUST

## Redwood Business and Strategy

This section of the Review is a broad introduction to Redwood Trust and provides a long-term overview of Redwood's business and strategy. We review and edit it every quarter and as a result, the content may change over time as the company and market conditions evolve. We recommend that you review it periodically.

## 1. Redwood Trust is a financial institution with competitive advantages in the business of investing in real estate loans and securities.

Since Redwood was founded in 1994, our goal has been to create a company that is more efficient than banks, thrifts, insurance companies, and other financial institutions at investing in, financing, and managing residential and commercial real estate loans and securities.

Like many financial institutions, our primary source of income is net interest income, which equals the interest income we earn from our investments in loans and securities less the interest expenses we incur from our borrowed funds and other liabilities.

Most financial institutions fund their asset investments with borrowed money sourced by taking bank deposits, writing insurance policies, or issuing corporate debt. By contrast, securitization is the primary source of funding for our investments.

We also borrow money on a collateralized and uncollateralized basis, typically at very competitive rates. We do not, however, take deposits or raise money in any other way that would subject us to consumer lending or banking regulations. Since we are not regulated as a financial institution and do not deal directly with consumers, our operating costs are far lower than other financial institutions, and we have far greater freedom to use securitization as a source of funding.

In a securitization, we sell our assets to an independent securitization entity that creates securities backed by those assets (asset-backed securities, or ABS) and sells these newly created securities to both domestic and international investors. Most of the securities created and sold earn the highest credit rating of AAA, so the interest expense paid out is relatively low. We typically generate a profit from these securitization entities, consisting of the yield on the securitized assets less the interest expense payments made to the holders of the ABS securities sold.

Advances in securitization technology have enabled securitization to become increasingly competitive as a funding source relative to corporate debt, deposits, insurance contracts, and other borrowings. The cost of funds for ABS issued continues to improve relative to the cost of other borrowings. More importantly, the range of assets that can be efficiently securitized continues to broaden and the capital efficiency of securitization as a source of funding continues to improve.

As global capital markets continue to develop and evolve, we expect securitization to become an even more efficient source of funding. There are trillions of dollars of real estate loans and securities in the U.S. and the world, and the amount outstanding has been and

## ABOUT REDWOOD TRUST

## Redwood Business and Strategy

is expected to continue to grow every year. We believe many of these assets would be better funded through securitization than by other means. Since we are highly efficient at using securitization as a source of funding, we believe we will continue to grow and diversify our business over time.

Our tax structure gives us an additional competitive advantage that cannot be easily replicated by most other financial institutions. We have structured our company for tax purposes as a real estate investment trust (REIT) because our primary business is investing in real estate assets. As a REIT, we are required to distribute the bulk of our profits as dividends. By doing so, we avoid paying corporate taxes on most of the income we generate. This lowers our costs, as taxes are one of the largest costs of doing business for most financial institutions.

## 2. In terms of capital employed, our largest area of investment is real estate creditenhancement securities.

Typically, $1 \%$ to $15 \%$ of the principal value of the securities created in a securitization of real estate assets are credit-enhancement securities (CES). These securities bear most of the credit risk with respect to the underlying assets that were securitized. If the underlying loans or securities suffer a loss of principal due to default, that loss is passed on by reducing the principal value of the CES. As a result of the high level of assumed credit risks, CES carry credit ratings that are below investment-grade. Because the CES absorb most or all of the credit risk that would normally be expected to occur, they reduce the credit risk of the more senior securities, allowing them to earn investment-grade ratings and to be sold at higher prices.

We are a leading investor in CES issued from securitizations of prime-quality residential real estate loans and we are an increasingly important investor in CES issued from securitizations of commercial real estate loans made on income-producing properties. In the last year, we have also made small investments in CES issued from securitizations of alt-a and subprime quality residential loans (some of these assets are also referred to as residuals and are listed on our balance sheet under 'other real estate investments'). In total, at March 31, 2007, we owned residential, commercial, and CDO CES and similar other real estate investments with a principal value of $\$ 2$ billion and a market value of $\$ 1$ billion. Many of these securities are deep discount securities where our cost is far less than the principal value. Since we receive interest payments based on the principal value of a CES security, our interest income cash flow returns are strong. In addition, if credit losses are low, we will receive principal payments in excess of our cost basis, thus generating additional investment returns. Conversely, larger than expected credit losses could rapidly reduce the principal value of our CES, causing our investment returns from CES to suffer.

At March 31, 2007, our CES were first in line to absorb credit losses from the $\$ 294$ billion of real estate loans and securities that underlie the securitizations from which our CES investments were issued. However, our potential credit losses are limited to the capital we have invested in CES.

## ABOUT REDWOOD TRUST

Redwood Business and Strategy

With respect to these CES investments, we have a high degree of structural leverage since the principal value of our CES equals only a small percentage of the underlying asset pools. We do not, however, use a high degree of financial leverage with respect to our CES assets. We use capital rather than debt to finance most of our investments in the more junior subordinated CES (the first-loss and second-loss securities, or equivalent) and we use capital plus a modest amount of securitization financing through our Acacia CDO issuance program to finance the more senior CES that are closer to investment-grade quality.

Recently, we have been acquiring more investment-grade securities than CES. We are highly focused on finding good opportunities to acquire residential, commercial, and CDO CES, as well as residuals, but in the current environment, we remain cautious. Later in 2007, and especially in 2008, we believe acquisition opportunities in CES may improve because we expect residential and commercial underwriting quality to improve.

## 3. We are increasing our investment in investment-grade rated real estate securities.

We are increasing our investments in residential and commercial real estate investmentgrade securities (IGS) rated AAA, AA, A, and BBB for three reasons. First, advances in securitization technology (such as CDOs) allow us to re-securitize portfolios of certain types of residential and commercial investment-grade securities and earn attractive returns on invested capital, as well as asset management fees. Secondly, in an environment of flat or falling housing prices and increased residential loan delinquencies and credit losses, we have for some time been tilting our investment focus towards assets that are creditenhanced by others (investment-grade securities) rather than towards assets that cause us to carry concentrated credit risk (credit-enhancement securities). Finally, we are increasing our investment in AAA- and AA-rated residential real estate securities funded with shortterm Redwood debt. We pursued this investment strategy on a large scale from 1994 to 2000, after which we focused our investment strategy almost exclusively on assets with highly concentrated credit risks such as CES. Debt-funding AAA and AA real estate securities can be a good investment strategy in most economic environments. In addition, it fits our current balance sheet needs well, as we believe it will help us increase our capital utilization rate in a flexible manner and also will offset some of the risks we have in our balance sheet. Currently, our balance sheet is set up to benefit somewhat more from rising short-term interest rates and faster prepayment speeds, whereas debt-funded AAA and AA asset strategies typically benefit from falling short-term interest rates and slower prepayment speeds.

## 4. We are increasing our investment in residential real estate loans.

We have been increasing our acquisitions of high-quality residential loans, and we are using both securitization proceeds and Redwood debt to fund these assets. Our residential loan portfolio declined in size over the last few years as we purchased fewer loans and the adjustable-rate residential loans in our portfolio prepaid at rapid rates. Because we have been increasing our loan purchases and our loan prepayment rate has slowed, we expect

## ABOUT REDWOOD TRUST

Redwood Business and Strategy

our loan portfolio size to start to stabilize. We are buying hybrid loans (fixed rate for 3-10 years, converting to adjustable rate thereafter) as well as adjustable-rate loans. Our interest in acquiring loans has increased because we have greater control over the underwriting quality of acquired loans than we do with respect to the loans underlying the residential CES we acquire. Quality control has become more important as residential underwriting standards have deteriorated. In addition, we are buying more loans because we want to hold a portion of our loan portfolio in whole loan form (unsecuritized) and use Redwood debt (including collateralized commercial paper) to fund the whole loans. Compared to the alternative of using securitization proceeds to fund these loans, using debt funding increases our flexibility in utilizing more of our capital. Debt-funding loans requires a much larger capital commitment ( $8 \%$ of loan value versus $3 \%$ ), and it generates a somewhat lower expected return on that capital than would a securitization. This is a flexible capital commitment, however, as we can easily recycle the capital utilized in this debt-funded strategy into other investments by either securitizing or selling the loans. Employing capital in this manner is useful at a time when we want to build our capital base to take advantage of future growth opportunities but we also want to improve profits by increasing our capital utilization rate, which has been lower than optimal in the last few years as we cut back our acquisition of CES.

We are replacing some of our existing securitization funding with debt funding. In 2007 and 2008, we will exercise our rights to call many of our older "Sequoia" securitizations of residential loans. The terms of these securitizations generally allow us to call the deals when the current loan balance of the underlying loan pool pays down to $10 \%$ or $20 \%$ of its original balance. When calling a securitization, we pay off all the security holders at 100\% of principal value and repurchase the underlying loans. We typically call our securitizations when we have the right to do so because the capital structure of a securitization becomes less efficient when the remaining balance of loans is small. It is better to call the deal so we can refinance the underlying loans more efficiently. We are financing a portion of the loans we acquire from called deals with Redwood debt and holding them as an ongoing investment. The remainder we either re-securitize or sell.

## 5. We buy most of our assets rather than originate them.

Our primary strategy for sourcing assets is to acquire closed loans and securities directly from other financial institutions or from the capital markets. We do not originate or service loans. Others create most of the real estate securities we invest in, some are created by us, but in both cases, others have originated the underlying loans. This role allows us to have an independent point of view on asset quality and attractiveness, as well as the flexibility to change investment strategies as markets evolve. In our experience over the years, many financial institutions that have origination operations have produced suboptimal asset investment results. We believe this is because, in some cases, there may have been incentives to retain loans that might not be the best investment (in terms of price and/or quality) in order to maintain or boost origination volumes and fees. In addition, origination (especially residential loan origination) is a business that is highly cyclical, operations intensive, and increasingly fraught with lender liability. Residential origination is

## ABOUT REDWOOD TRUST

Redwood Business and Strategy

becoming concentrated in the hands of a few large companies that have either banking or brokerage operations as well. Rather than competing with these companies, we develop close relationships with them and help them build their businesses. They need companies like Redwood to buy their loans and credit-enhance their securitizations.

We previously built a successful commercial real estate loan origination operation at Redwood, and we may do so again in the future now that CDO securitization technology has improved the efficiency and ease of securitizing commercial real estate loans. We may also build a commercial real estate loan special servicing operation. However, we expect to continue to source most of our residential and commercial assets through acquisition rather than origination.
6. Competition for assets is strong, but we believe our operating efficiencies will allow us to remain competitive.

Our competitors are banks, thrifts, insurance companies, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Wall Street brokerage firms, hedge funds, private equity firms, specialty finance companies, mortgage REITs, mortgage insurance companies, CDO securitization managers, asset management companies, foreign investors, and other financial institutions.

Our corporate structure and competitive strengths differ from most other financial institutions. With our differentiated capabilities, we interact not only as competitors, but also as customers and suppliers, with most of the institutions active in the vast and interconnected real estate capital markets.

We commenced operations in 1994, a period of turmoil in financial markets. This turmoil allowed us to acquire assets that produced very high returns in subsequent years. The level of competition increased dramatically through the end of 1997, at which time we generally sold assets as the prospective risk/reward relationships for assets did not seem that attractive. There were several financial dislocations in 1998, including a prepayment acceleration crisis and a liquidity crisis. This allowed us to use our excess capital to acquire assets, including our own stock, at attractive prices. The CES we acquired in 1999 - 2002 performed very well, allowing us to report high return on equity results and to pay special dividends of $\$ 4.75$ and $\$ 6.00$ per share in 2003 and 2004 , as well as $\$ 3.00$ per share in each of the last two years.

The competitive environment over the last year has been much like 1997 - new entrants and other investors were willing to buy assets at high prices (low yields) despite increased potential risks. We responded to this lower return/higher risk environment by selling CES assets and slowing our acquisitions. We increased our acquisitions of assets (such as investment-grade securities and loans) that carry less concentrated credit risks than CES. We fund most of these assets via securitization, a form of financing that does not expose us to liquidity risks once a securitization is completed. For these assets, high prices were less of a concern because these high prices (and the resulting narrow spreads) were offset by the high prices at which we sell the securities we create using these assets as collateral.

## ABOUT REDWOOD TRUST

## Redwood Business and Strategy

Now the financial markets are experiencing turmoil due to falling housing prices and rising residential loan defaults. In all likelihood, we will incur increased credit losses, but we are also in a position to acquire lower priced assets with higher return potential. We believe competition will remain strong, however, and that any extraordinary asset acquisition opportunities will be short-lived. With our operating efficiencies, funding strategy, corporate structure, permanent capital base, and investment discipline, we believe we are prepared to continue to compete effectively in the highly competitive market that we expect will be the norm going forward.

## 7. We maintain a strong balance sheet with risks that are largely segregated and limited.

Through our internal risk-adjusted capital policies, we seek to maintain a strong balance sheet with a large capital base, risks that are limited and segregated, and ample liquidity. Our $\$ 1.0$ billion long-term capital base is primarily common equity but also includes $\$ 0.1$ billion of unsecured junior subordinated notes (trust-preferred securities) that have a 30year maturity.

We use capital, not debt, to fund assets such as first-loss credit-enhancement securities and residuals that carry concentrated credit risks. These assets have a high degree of structural credit risk, so we do not feel it would be prudent to employ financial leverage to acquire these assets. Our risk is limited to our investment in these securities. Since we fund these assets with capital rather than debt, high credit losses should not cause liquidity concerns. Similarly, our economic risk is limited and our liquid reserves are secure with respect to securitized assets, since the assets are sold to and the securities are issued by independent securitization entities, whose liabilities are not Redwood's obligations. Our economic risk is limited to the value of any securities we may acquire as an investment from these entities. Typically, either we fund securities acquired from securitizations we sponsor with capital or we sell these securities to another securitization entity for resecuritization. In either case, the risk is segregated and limited.

We also use Redwood debt to fund assets. This funding strategy brings us a number of benefits, including allowing us to employ our excess capital in a flexible manner. It does, however, expose us to potential liquidity risks as well as potential credit risks that are not as limited as with other parts of our balance sheet. Accordingly, we use Redwood debt primarily to fund assets (such as investment-grade rated securities and prime-quality residential whole loans) that do not have concentrated credit risks and that typically can be liquidated quickly. Increasingly, we expect to use extendable collateralized commercial paper as a source of short-term Redwood debt for debt-funded asset strategies. We believe the potential liquidity risks of commercial paper are less than those of our debt facilities in the form of repurchase agreements. Finally, we allocate capital equal to $8 \%$ of assets to support our debt-funded asset strategies, an amount that is well in excess of the amount required by our lenders. We believe this gives us a margin for safety should liquidity, market value, or credit concerns arise.

ABOUT REDWOOD TRUST

## Redwood Business and Strategy

With respect to interest rate and prepayment rate risks, we seek to maintain a balance sheet that is well balanced and that can generate cash flows to fund our regular dividend in a wide variety of scenarios. We believe we have achieved this - the net present value of our projected cash flows does not vary materially with respect to scenarios incorporating changes in interest rates or prepayment rates. Scenarios incorporating different degrees of potential credit losses, however, show a wide variation in the long-term net present value of our cash flows. In the near-term (one to three years), our results may vary as a function of changes in interest rates, prepayments, credit results, mark-to-market asset values, and other factors.

## 8. Our primary financial goal is to deliver an attractive sum of dividends per share over time.

Our financial goal is to distribute the highest sum of dividends per share over the next few decades as we can. We seek to do that while also remaining within our risk tolerance levels and while increasing the inherent value of the company by building competitive advantages, diversifying risks and opportunities, developing internal capabilities, maintaining our culture, keeping operations highly efficient, and increasing book value per share.

As a REIT, we are required to distribute to our shareholders as dividends at least $90 \%$ of our REIT profits as calculated for tax purposes. We distribute our profits as a regular quarterly dividend and also, in some years, in a year-end special dividend. The regular dividend rate for 2006 was $\$ 0.70$ per share per quarter and the special dividend was $\$ 3.00$ per share. Total dividends for 2006 were $\$ 5.80$ per share.

We increased the regular dividend rate to $\$ 0.75$ per share per quarter for the first quarter of 2007. We set the regular dividend rate at a level we believe is likely to be sustained over the next few years. Whether we pay a special dividend or not in 2007 will depend primarily on how much REIT taxable income we generate during the year. We expect that our total annual dividend payout amounts (regular plus special) will vary from year to year.

## 9. Growth is our mission.

In a manner consistent with our goal of distributing an attractive sum of dividends per share over time, our mission is to grow to become a larger company in terms of capital employed and market capitalization. We are targeting growth by building real estate investment, financing, and management operations with competitive advantages. Over the long term, growth should bring several advantages, including book value accretion and a diversified income stream.

We plan to grow organically as markets grow and as we gain long-term market share, rather than simply growing for growth's sake or through short-term acquisition of market share, which would be irresponsible and inconsistent with our long-term goal of distributing attractive dividends per share. In addition, we do not expect growth to be linear, because, in cyclical markets, growth is not always the appropriate short-term strategy.

## FINANCIAL REVIEW

## GAAP Earnings and Core Earnings

## What is this?

GAAP income is income calculated under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) in the United States.
Core earnings is a profitability measure that highlights earnings that are more likely to be ongoing in nature. In calculating core earnings, we start with GAAP earnings and then exclude realized gains and losses on calls and sales, unrealized market value adjustments, and one-time items that are unlikely to be repeated. Table 2 in the Appendix shows a reconciliation of core earnings to GAAP earnings.

## Highlights

- GAAP earnings per share for the first quarter of $\$ 0.66$ per share were lower than recent quarters primarily due to $\$ 10$ million negative unrealized mark-to-market valuation adjustments, a $\$ 3$ million charge against a commercial real estate loan, and $\$ 2$ million severance costs. Net interest income for the first quarter was strong.
- For the past year and a half, quarterly core earnings have ranged from $\$ 0.97$ to $\$ 1.20$ per share. Our first quarter core earnings of $\$ 1.08$ per share were near the middle of this range.


## Tables \& Graphs

| GAAP Earnings (in thousands) | For the Quarter Ended |  |  | Core Earnings (in thousands) | For the Quarter Ended |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Mar-07 | Dec-06 | Mar-06 |  | Mar-07 | Dec-06 | Mar-06 |
| Net interest income | \$47,009 | \$44,534 | \$45,227 | Net interest income | \$47,009 | \$44,534 | \$45,227 |
| Operating expenses | $(17,782)$ | $(13,851)$ | $(12,582)$ | Operating expenses | $(15,402)$ | $(13,851)$ | $(12,582)$ |
| Gains on sales | 303 | 5,308 | 1,062 | Gains on sales | - | - | - |
| Gains on calls | 843 | 1,511 | - | Gains on calls | - | - | - |
| Valuation adjustments, net | $(10,264)$ | $(1,404)$ | $(2,932)$ | Valuation adjustments, net | - | - | - |
| Provision for income taxes | $(1,800)$ | (407) | $(2,760)$ | Provision for income taxes | $(1,800)$ | (407) | $(2,760)$ |
| GAAP Earnings | \$18,309 | \$35,691 | \$28,015 | Core Earnings | \$29,807 | \$30,276 | \$29,885 |
| GAAP earnings per share | \$0.66 | \$1.32 | \$1.09 | Core earnings per share | \$1.08 | \$1.12 | \$1.16 |

GAAP Earnings Per Share


Core Earnings per Share


## FINANCIAL REVIEW

## GAAP Earnings and Core Earnings

## Quarterly Update:

$>$ Net interest income for the first quarter of 2007 increased by $\$ 2$ million over the fourth quarter of 2006 and $\$ 2$ million over the first quarter of 2006. Higher net interest income earnings from our CES and IGS portfolios more than offset a decrease in net interest income from our residential loan portfolio and a $\$ 3$ million charge related to a commercial real estate loan. The average balance of our residential loan portfolio continued to decline due to high prepayments on adjustable-rate residential loans acquired and securitized under our Sequoia program.
$>$ Our residential CES portfolio continues to benefit from strong credit performance and rapid prepayments on those securities backed by ARM loans. The yield for this portfolio was $22 \%$ in the first quarter of 2007, $22 \%$ in the fourth quarter of 2006 , and $20 \%$ in the first quarter of 2006.
$>$ Operating expenses for the first quarter include $\$ 2$ million of severance charges. Excluding this item, operating expenses increased by $\$ 2$ million (or $11 \%$ ) over the fourth quarter of 2006 as we have increased the number of our employees and increased pay levels at year-end.
$>$ The largest factor causing a decline in our GAAP earnings was $\$ 10$ million of negative unrealized mark-to-market valuation adjustments. These adjustments were $\$ 9$ million or $\$ 0.32$ per share higher than the fourth quarter of 2006 and $\$ 7$ million or $\$ 0.26$ per share higher than the first quarter of 2006. The decrease in fair value reflects the overall market decline in prices for real estate securities (particularly, securities backed by subprime and alt-a loans) that occurred during the first quarter. Of the $\$ 10$ million, $\$ 9$ million related to securities accounted for as trading securities, for which quarterly mark-to-markets are a factor in GAAP net income. We had no securities classified as trading in the first quarter or fourth quarter of 2006.
$>$ As we expect to increase the amount of securities we classify as trading for accounting purposes, our quarterly GAAP earnings going forward will become increasingly volatile. Only certain types of market value changes are reported in our net income, so earnings changes will not reflect the net overall market value changes of our assets and liabilities.

Taxable Income

## What is this?

Total taxable income is our pre-tax income as calculated for tax purposes. Total taxable income differs materially from GAAP earnings. Table 3 in the Appendix reconciles these two profitability measures.
REIT taxable income is the primary determinant of the minimum amount of dividends we must distribute in order to maintain our tax status as a real estate investment trust (REIT). REIT taxable income is pre-tax profit, as calculated for tax purposes, excluding taxable income earned at our non-REIT taxable subsidiaries. Over time, we must distribute at least $90 \%$ of our REIT taxable income as dividends. A reconciliation of GAAP income to REIT taxable income appears in Table 3 of the Appendix.

## Highlights

- Total taxable income for the first quarter of 2007 was strong at $\$ 1.48$ per share, an increase from the prior quarter due to reduced tax deductions from stock option exercises.
- REIT taxable income remained strong at $\$ 1.29$ per share and continues to exceed our regular quarterly dividend by a comfortable margin.

Tables \& Graphs
Total Taxable Earnings per Share


## FINANCIAL REVIEW

Taxable Income

REIT Taxable Income per Share


## Quarterly Update:

$>$ Total taxable income was $\$ 40$ million, or $\$ 1.48$ per share, in the first quarter of 2007. This was an increase from the total taxable income we generated in the prior quarter of $\$ 38$ million or $\$ 1.42$ per share. In the prior quarter, we had more tax deductions relating to stock option exercises.
$>$ Our REIT taxable income was $\$ 1.29$ per share in the first quarter of 2007. This was lower than the fourth quarter of 2006 of $\$ 1.53$ per share due primarily to the timing of the reallocation of expenses between REIT and taxable subsidiaries. We are working to further develop this process so it does not cause large quarter-to-quarter variations.
$>$ Our taxable income continues to be higher than our GAAP income as we are not permitted to establish credit reserves for tax. As a result, we amortize more of our CES discount into income for tax and recognize a higher yield until credit losses occur. The cumulative difference at March 31, 2007 in the discount amortization between tax and GAAP for residential, commercial, and CDO CES was $\$ 99$ million.
$>$ Another reason for the difference between tax and GAAP income is that we do not recognize changes in market values of assets for tax until the asset is sold. Consequently, the negative $\$ 10$ million of unrealized market valuation adjustments included in our GAAP earnings this quarter were not included in our tax earnings.
$>$ Total taxable income and REIT taxable income were reduced by $\$ 2.2$ million ( $\$ 0.08$ per share) in the first quarter of 2007 as a result of deductions for actual credit losses. The components of the $\$ 2.2$ million in losses were $\$ 1.8$ million on residential assets and $\$ 0.4$ million on commercial assets. These deductions were less than the actual principal losses incurred on the underlying loans of $\$ 5.9$ million ( $\$ 4.6$ million residential and $\$ 1.3$ million commercial), as we own most of our credit-sensitive assets at a tax basis that is

Taxable Income

## Quarterly Update (Continued):

substantially less than par (principal) value. We currently expect that realized credit losses will increase substantially relative to our recent experience. We believe there is a reasonable chance that cumulative losses could remain less than the assumptions we have used for our pricing, GAAP reserve, and effective yield calculations. All realized credit losses, after adjusting for our tax basis in the assets we own, will reduce our dividend distribution requirements.

## FINANCIAL REVIEW

## Book Value per Share

## What is this?

Book value per share is the amount of equity capital we have per share of common stock outstanding.
GAAP book value is our common equity as calculated for GAAP purposes. It includes mark-to-market valuation adjustments of some of our assets (principally the securities portfolio), but for none of our liabilities.
Core book value is GAAP book value excluding those mark-to-market valuation adjustments reflected on our GAAP balance sheets. Core book value more closely reflects historical amortized costs rather than current market values.

A reconciliation of GAAP book value to core book value appears in Table 7 of the Appendix.

## Highlights

- GAAP book value declined by $9 \%$, or $\$ 3.45$ per share, during the first quarter from $\$ 37.51$ per share to $\$ 34.06$ per share as a result of declining asset values for those particular assets we own that are marked-to-market for balance sheet purposes.
- Core book value rose by $1 \%$ during the first quarter of 2007 from $\$ 34.02$ per share to $\$ 34.29$ per share.
- The disruption in the capital markets also impacted liability spreads. Under GAAP, we are required to carry our real estate securities on our balance sheet at their current market value, but we are not permitted to adjust paired Acacia ABS issued liabilities or other liabilities to market value. We estimate that if we had reported our Acacia ABS issued at fair value, our book value at March 31, 2007 would have been higher than reported by $\$ 41$ million (or $\$ 1.51$ per share).

Book Value per Share

## Charts \& Graphs

GAAP Book Value per Share


Core Book Value per Share


## FINANCIAL REVIEW

## Book Value per Share

## Quarterly Update:

> The difference between core book value of $\$ 34.29$ per share and GAAP book value of $\$ 34.06$ per share at March 31, 2007 was cumulative mark-to-market balance sheet adjustments for GAAP of negative $\$ 6$ million at quarter-end.
$>$ For the $\$ 3.6$ billion of assets that were marked-to-market for balance sheet purposes at March 31, 2007, market values declined by $\$ 93$ million in the first quarter of 2007. This represents an average decline in value during the quarter of $2 \%$ of principal value.
> Market spreads widened in March - the yields the market requires increased, so asset values dropped. For some assets, value declines reflect a decline in economic value due to an increase in credit loss expectations. For other assets (including most of our assets), value declines reflect an increase in potential risks rather than a change in expected cash flows. The table below summarizes the change in unrealized mark-tomarket (MTM) adjustments during the first quarter.

|  | Unrealized MTM Adjustments |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | first quarter 2007 (in \$ millions) |  |  |  |
|  | Resi |  | CDO | Total |
| IGS | (\$54) | (\$2) | (\$10) | (\$66) |
| CES | (14) | (12) | (1) | (27) |
| Total | (\$68) | (\$14) | (\$11) | (\$93) |

$>$ On the positive side, our consolidated liabilities increased in value during the quarter, meaning we could buy back the securities we issued at a lower price than their issuance price. The interest expense we are incurring on the securities we issued is less than the interest expense we would have to pay if we had issued these liabilities in the first quarter of 2007.
$>$ Relative to the last few years, because asset prices are down, we earn more income on assets we buy today, but we also pay a higher interest expense on the securities we create and issue to finance our acquisitions. Overall, as of this writing, the resulting spread earning potential still appears attractive. The markets are volatile, however, and the cost to finance future asset acquisitions through securitization cannot be known until each transaction is completed. The overall situation is characterized by uncertainty, which, on average, we believe should benefit us relative to our competitors.
$>$ Changes in market values for our existing assets and liabilities have had little effect on our operations or actual and expected cash flows. On average, we see the increase in spreads (lower asset prices, more expensive liabilities) as a positive trend. Part of our business is being paid to assume credit risk, and it appears we are likely to be paid more in the future to take this risk than we have been in the recent past.

## Book Value per Share

## Quarterly Update (Continued):

$>$ At the end of our first quarter of operations in September 1994, GAAP book value was $\$ 11.67$ per share. Since that time, we have paid $\$ 41.18$ per share of dividends while also increasing GAAP book value by $\$ 22.39$ per share.
$>$ Book value per share growth generally is not a direct indicator of our market value or an indicator of the returns available to our shareholders. If you had acquired Redwood stock at our initial public offering in August 1995 and had reinvested all dividends back into Redwood stock, your compounded return as a shareholder would have been $21 \%$ per year through March 31, 2007. Future results will vary.

## Return on Equity

## What is this?

Return on equity (ROE) is the amount of profit we generate each year per dollar of equity capital.
GAAP ROE is GAAP earnings divided by GAAP equity.
Adjusted ROE is GAAP earnings divided by core equity. Core equity excludes balance sheet mark-to-market adjustments that are not included in earnings.
Core ROE is core earnings divided by core equity.
A reconciliation of GAAP ROE to Adjusted ROE and core ROE, and of GAAP equity to core equity, appears in Table 7 of the Appendix.

## Highlights

- During the first quarter of 2007, our adjusted return on equity dropped to $8 \%$ primarily due to the negative impact of unrealized market valuation adjustments on our GAAP earnings.
- Over the long term, we expect to be able to generate annual adjusted returns on equity between $11 \%$ and $18 \%$.
- Core return on equity (core earnings divided by core equity) was $13 \%$ for the quarter.

Return on Equity

## Charts \& Graphs

Adjusted Return on Equity


Core Return on Equity


Dividends

## What is this?

We have established a regular quarterly dividend rate at a level we believe it is likely to be sustainable for the next few years. Distributions in excess of the regular dividend rate, if any, are typically paid in a fourth quarter special dividend.

## Highlights

- We increased our regular quarterly dividend rate to $\$ 0.75$ per share in 2007.


## Graphs

RWT Regular Dividends per Share


RWT Special Dividends per Share


## Quarterly Update:

> Total dividend distributions over the last four quarters were $\$ 5.85$ per share. Assuming the recent Redwood stock price of $\$ 51$, the indicated dividend yield would be $11.5 \%$ based on the last twelve months of dividends and $5.9 \%$ based on the current regular dividend rate of $\$ 3.00$ per share for 2007.
$>$ Based on our estimates of REIT taxable income through the first quarter of 2007, at quarter end, we had $\$ 60$ million ( $\$ 2.20$ per share) undistributed REIT taxable income that we anticipate distributing in 2007 through our regularly quarterly dividend and a special dividend.
$>$ We generally distribute $100 \%$ of REIT capital gains income and $90 \%$ of REIT ordinary income, retaining $10 \%$ of the ordinary REIT income. We generally retain $100 \%$ of the after-tax income we generate in taxable subsidiaries.

## RESIDENTIAL REVIEW

Residential Real Estate Securities

## What is this?

We invest in securities that are backed by pools of residential real estate loans. These are shown on our balance sheet in real estate securities and in other real estate investments.

## Highlights

- Total residential securities increased by $15 \%$ in the first quarter, from $\$ 2.4$ billion to $\$ 2.8$ billion, as a result of $\$ 609$ million acquisitions, $\$ 20$ million discount amortization, $\$ 114$ million sales, $\$ 4$ million calls, $\$ 63$ million principal pay downs, and $\$ 70$ million market value declines. Our primary emphasis during the first quarter was acquiring investmentgrade rated securities.
- For the most part, we believe the trend towards lower market values is good for us - it allows us to buy new assets more cheaply while not affecting our business in a material way. We are much more concerned about the cash flows our assets will generate than we are about market value fluctuations.
- We have had increasing concerns about the credit performance of the loan pools underlying a small number of our residential securities. We have sold most of these securities. In the second quarter through May 4, 2007, we sold $\$ 6$ million residential securities generating a de minimis GAAP loss in the second quarter.
- We own some assets that would appear to be higher risk assets in the current environment. Using March 31, 2007 values and adjusting for subsequent second quarter sales, we currently own $\$ 17$ million subprime securities of the 2006 vintage rated BBB- or lower and $\$ 78$ million alt-a securities of the 2006 vintage rated BB+ or lower. We bought some of these assets at very low prices, some have higher-than-average loan quality for their type, some have very short average lives, and others generate returns driven primarily by prepayment rates rather than credit losses. Most of these remaining higherrisk assets are currently performing better than or equal to our expectations. We expect that cash flow returns from many of these assets will be attractive relative to similar assets of the same vintage and rating. Although certainly not free from risk, for the most part they have the potential to generate reasonable investment returns in a housing environment even more difficult than currently appears to be indicated. The upside potential from some of these assets is quite large if the environment does not worsen. Market values will fluctuate.
- Our credit reserves for residential securities were $\$ 393$ million, or $\$ 14.48$ per share, at March 31, 2007. Reserves associated with prime assets were $\$ 264$ million; reserves associated with alt-a assets were $\$ 129$ million; no reserves were associated with our $\$ 9$ million investment in subprime BB-rated securities.
- Of the $\$ 2.8$ billion residential securities we owned at March 31, 2007, $\$ 1.8$ billion were financed through re-securitization via Acacia CDO transactions and $\$ 1.0$ billion were financed with Redwood debt and capital.


## Residential Real Estate Securities

- We plan to continue to acquire new residential securities of all types. Although we expect to incur some credit losses, overall we believe the longer-term outlook for investing in residential securities is increasingly positive. We expect underwriting quality to improve and we expect pricing and spreads between assets and liabilities to become somewhat more attractive than they have been in the recent past.
- In the short-term, our biggest issue with respect to investing in additional residential IGS securities is that our CDO financing costs are unknown because the CDO issuance market is experiencing substantial disruption. Nevertheless, we priced an option ARM CDO transaction in April at attractive economic levels. We expect to price another CDO transaction in the second quarter; if we can achieve currently indicated CDO pricing levels, this will also be a profitable transaction.
- We have established and initiated the funding of a wholly-owned qualified REIT subsidiary - Cypress Trust, Inc. - to hold some of our investments in high-quality investment-grade residential securities and high-quality prime residential loans. These assets will be funded initially with debt, although Cypress will likely also utilize securitization as a form of financing in the future. We believe spread lending opportunities with high credit quality securities and loans are becoming increasingly attractive. In order to raise capital to accommodate growth in this low credit risk strategy, we may sell new shares in Cypress at some point. Our asset management subsidiary, Redwood Asset Management, Inc., would manage Cypress as an external REIT.

Residential Real Estate Securities

## Quarterly Update:

a) Residential Investment-Grade Securities

RWT Residential IGS
(market value in $\$$ billions)


## RWT Residential IGS

 Collateral Type (by market value)(at March 31, 2007)

$>$ Our residential IGS portfolio increased by $19 \%$ in the first quarter from $\$ 1.7$ billion to $\$ 2.0$ billion as a result of acquisitions of $\$ 535$ million, market value declines of $\$ 54$ million, sales of $\$ 108$ million, calls of $\$ 2$ million, transfers to other portfolios of $\$ 14$ million, and principal pay downs of $\$ 30$ million.
$>$ The majority of our residential IGS acquisitions for the quarter were designated investments for two upcoming Acacia securitizations. One of these securitizations is predominately focused on option ARMs; the other is our more typical mezzanine CDO with a broader range of underlying mortgage collateral types.
$>$ During the first quarter, our residential IGS acquisitions were $25 \%$ prime, $63 \%$ alt-a, and $12 \%$ subprime. By interest rate type, these acquisitions were $60 \%$ option ARMs, $20 \%$ hybrids, and 20\% fixed.
> At March 31, 2007, $\$ 1.3$ billion residential IGS were financed via securitization in our Acacia CDO program and $\$ 0.7$ billion were financed with Redwood debt and capital. We are holding most of these $\$ 0.7$ billion of securities in anticipation of selling them to future Acacia securitizations.
$>$ At March 31, 2007, the interest rate characteristics of residential IGS were 46\% adjustable-rate, $35 \%$ hybrid, and 19\% fixed rate. We use interest rate agreements to generally match the interest rate characteristics of these assets to their corresponding funding sources.
$>$ We have never incurred a principal loss on residential IGS. We do not have credit reserves for these assets.

## Residential Real Estate Securities

## Quarterly Update (Continued):

> Interest income generated by residential IGS was $\$ 29$ million for the first quarter. The yield for the first quarter was $6.56 \%$, a decline from $6.77 \%$ the previous quarter as we purchased higher-rated securities with lower yields.
> Net discount amortization income (which is included in interest income) for the first quarter was $\$ 1$ million. At quarter-end, our net discount balance for these assets was $\$ 20$ million, giving us an average amortized balance sheet cost basis for residential IGS of $99.06 \%$ of principal value.
> We purchased $\$ 33$ million residential IGS in April at significantly higher expected yields.
> In the first quarter, our residential prime IGS portfolio grew by $\$ 66$ million (or $9 \%$ ) to $\$ 789$ million. Our residential alt-a IGS portfolio grew by $\$ 311$ million (or 68\%) to $\$ 766$ million as we acquired collateral for an option ARM CDO.
> Our subprime IGS portfolio declined by $\$ 48$ million (or $9 \%$ ) to $\$ 471$ million as sales exceeded new acquisitions of $\$ 66$ million. We sold $\$ 84$ million subprime IGS in the first quarter - $\$ 53$ million of which was older subprime IGS that we reacquired through the call of Acacia 4. The remaining $\$ 31$ million were credit risk sales of underperforming 2006 securities; sales of these securities generated a GAAP income statement loss of $\$ 1$ million in the first quarter.
> Additional information on our residential IGS can be found in Tables 9, 10, and 18 of the Appendix.

Residential Real Estate Securities

## Quarterly Update (Continued):

b) Residential Credit-Enhancement Securities

RWT Residential CES
(market value in \$ millions)


# RWT Residential CES 

Collateral Type
(by market value)
(at March 31, 2007)

> The total value of our residential CES portfolio increased by $4 \%$ from $\$ 722$ million to $\$ 752$ million in the first quarter as a result of $\$ 74$ million acquisitions, $\$ 15$ million market value declines, $\$ 2$ million EITF 99-20 impairment write-downs, $\$ 5$ million sales, $\$ 1$ million calls, $\$ 19$ million discount amortization, $\$ 5$ million transfers out to other portfolios, and $\$ 35$ million principal pay downs.
$>$ The balance of residential loans underlying our residential CES increased by 13\% from $\$ 210$ billion to $\$ 237$ billion during the first quarter.
$>$ During the quarter, the loans underlying our residential CES acquisitions were 45\% prime, $49 \%$ alt-a, and $6 \%$ subprime. By interest rate type, the loans underlying these acquisitions were $58 \%$ option ARMs, $33 \%$ hybrids, and $9 \%$ fixed.
$>$ Interest income generated by residential CES was $\$ 38$ million for the first quarter. The yield for the first quarter was $22 \%$, the same as the previous quarter. Yields for the first quarter were $24 \%$ for prime CES, $19 \%$ for alt-a CES, and $10 \%$ for subprime CES. Interest income was $\$ 30$ million, $\$ 7$ million, and $\$ 1$ million for these sub-portfolios, respectively. CES yields remain high due to fast prepayment speeds and continued good credit performance for underlying loans.
$>$ Overall, our alt-a and prime CES portfolios are performing well from a credit perspective. Our subprime CES portfolio has limited seasoning; early credit performance results are within our expectations.

RESIDENTIAL REVIEW

Residential Real Estate Securities

## Quarterly Update (Continued):

> Principal value credit losses for loans underlying CES were $\$ 3.8$ million for the quarter, a decrease from $\$ 4.2$ million in the previous quarter. As assets season, we expect losses to increase substantially in percentage terms, while perhaps remaining relatively low in absolute numbers. Cumulative losses and the current loss rate remain lower than our original pricing expectations.
> For tax purposes, realized credit losses were $\$ 1.5$ million ( $\$ 0.06$ per share) for residential CES for the first quarter. This deduction is less than the principal value losses incurred on the underlying loans of $\$ 3.8$ million, as we own most of our creditsensitive assets at a tax basis that is substantially less than par (principal) value.
$>$ Our GAAP credit reserves for residential CES were $\$ 393$ million ( $\$ 14.48$ per share) at March 31, 2007, an increase of $\$ 21$ million for the quarter. New acquisitions increased this reserve by $\$ 48$ million. As a result of the strong credit performance of underlying loans, we transferred $\$ 22$ million residential CES credit reserves to unamortized discount that will be amortized into income over time. Unamortized discount balances for residential CES were $\$ 159$ million at quarter-end.
> At March 31, 2007, $\$ 286$ million residential CES were financed with equity and Redwood debt, and $\$ 466$ million were financed through our Acacia CDO program.
$>$ Our total residential prime CES portfolio increased by $\$ 16$ million (3\%) to $\$ 571$ million during the first quarter. Overall, our prime CES portfolio is performing well from a credit perspective and continues to benefit from fast prepayments.
$>$ The balance of seriously delinquent loans underlying prime residential CES increased from $\$ 381$ million to $\$ 485$ million during the quarter, an increase from $0.12 \%$ to $0.14 \%$ of original balances and $0.20 \%$ to $0.23 \%$ of current balances. These increases remain in line with normal seasoning and remain well below our initial modeling expectations.
$>$ Securities backed by option ARM and traditional ARM loans continued to prepay significantly faster than our original expectations at a weighted average CPR of $40 \%$. These securities represent $50 \%$ of our prime CES, and they are priced and structured to benefit from fast prepayment speeds in addition to low losses.
$>$ The principal value of credit losses for loans underlying our prime CES was $\$ 2.5$ million, which is less than one basis point (0.01\%) per year.
$>$ Fifty percent of our prime portfolio is composed of securities backed by hybrid and fixedrate mortgages. The loans underlying these securities prepaid at a weighted average CPR of $13 \%$ in the first quarter. This is slower than our original expectations. Cumulatively over time, however, prepayment rates for these assets have been more rapid than we originally assumed.
$>$ Our residential alt-a CES portfolio increased by $\$ 15$ million (10\%) to $\$ 172$ million during the first quarter. Option ARM collateral makes up $92 \%$ of this portfolio. We sold $\$ 5$ million underperforming alt-a CES in April for a minimal loss.

RESIDENTIAL REVIEW

## Residential Real Estate Securities

## Quarterly Update (Continued):

$>$ We generally acquire these alt-a securities backed by option ARMs with loss expectations that are six times greater than we expect for our prime hybrid CES. To date, the performance of our CES backed by option ARMs continues to exceed our expectations.
$>$ The balance of seriously delinquent loans underlying alt-a residential CES increased from $\$ 187$ million to $\$ 296$ million during the quarter, an increase from $0.60 \%$ to $0.82 \%$ of original balances and $1.03 \%$ to $1.51 \%$ of current balances. These increases remain below our initial modeling expectations.
$>$ Our subprime CES portfolio remained nearly flat for the quarter at $\$ 9$ million, with $\$ 4$ million acquisitions and $\$ 3$ million of transfers from other portfolios. Our subprime CES portfolio has limited seasoning; however, the early credit performance continues to be within our expectations.
$>$ In April 2007, we purchased $\$ 21$ million deep-discounted subprime BBB and BBBsecurities.
$>$ We continue to search for subprime credit investment opportunities, and we expect to make additional investments in distressed assets as well as in assets backed by new loans as quality improves. In addition, we expect to create new assets by buying and securitizing loans. At this point, we believe the subprime sector is still far from recovery, so we currently expect the volume of our subprime CES and residual investments will remain limited for some time. We do not originate or service subprime loans, nor at this point, do we intend to.
$>$ The subprime markets are very large in terms of potential capital employed and we believe they offer ongoing opportunities for Redwood, potentially on a large scale. So as to not change the essential nature of Redwood as an investor in higher quality loans, we are considering raising capital though a separately managed vehicle in order to fund our future growth in the subprime markets.
$>$ Additional information on our residential CES can be found in Tables 9, 10, 11, and 12 of the Appendix.

RESIDENTIAL REVIEW

## Residential Real Estate Securities

## Quarterly Update (Continued):

c) Other Residential Real Estate Investments
$>$ Other real estate investments (OREI) are assets that we mark-to-market for income statement purposes, in many cases because they may otherwise be deemed to contain embedded derivatives for accounting purposes under FAS 155. We expect to acquire additional OREI assets. Unrealized mark-to-market fluctuations will affect GAAP income but will not directly affect core or taxable income.
$>$ OREI are a new reporting category we established in the first quarter of 2007. We transferred $\$ 18$ million of assets that were held in other portfolios at December 31, 2006 into this category. Total OREI at March 31, 2007 was $\$ 50$ million. This included $\$ 19$ million residuals, $\$ 29$ million net interest margin securities (NIMs), and $\$ 2$ million IOs.
$>$ The collateral type underlying our OREI was $\$ 2$ million prime, $\$ 28$ million alt-a, and $\$ 20$ million subprime at March 31, 2007.
$>$ Our OREI portfolio generated a $26 \%$ yield for the first quarter, producing $\$ 2$ million interest income. Mark-to-market charges to income were negative $\$ 5$ million for the quarter, as a result of the substantial bid-ask spread on these new purchases plus the general decline in market values towards quarter-end.
$>$ Residuals are first-loss securities that are not rated by a rating agency. The value of residual securities can vary widely and is highly dependent on prepayment speeds. The value is also dependent on the level and timing of credit losses, but often is not as sensitive to losses as it is to prepayment speeds. These securities perform poorly when prepayments are fast and losses are higher than expected.
$>$ Due to early, poor credit performance, we sold one residual security in April. We sold the security at the market value reflected in our first quarter financial statements.
$>$ Our NIMs are structured in such a way that they mature quickly (typically less than two years). The majority of the NIMs we have acquired have an investment-grade rating.
$>$ OREI at March 31, 2007 consisted of $\$ 8$ million of investment-grade alt-a NIMs with an average life of 2.5 years.

Additional Information - Residential Prime

Prime securities are mortgage-backed securities backed by high credit quality residential loans. The borrowers typically have high FICO credit scores. The loans have relatively low loan-to-value (LTV) ratios.

## RWT Residential Prime Securities

Rating \& Vintage
(by market value in \$ millions)
(at March 31, 2007)
$\begin{array}{lrrrrr}$\cline { 3 - 5 } \& \& \& \& \& <br> \& $\left.\mathbf{2 0 0 4} & \mathbf{2 0 0 5} & \mathbf{2 0 0 6} & \mathbf{2 0 0 7} & \text { Total } \\ \text { IGS } & & & & & \\ \text { AAA } & \$ 6 & \$ 12 & \$ 5 & \$ 44 & \$ 67 \\ \text { AA } & 66 & 68 & 34 & 12 & 180 \\ \text { A } & 65 & 132 & 39 & 11 & 247 \\ \text { BBB+ } & 2 & 9 & 9 & 29 & 49 \\ \text { BBB } & 36 & 113 & 22 & 10 & 181 \\ \text { BBB- } & 10 & 22 & 17 & 16 & 65 \\ \hline \text { Total IGS } & \mathbf{1 8 5} & \mathbf{3 5 6} & \mathbf{1 2 6} & \mathbf{1 2 2} & \mathbf{7 8 9} \\ \hline \text { CES } & & & & & \\ \text { BB } & 134 & 97 & 75 & 10 & 316 \\ \text { B } & 42 & 41 & 42 & 7 & 132 \\ \text { NR } & 75 & 31 & 13 & 5 & 124 \\ \hline \text { Total CES } & \mathbf{2 5 1} & \mathbf{1 6 9} & \mathbf{1 3 0} & \mathbf{2 2} & \mathbf{5 7 2}\end{array}\right\}$

|  | < $=2004$ | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Option ARM | \$74 | \$109 | \$48 | \$5 | \$236 |
| ARM | 43 | 6 | - | - | 49 |
| Hybrid | 98 | 37 | 75 | 17 | 227 |
| Fixed | 36 | 17 | 7 | - | 60 |
| Total | \$251 | \$169 | \$130 | \$22 | \$572 |


| OREI <br> IOs |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| AAA | 1 |  | - | - | 1 |
| Total OREI | 1 | - | - | - | 1 |
| Total | $\$ 437$ | $\$ 525$ | $\$ 256$ | $\$ 144$ | $\$ 1,362$ |

RWT Residential Prime CES Seriously Delinquent Trends


Source: Mortgage Bankers Association, Redwood Trust

RWT Residential Prime CES Seriously Delinquent Trends by Vintage
(at March 31, 2007)


RWT Residential Prime CES Prepayment Speeds


Additional Information - Residential Prime

RWT Residential Prime
First Quarter 2007 Activity
(\$ millions)

|  | $\underline{\text { IGS }}$ | $\underline{\text { CES }}$ | OREI | Total |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Market Value 12/31/06 | $\mathbf{\$ 7 2 3}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 5 5 5}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 0}$ | $\$ 1,278$ |
| Acquisitions | 132 | 33 | - | 165 |
| Upgrades / Downgrades | - | - | - | - |
| Transfers to / from other portfolios | $(23)$ | 9 | 1 | $(13)$ |
| Sales | $(13)$ | $(4)$ | - | $(17)$ |
| Principal Payments | $(18)$ | $(30)$ | - | $(48)$ |
| Discount / (Premium) Amortization | 1 | 16 | - | 17 |
| Net Mark-to-Market Adjustment | $(13)$ | $(7)$ | - | $(20)$ |
|  | $\mathbf{\$ 7 8 9}$ | $\$ 572$ | $\mathbf{\$ 1}$ | $\$ 1,362$ |

RWT Residential Prime CES
Underlying Loan Characteristics
(at March 31, 2007)

| Number of loans | 600,406 | Wtd avg FICO | 737 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Total loan face (\$mm) | \$213,262 | FICO: < 620 | 2\% |
| Average loan size (\$000) | \$355 | FICO: 621-660 | $4 \%$ |
|  |  | FICO: 661-700 | 15\% |
| Southern CA | 24\% | FICO: 701-740 | 27\% |
| Northern CA | 21\% | FICO: > 740 | 51\% |
| Florida | 6\% | Unknown | 1\% |
| New York | 5\% |  |  |
| Georgia | 2\% | Conforming at origination \% | 31\% |
| New Jersey | 3\% | > \$1 MM \% | 9\% |
| Other states | 39\% |  |  |
|  |  | 2nd home \% | 7\% |
| 2007 origination | 2\% | Investment home \% | 2\% |
| 2006 origination | 20\% |  |  |
| 2005 origination | 28\% | Purchase | 42\% |
| 2004 origination and earlier | 50\% | Cash out refi | 27\% |
|  |  | Rate-term refi | 31\% |
| Wtd avg original LTV | 68\% |  |  |
| Original LTV: 0-50 | 13\% | Full doc | 45\% |
| Original LTV: 50-60 | 12\% | No doc | 6\% |
| Original LTV: 60-70 | 22\% | Other (limited, etc) | 49\% |
| Original LTV: 70-80 | 50\% | Unknown/not categorized | 0\% |
| Original LTV: 80-90 | 2\% |  |  |
| Original LTV: 90-100 | 1\% | 2-4 family | 2\% |
|  |  | Condo | 9\% |
|  |  | Single family | 89\% |

Alt-A securities are residential mortgage-backed securities backed by loans that generally have higher credit quality characteristics than subprime, but lower credit quality characteristics than prime.

## RWT Residential Alt-A Securities Rating \& Vintage

(by market value in \$ millions) (at March 31, 2007)
<= $20042005 \quad 2006 \quad 2007$ Total


## RESIDENTIAL REVIEW

Additional Information - Residential Alt-A

RWT Residential Alt-A Option ARM CES and Residuals Seriously Delinquent Trends by Vintage

RWT Residential Alt-A Option ARM BBB Spreads


RWT Residential Alt-A Option ARM CES \& Residuals Predavment Speeds



RWT Residential Alt-A CES \& Residuals Principal Value Credit Losses
(in \$ millions)


Additional Information - Residential Alt-A

RWT Residential Alt-A
First Quarter 2007 Activity
(\$ millions)

|  | IGS | CES | OREI | Tota |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Market Value 12/31/06 | $\$ 157$ | $\$ 0$ | $\$ 612$ |
| Acquisitions | 337 | 36 | 21 | 394 |
| Upgrades / downgrades | - | - | - | - |
| Transfers to / from other portfolios | 9 | $(11)$ | 14 | 12 |
| Sales | $(10)$ | $(1)$ | - | $(11)$ |
| Principal payments | $(4)$ | $(5)$ | $(1)$ | $(10)$ |
| Discount / (premium) amortization | - | 3 | - | 3 |
| Net mark-to-market adjustment | $(21)$ | $(8)$ | $(6)$ | $(35)$ |
|  | $\$ 766$ | $\$ 171$ | $\$ 28$ | $\$ 965$ |

RWT Residential Alt-A CES Underlying Loan Characteristics
(at March 31, 2007)

| Number of loans | 59,900 | Wtd avg FICO | 708 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Total loan face (\$mm) | \$19,620 | FICO: < 620 | 2\% |
| Average loan size (\$000) | \$333 | FICO: 621-660 | 14\% |
|  |  | FICO: 661-700 | 29\% |
| Southern CA | 31\% | FICO: 701-740 | 24\% |
| Northern CA | 21\% | FICO: > 740 | 23\% |
| Florida | 10\% | Unknown | 8\% |
| New York | 2\% |  |  |
| Georgia | 1\% | Conforming at origination \% | 49\% |
| New Jersey | 3\% | > \$1 MM \% | 10\% |
| Other states | 32\% |  |  |
|  |  | 2nd home \% | 6\% |
| 2007 origination | 4\% | Investment home \% | 11\% |
| 2006 origination | 25\% |  |  |
| 2005 origination | 39\% | Purchase | 37\% |
| 2004 origination and earlier | 32\% | Cash out refi | 41\% |
|  |  | Rate-term refi | 22\% |
| Wtd avg original LTV | 75\% |  |  |
| Original LTV: 0-50 | 4\% | Full doc | 18\% |
| Original LTV: 50-60 | 6\% | No doc | 1\% |
| Original LTV: 60-70 | 15\% | Other (limited, etc) | 71\% |
| Original LTV: 70-80 | 61\% | Unknown/not categorized | 10\% |
| Original LTV: 80-90 | 10\% |  |  |
| Original LTV: 90-100 | 4\% |  | 4\% |
|  |  | Condo | 11\% |
|  |  | Single family | 85\% |

Additional Information - Residential Subprime

Subprime securities are residential mortgage-backed securities backed by lower-quality loans. Many subprime borrowers have impaired credit histories.

RWT Residential Subprime Securities
Rating \& Vintage
(market value in \$ millions)

|  | $\leqslant=2004$ | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| IGS |  |  |  |  |  |
| AAA | \$0 | \$5 | \$3 | \$0 | \$8 |
| AA | 44 | 58 | 22 | 28 | 152 |
| A | 118 | 31 | 14 | 10 | 173 |
| BBB+ | 52 | - | 46 | 10 | 108 |
| BBB | - | - | 15 | - | 15 |
| BBB- | - | - | 12 | 3 | 15 |
| Total IGS | 214 | 94 | 112 | 51 | 471 |
| CES |  |  |  |  |  |
| BB | - | - | 5 | 4 | 9 |
| B | - | - | - | - | - |
| NR | - | - | - | - | - |
| Total CES | - | - | 5 | 4 | 9 |
| OREI |  |  |  |  |  |
| Residuals |  |  |  |  |  |
| NR | - | - | 3 | - | 3 |
| NIMs |  |  |  |  |  |
| A | - | - | 15 | - | 15 |
| BBB | - | - | 2 | - | 2 |
| Total NIMs | - | - | 17 | - | 17 |
| Total OREI | - | - | 20 | - | 20 |
| Total | \$214 | \$94 | \$137 | \$55 | \$500 |

RWT Residential Subprime Securities Seriously Delinquent Trends by Vintage
(at March 31, 2007)


RWT Residential Subprime Spreads


Source: UBS, Redwood Trust

RWT Collateral Loss Required to Incur the First Dollar of Loss on a Security (generic 2007 subprime)
(at March 31, 2007)


## Explanation of Graph:

The graph above uses a base case prepayment and loss curve on generic 2007 subprime IGS to generate a cumulative deal loss where the selected IGS will suffer its first dollar of principal loss. For example, a generic 2007 subprime IGS with a rating of AA will take a principal loss when underlying cumulative credit losses approximate 19\% of the original loan balance or higher using a base case prepayment and loss curve. Actual risk characteristics for individual subprime securitizations differ.

Additional Information - Residential Subprime

RWT Residential Subprime
First Quarter 2007 Activity
(\$ millions)

|  | $\underline{\text { IGS }}$ | CES | OREI | Total |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Market Value 12/31/06 | $\$ 518$ | $\frac{\$ 9}{\$ 0}$ | $\$ 527$ |  |
| Acquisitions | 66 | 4 | 20 | 90 |
| Upgrades / downgrades | - | - | - | - |
| Transfers to / from other portfolios | - | $(3)$ | 3 | - |
| Sales | $(84)$ | - | - | $(84)$ |
| Principal payments | $(10)$ | - | $(3)$ | $(13)$ |
| Discount / (premium) amortization | - | - | - | - |
| Net mark-to-market adjustment | $(19)$ | $(1)$ | - | $(20)$ |
|  | $\$ 471$ | $\$ 9$ | $\$ 20$ | $\$ 500$ |

RWT Residential Subprime CES Underlying Characteristics
(at March 31, 2007)

| Number of loans | 25,001 | Wtd avg FICO | 642 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Total loan face (\$mm) | \$3,615 | FICO: < 620 | 37\% |
| Average loan size (\$000) | \$145 | FICO: 621-660 | 28\% |
|  |  | FICO: 661-700 | 19\% |
| Southern CA | 18\% | FICO: 701-740 | 10\% |
| Northern CA | 13\% | FICO: $>740$ | 6\% |
| Florida | 12\% | Unknown | 0\% |
| New York | 4\% |  |  |
| Georgia | 1\% | Conforming at origination \% | 77\% |
| New Jersey | 4\% | > $\$ 1 \mathrm{MM}$ \% | 0\% |
| Other states | 48\% |  |  |
|  |  | 2nd home \% | 2\% |
| 2007 origination | 2\% | Investment home \% | $9 \%$ |
| 2006 origination | 98\% |  |  |
| 2005 origination | 0\% | Purchase | 52\% |
| 2004 origination and earlier | 0\% | Cash out refi | 44\% |
|  |  | Rate-term refi | $4 \%$ |
| Wtd avg original LTV | 75\% |  |  |
| Original LTV: 0-50 | 13\% | Full doc | 49\% |
| Original LTV: 50-60 | 2\% | No doc | 1\% |
| Original LTV: 60-70 | 6\% | Other (limited, etc) | 50\% |
| Original LTV: 70-80 | 43\% | Unknown/not categorized | 0\% |
| Original LTV: 80-90 | 22\% |  |  |
| Original LTV: 90-100 | 14\% | 2-4 family Condo | $7 \%$ $7 \%$ |
|  |  | Single family | 86\% |

## Residential Loans

## What is this?

We invest in residential real estate loans that we acquire from mortgage origination companies. Most of the loans we acquire are prime-quality loans. We do not originate or service residential real estate loans. We fund our loan investments via securitization and with Redwood debt and capital.

## Highlights

- Our loan acquisition activity through our conduit is increasing. Our primary focus has been hybrids, as ARMs are out of favor in the current yield curve environment. We purchased $\$ 415$ million residential hybrid loans this quarter. All our loans were primequality loans at origination.
- Seriously delinquent loans and credit losses on residential loans are increasing due to normal seasoning, but remain well below our initial expectations.
- Prepayment speeds on our loan portfolio, consisting mostly of ARM loans, continued to be fast, prepaying at a CPR of nearly $37 \%$ for the first quarter.
- We completed one securitization in the first quarter, financing $\$ 885$ million hybrid loans. In April, we priced another Sequoia securitization that will close in May. We called one older Sequoia securitization during the first quarter. The cost of financing loans has risen as market spreads for ABS have widened. Nevertheless, the two Sequoia transactions we have priced in 2007 have been profitable.


## Residential Loans

RWT Residential Loans Prepayment Speeds

RWT Residential Loan
Net Charge Offs
(in \$ millions)



RWT Residential Loans
(principal value in $\$$ billions)


RESIDENTIAL REVIEW

## Residential Loans

## Quarterly Update:

> In the first quarter, our residential loan portfolio declined from $\$ 9.3$ billion to $\$ 8.7$ billion. We acquired $\$ 415$ million loans and had no sales. Principal pay downs were $\$ 1.0$ billion. The average annual prepayment rate (CPR) was $37 \%$ for the first quarter versus $34 \%$ for all of 2006. Most of these loans are adjustable-rate loans that tend to prepay rapidly when the yield curve is flat or inverted.
> Interest income was $\$ 129$ million in the first quarter, a decrease from $\$ 138$ million in the previous quarter. This portfolio yielded $5.93 \%$. The yield in the previous two quarters was $5.97 \%$.
$>$ Premium amortization expenses, a component of interest income, were $\$ 12$ million for the first quarter. We ended the first quarter with $\$ 8.6$ billion principal value of loans and a loan premium balance of $\$ 117$ million for an average basis of $101.37 \%$ of principal value. For various technical accounting reasons, for several years we have not been able to amortize premium expense balances as quickly as the loans prepaid. If shortterm interest rates decline, under these accounting rules we would expect premium amortization expenses to increase significantly. Largely because premium amortization expenses have not kept pace with prepayments in the past, we estimate the book value of residential loans exceeded their market value by $\$ 65$ million at quarter-end.
$>$ Realized credit losses were $\$ 1.6$ million for the first quarter, an annual loss rate of eight basis points ( $0.08 \%$ ) of the reduced loan balances. The loss for tax purposes was $\$ 0.3$ million. Cumulative losses have been far lower than our original expectations. We expect losses to continue to increase as these loans season. Credit reserves for this portfolio were $\$ 20$ million (or $0.23 \%$ ) at quarter-end.
$>$ The balance of seriously delinquent loans increased from $\$ 74$ million to $\$ 79$ million during the quarter, an increase from $0.24 \%$ to $0.26 \%$ of original balances and an increase from $0.81 \%$ to $0.92 \%$ of current balances.
$>$ At the end of the first quarter, $\$ 7.4$ billion residential loans were financed via securitization ("Sequoia") and $\$ 1.3$ billion were financed with Redwood debt and equity.
$>$ We are planning to acquire and securitize alt-a and subprime loans in the future in addition to our current business of acquiring and securitizing prime-quality loans.
$>$ Additional information on our residential loans can be found in Tables 9, 10, 11, and 14 of the Appendix.

## RWT Residential Loans

First Quarter 2007 Activity
(\$ millions)

|  | $\underline{\mathbf{Q 1 : 0 7}}$ | $\underline{\mathbf{Q 4 : 0 6}}$ | $\mathbf{Q 1 : 0 6}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Carrying value beginning | $\$ 9,324$ | $\$ 9,843$ | $\$ 13,875$ |
| Acquisitions | 415 | 726 | 52 |
| Sales | - | - | - |
| Principal payments | $(1,047)$ | $(1,231)$ | $(1,925)$ |
| Discount / (premium) amortization | $(12)$ | $(13)$ | $(12)$ |
| Credit provision | $(2)$ | $(2)$ | - |
| Net charge-offs/(recoveries) | 2 | 1 | - |
| Carrying value ending | $\$ 8,680$ | $\$ 9,324$ | $\$ 11,990$ |

RWT Residential Loans
Loan Characteristics
(at March 31, 2007)

| Number of loans | 25,579 | Wtd avg FICO | 727 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Total loan face (\$mm) | \$8,583 | FICO: < 620 | 2\% |
| Average loan size (\$000) | \$336 | FICO: 621-660 | 5\% |
|  |  | FICO: 661-700 | 19\% |
| Southern CA | 14\% | FICO: 701-740 | 26\% |
| Northern CA | 10\% | FICO: > 740 | 48\% |
| Florida | 13\% |  |  |
| New York | 6\% | Conforming at origination \% | 37\% |
| Georgia | 5\% | > \$1 MM \% | 16\% |
| New Jersey | 4\% |  |  |
| Other states | 48\% | 2nd home \% | 11\% |
|  |  | Investment home \% | $3 \%$ |
| 2007 origination | 3\% |  |  |
| 2006 origination | 19\% | Purchase | 35\% |
| 2005 origination | 5\% | Cash out refi | 31\% |
| 2004 origination and earlier | 73\% | Rate-term refi | 32\% |
|  |  | Other | 2\% |
| Wtd avg original LTV | 68\% |  |  |
| Original LTV: 0-50 | 15\% | Hybrid rate | 15\% |
| Original LTV: 50-60 | 12\% | Adjustable rate | 85\% |
| Original LTV: 60-70 | 20\% | Interest-only | 97\% |
| Original LTV: 70-80 | 46\% | Fully amortizing | 3\% |
| Original LTV: 80-90 | 2\% |  |  |
| Original LTV: 90-100 | 5\% |  |  |

## COMMERCIAL REVIEW

Commercial Real Estate Securities and Loans

## What is this?

We invest in securities that are backed by pools of commercial real estate loans. These are represented on our balance sheet as part of real estate securities. We also invest in commercial real estate loans. These are represented on our balance sheet as part of real estate loans.

## Highlights

- Total commercial securities declined by $3 \%$ in the first quarter, from $\$ 568$ million to $\$ 551$ million, as a result of $\$ 6$ million acquisitions, $\$ 6$ million sales, $\$ 1$ million principal pay downs, and $\$ 14$ million negative market value changes. We did not acquire or sell any commercial loans.
- Spreads for commercial securities widened (asset prices declined) somewhat in the first quarter as market participants became more risk-averse and markets became less liquid. Problems in subprime residential lending, developing problems in CDO markets, and record volumes of new CMBS issuance were part of the cause.
- In the first quarter, we did not invest in any CMBS transactions as the first-loss buyer. We invested in a new transaction in the second quarter, making a new investment of $\$ 42$ million in these commercial CES.
- For 2007, we now expect to slow our pace of commercial CES acquisitions relative to last year. Although the commercial property market is healthy, our concerns for the longerterm are growing, given elevated property prices and increasingly aggressive underwriting. We are satisfied with our current assets, but we are not currently looking to add substantial new assets. Our current focus is primarily on building our surveillance and special servicing capabilities. Over time, we also expect to expand our capacity to acquire, originate, and finance commercial real estate loans.
- We are committed to building a complete commercial real estate finance business with more fully developed capabilities and a broader product line. We are not in any hurry to do so, however. Given current market dynamics, building slowly seems the prudent course of action.


## COMMERCIAL REVIEW

Commercial Real Estate Securities and Loans

## Quarterly Update:

## a) Commercial Investment-Grade Securities

> Our commercial IGS declined by $\$ 4$ million (or 3\%) in the first quarter. Acquisitions were $\$ 3$ million, sales were $\$ 6$ million, principal pay downs were $\$ 1$ million, upgrades of commercial CES securities to IGS were $\$ 4$ million, and market value declines were $\$ 2$ million. Sales were the result of our call of Acacia 4 and the subsequent sale of some of Acacia 4's assets. We recognized $\$ 0.1$ million of gains from these sales of commercial IGS.
> Anticipating spread widening, we have not been acquiring significant volumes of investment-grade CMBS for some time. We may seek to complete our second commercial real estate CDO (CRE CDO) in 2008, in which case we may acquire additional commercial IGS.
> Interest income generated by commercial IGS was $\$ 2$ million for the first quarter. The yield for the quarter was $6.14 \%$, a decrease from $8.77 \%$ in the previous quarter. The decrease in yield was primarily the result of our sale of higher-yielding commercial interest-only securities during the fourth quarter of 2006.
> The market value decline of $\$ 2$ million in commercial IGS was largely the result of credit spread widening in BBB-rated securities, reflecting increased supply of CMBS amidst credit concerns across all mortgage ABS sectors.
> The credit performance of our commercial IGS portfolio remains strong.
> We have never incurred a principal loss on a commercial IGS security and we do not currently maintain GAAP credit reserves against our commercial IGS securities, as we expect external credit enhancement (primarily structural credit subordination) will sufficiently protect our investments from principal losses.
> The interest rate characteristics of commercial IGS were $80 \%$ fixed rate and $20 \%$ floating rate. We use interest rate agreements to reduce interest rate mismatches that may occur between assets and their associated liabilities.
> At March 31, 2007, 92\% of our commercial IGS were financed via our Acacia CDO program.
> Additional information on this portfolio can be found in Tables 9, 10, and 18 of the Appendix.

Commercial Real Estate Securities and Loans

## Quarterly Update (Continued):

b) Commercial IGS Tables \& Graphs

RWT Commercial IGS
Rating \& Vintage
(by market value in $\$$ millions)
(at March 31, 2007)


| IGS |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | :--- | :--- | ---: |
| AAA | $\$ 0$ | $\$ 9$ | $\$ 0$ | $\$ 0$ | $\$ 9$ |
| AA | 4 | - | - | - | 4 |
| A | 19 | 5 | - | - | 24 |
| BBB + | 4 | 7 | - | - | 11 |
| BBB | 9 | 22 | - | - | 31 |
| BBB- | 17 | 18 | 2 | - | 37 |
| Total | $\$ 53$ | $\$ 61$ | $\$ 2$ | $\$ 0$ | $\$ 116$ |

RWT Commercial IGS
(market value in \$ millions)


RWT Commercial IGS Vintage
(at March 31, 2007)


RWT Commercial IGS
(by rating)
(at March 31, 2007)


## COMMERCIAL REVIEW

Commercial Real Estate Securities and Loans

## Quarterly Update (Continued):

c) Commercial Credit-Enhancement Securities
> Our commercial CES decreased by $\$ 13$ million (or $3 \%$ ) in the first quarter. Acquisitions were $\$ 3$ million, commercial CES upgrades to IGS were $\$ 4$ million, and market value depreciation was $\$ 12$ million. There were no sales during the quarter.
> Interest income generated by commercial CES was $\$ 10$ million for the first quarter. The yield for the quarter was $9.52 \%$, an increase from $8.97 \%$ in the previous quarter. The level of current yield we recognize on these assets is largely a function of the amount and timing of our future credit loss assumptions. All of our commercial CES pay fixed monthly coupon rates of interest.
> For the first quarter of 2007, the market value of our commercial CES declined by $\$ 12$ million as market spreads widened. This decrease was recognized on our balance sheet and not through our income statement.
> During April 2007, Moody's announced it was revising its credit rating standards on commercial CES, effectively increasing capital required to credit-enhance future CMBS transactions through higher subordination levels. The other two rating agencies, S\&P and Fitch, are also expected to increase subordination levels somewhat for commercial securitizations. The revised credit standards address the perceived erosion of protection to CMBS investors due to aggressive underwriting on underlying commercial mortgages. As a long-term investor in commercial CES, we expect this change will have a positive effect on our ability to invest profitably in future CMBS transactions. However, tougher ratings criteria may reduce market valuations on our existing investments.
> Our GAAP credit reserves for commercial CES were $\$ 294$ million ( $\$ 10.85$ per share) at March 31, 2007, or $0.51 \%$ of underlying loan balances. Credit reserves decreased by $\$ 1$ million upon realization of an anticipated credit loss that occurred during the quarter. The credit performance of our commercial CES securities remains strong. Credit losses on this portfolio to date total less than one basis point ( $0.1 \%$ ).
> Most of our commercial CES ( $\$ 311$ million or $71 \%$ ) are in a second-loss or more senior position in the securitization and thus are protected from initial credit losses within the underlying loan pool. For the remaining $\$ 124$ million of securities that are in a direct first loss position, $44 \%$ share losses with other CES investors.
> For loans underlying CES, serious delinquencies at March 31, 2007 were $\$ 78$ million, an increase of $\$ 14$ million from the previous quarter. These delinquencies were $0.14 \%$ of current balances at quarter-end versus $0.24 \%$ for the industry. We expect that our delinquency rates will not stay at such low levels over time. Of the $\$ 78$ million in serious delinquencies, $\$ 57$ million are contained within one security that we deemed impaired during a prior period. We currently have a zero cost basis in this security, with no risk of future write downs affecting our income statement.

## COMMERCIAL REVIEW

Commercial Real Estate Securities and Loans

## Quarterly Update (Continued):

> For tax purposes, realized credit losses were $\$ 0.4$ million. This deduction is less than the principal value losses incurred on the underlying loans of $\$ 1.3$ million, as we own most of our commercial CES at a tax basis that is substantially less than par (principal) value.
> At March 31, 2007, $\$ 196$ million (or 45\%) commercial CES were funded with Redwood capital and $\$ 239$ million (or $55 \%$ ) were financed through our Acacia CDO program. We are currently planning to complete a CRE CDO transaction in 2008 to finance many of the commercial CES assets we are now funding with capital. In the interim, we are seeking financing facilities for our unsecuritized commercial CES that would allow us to recycle some of the Redwood capital currently employed by these assets.
> Additional information on commercial CES can be found in Tables 9, 10, 15, 16, and 18 of the Appendix.
d) Commercial CES Tables \& Graphs

## RWT Commercial CES

Rating \& Vintage
(by market value in $\$$ millions)
(at March 31, 2007)

```
\(<=2004 \quad 2005 \quad 2006 \quad 2007\) Total
```

| CES |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| BB + | $\$ 15$ | $\$ 22$ | $\$ 40$ | $\$ 0$ | $\$ 77$ |
| BB | 30 | 21 | 34 | 0 | 85 |
| BB- | 4 | 22 | 34 | 0 | 60 |
| B+ | 2 | 7 | 18 | 0 | 27 |
| B | 2 | 10 | 21 | 0 | 33 |
| B- | 2 | 7 | 19 | 0 | 28 |
| CCC | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| NR | 14 | 41 | 65 | 0 | 121 |
| Total CES | $\$ 73$ | $\$ 131$ | $\$ 232$ | $\$ 0$ | $\$ 435$ |

RWT Commercial CES
(market value in \$ millions)


## COMMERCIAL REVIEW

Commercial Real Estate Securities and Loans

## Quarterly Update (Continued):

RWT Commercial CES
Portfolio Delinquency by Vintage
(at March 31, 2007)


Source: Trepp
(by rating)
(at March 31, 2007)

RWT Commercial CES
Property Type Distribution
(at March 31, 2007)


RWT Commercial CES Geographic Distribution
(at March 31, 2007)


## Quarterly Update (Continued):

e) Commercial Loans
$>$ Our commercial loan portfolio decreased by $\$ 2$ million (or $8 \%$ ) to $\$ 26$ million in the first quarter as a result of a write-down of a mezzanine loan investment. There were no acquisitions or sales during the quarter. With the write-off of this investment, all of our remaining commercial loan investments on our GAAP books are b-notes, which are the junior portion of a commercial loan that has been restructured to create a senior and a junior ownership investment in that loan.
$>$ Our mezzanine loan investment was part of the financing on a residential condominium conversion project. This loan accrued interest but did not require payment until completion of the project and subsequent sale of the condominium units. During the quarter, we fully reserved against the outstanding principal balance of this loan based upon our updated cash flow assumptions. These assumptions reflect the softening residential condominium market, cost increases required to complete the project, and our subordinate position in the principal repayment structure. This mezzanine loan investment was the remaining part of a broader distressed asset investment we made at a discounted price in 2003. The other assets we acquired at that time paid off profitably during prior quarters.
$>$ Commercial b-note loan investments did not change during the quarter. One b-note loan was downgraded by a credit rating agency from BBB- to BB+ in March 2007; however, this loan is still current and is performing as expected.
$>$ Of our $\$ 26$ million b-note investments, $99 \%$ are financed through Acacia CDO securitizations.
$>$ Additional information on our commercial loans can be found in Tables 9, 10, 15, and 17 of the Appendix.

Commercial Real Estate Securities and Loans

## Quarterly Update (Continued):

f) Commercial Loan Charts

RWT Commercial B-Note
Property Type Distribution
(by market value)
(at March 31, 2007)


RWT Commercial B-Note Geographic Distribution
(by market value) (at March 31, 2007)


## CDO Securities

## What is this?

We invest in securities issued from collateralized debt obligation (CDO) securities sponsored by third parties. Typically, the collateral pool underlying these securities consists of a mixture of residential and commercial investment-grade and near investmentgrade securities.

## Highlights

- Our total investment in CDO securities increased 10\% during the first quarter, from $\$ 246$ million to $\$ 270$ million as a result of $\$ 35$ million acquisitions offset by principal pay downs of $\$ 0.4$ million and market value decreases totaling $\$ 11$ million.
- Of our total investment in CDO assets of $\$ 270$ million, $\$ 254$ million ( $94 \%$ ) were investment-grade rated securities and $\$ 16$ million (6\%) were below investment-grade credit-enhancement securities (CDO equity).
- Recently, spreads on CDO securities have widened dramatically, reducing asset prices. Many CDOs are backed by collateral pools containing high concentrations of 2006vintage subprime securities rated BBB and BBB-. As a result of expected poor subprime performance, many such CDO securities will likely experience credit rating downgrades and credit losses.
- Although the market value of our CDO assets has declined, we have generally avoided investing in transactions backed by heavy concentrations of the types of assets that now appear to be most at risk. Our CDO assets continue to perform well. We remain diligent in our monitoring of these assets and we will take action to sell underperforming assets where appropriate.
- The CDO markets are currently experiencing price dislocations and swelling inventories of bonds and collateral. Liquidity is poor, as many investors have stopped buying CDO bonds. The volume of new issuance is expected to drop rapidly.
- As subprime losses are realized, we expect that turmoil within the CDO markets will increase. We are directing additional resources towards evaluating acquisitions of CDO assets, as we believe selected acquisition opportunities are attractive now and may become more so in the future.


## CDO Securities

## Quarterly Update:

## a) CDO Investment-Grade Securities

$>$ Our CDO IGS portfolio increased by $13 \%$, from $\$ 224$ million to $\$ 254$ million, in the first quarter of 2007. This increase was the result of acquisitions of $\$ 35$ million, offset by principal pay downs of $\$ 0.4$ million and market value decreases of $\$ 10$ million.
> Interest income generated by the CDO IGS portfolio during the first quarter was $\$ 3.9$ million, an increase of $16 \%$ over the $\$ 3.3$ million generated in the fourth quarter of 2006. The yield for the first quarter was $6.70 \%$, consistent with the previous quarter, as LIBOR rates have remained relatively stable. Substantially all of these assets earn a floating rate of interest based on the LIBOR interest rate.
> We have never incurred a principal loss on a CDO IGS security and we do not currently have credit reserves for these assets.
$>$ At March 31, 2007, we had a total of $\$ 254$ million CDO IGS. Of this amount, $\$ 191$ million was financed via securitization in our Acacia CDO program. We funded $\$ 20$ million CDO IGS assets with capital with the remaining $\$ 43$ million currently financed in warehouse facilities as they await future re-securitization.
$>$ We use interest rate agreements to reduce mismatches of interest rate characteristics between the fixed-rate CDO IGS we own and the floating-rate CDO securities issued by Acacia to finance these assets.

## CDO Securities

## Quarterly Update (Continued):

b) CDO IGS Tables \& Graphs

RWT CDO IGS
(by market value in $\$$ millions)


RWT CDO IGS Composition by CDO Type
(as a percentage of total market value)
(at March 31, 2007)


RWT CDO IGS
Ratings Distribution
(by market value)
(at March 31, 2007)


RWT Mezzanine CDO IGS
(vintage exposure by rating) (at March 31, 2007)


| Rating | 2005 \& Before | $\mathbf{2 0 0 6}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 7}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| AAA | $55 \%$ | $26 \%$ | $19 \%$ |
| AA | $77 \%$ | $23 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| A | $59 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $24 \%$ |
| BBB | $78 \%$ | $8 \%$ | $14 \%$ |

## CDO Securities

## Quarterly Update (Continued):

c) CDO Credit-Enhancement Securities
> Our CDO CES portfolio decreased during the first quarter by $\$ 6$ million or $26 \%$ over the fourth quarter of 2006 to $\$ 16$ million.
> We did not acquire additional CDO CES in the quarter and the decrease of $\$ 6$ million was predominately due a $\$ 5$ million bond being upgraded from BB to BBB and moving out of the CDO CES portfolio and into our CDO IGS portfolio. An additional $\$ 0.7$ million decrease was due to mark-to-market adjustments on these securities based on spread widening for the quarter.
> Interest income generated by CDO CES was $\$ 0.5$ million for the first quarter. The yield for the quarter was $10.84 \%$, a decline over the previous quarter's yield of $11.67 \%$. The underlying securities supporting our CES CDO investments continue to perform well.
> We did not incur credit losses on CDO CES in the first quarter and we have no credit reserves for these assets.
> At March 31, 2007, $\$ 12$ million of CDO CES was financed via our Acacia CDO program and $\$ 4$ million was financed with capital.

## d) CDO CES Tables \& Graphs

RWT CDO CES
Ratings Distribution
(by market value)
(at March 31, 2007)


## RWT CDO CES

(by market value)
(at March 31, 2007)


## What is this?

Our capital base includes equity plus $\$ 100$ million junior subordinated notes (trust preferreds).
We use capital to fund operations and working capital, to fund investments in illiquid or credit-sensitive assets, and to meet lender capital requirements with respect to the collateralized borrowings we undertake. We also hold capital as a reserve to meet liquidity needs that may arise.
Through our internal risk-adjusted capital policies, we estimate the amount of capital we need to manage our current book of business, and set aside a prudent level of reserve capital. Any capital that exceeds our risk-adjusted capital guideline amount is excess capital that can be used to support business growth.

## Highlights

- We had $\$ 114$ million excess capital at March 31, 2007, a decrease from $\$ 182$ million at the beginning of the quarter. We expect excess capital to increase to approximately $\$ 140$ million to $\$ 170$ million by the end of May, in part because we expect to complete a Sequoia securitization.
- We anticipated net capital absorption of $\$ 200$ million to $\$ 400$ million for 2007 . At this point, the outlook for capital absorption is uncertain due to market turmoil. Given our current acquisition plans, it is possible that we will finish the year at the lower end of that range.
- Our current plan is to continue to invest in new assets but also to hold some excess capital in reserve to fund several quarters of future acquisitions. To accomplish both of these objectives to their full extent, we may need to raise additional capital (long-term debt or equity) in 2007 and may also take advantage of opportunities to recycle capital currently employed on our balance sheet through re-securitizations and other secure financings.


## CAPITAL REVIEW

## Capital

## RWT Capital



## Quarterly Update:

> Excess capital declined by $\$ 68$ million during the quarter. In the first quarter, uses of capital included new asset acquisitions ( $\$ 182$ million) and dividends ( $\$ 21$ million). Sources of capital included asset sales (\$39 million), principal payments (\$64 million), and equity issuance ( $\$ 24$ million). Other elements, including cash from earnings, the (relatively small) effect on excess capital of market value declines, and changes in financings netted to an increase of $\$ 8$ million of available capital for the quarter.
> Capital employed decreased slightly in the first quarter from $\$ 914$ million to $\$ 910$ million.
> Some of the capital utilized during the quarter is currently used on a temporary basis in an inefficient manner to fund assets that would be more efficiently financed with debt or via securitization or to fund delinquent loans from called Sequoia securitizations. Over time, we will employ this capital more efficiently, freeing capital to support future growth.
> Market declines did not have a large effect on excess capital, since, for the most part, asset value declines result in an equal reduction of both total capital and also of capital required under our internal risk-adjusted capital guidelines.
> Our total capital base decreased by $\$ 79$ million during the quarter, from $\$ 1.1$ billion to $\$ 1.0$ billion, due to $\$ 99$ million market value declines for assets and derivatives that were recorded for GAAP. We estimate that if we had reported our Acacia ABS issued at market value, our book value at March 31, 2007 would have been higher than reported by $\$ 41$ million (or $\$ 1.51$ per share). Market value changes to our liabilities (and market value changes for certain other assets) are not recognized for GAAP purposes and we do not include them in our capital calculations. In any event, changes in market values of any of these assets or liabilities generally have little effect on our cash flows.

## Redwood Debt

## What is this?

Redwood debt is all the debt incurred by Redwood Trust, with the exception of junior subordinated notes that we count as part of our capital base.

## Graph

Redwood Debt Cost of Funds


## Redwood Debt

## Quarterly Update:

$>$ Redwood debt balances started and finished the first quarter of 2007 at $\$ 1.9$ billion.
$>$ At March 31, 2007, Redwood debt funded $\$ 0.9$ billion residential whole loans and $\$ 1.0$ billion securities.
> The cost of funds for Redwood's debt was $5.68 \%$ for the first quarter and $6.06 \%$ for the fourth quarter. Interest expense for Redwood debt was $\$ 31$ million for the first quarter. Our debt expense varies by the rate of short-term interest rates, the type of facility used, and the type of collateral financed.
$>$ At March 31, 2007, all Redwood debt was short-term debt collateralized by the pledge of assets. Maturities are generally one year or less, and the interest rate usually adjusts to market levels each month.
> When we fund fixed-rate or hybrid-rate assets with Redwood debt, we may use interest rate agreements to reduce the interest rate mismatch between the asset and the liability.
$>$ Commercial paper borrowings under our Madrona program are rated the highest CP rating of A1+/P1 and represent our lowest cost borrowings. At March 31, 2007, CP outstanding was $\$ 250$ million. We expect to use CP more extensively in the future.
> Redwood's debt obligations of $\$ 2.0$ billion (including $\$ 100$ million of junior subordinated notes) were 2.1 times Redwood's equity of $\$ 924$ million at March 31, 2007.

## Acacia CDO ABS Issued

## What is this?

We finance a majority of our investments in securities using proceeds from collateralized debt obligation (CDO) securitizations. We sell a diverse pool of our residential, commercial, and CDO real estate securities (primarily rated investment-grade or $B B$ ) to an independent securitization entity (typically called Acacia) that creates CDO securities. The newly created CDO ABS securities that are rated investment-grade are sold to third-party investors. Redwood earns ongoing asset management fees for managing the Acacia entities. In addition, Redwood acquires most of the CDO CES that Acacia creates. By acquiring Acacia CDO CES, Redwood earns the net interest income created when the yield on the assets in the Acacia collateral pool exceeds the interest payments required and made to the buyers of the CDO ABS securities Acacia has sold. Acacia CDO ABS are not obligations of Redwood Trust. However, they are shown on our consolidated balance sheet as part of $A B S$ issued liabilities.

## Highlights

- We believe we should be able to benefit from the current turmoil in the new issuance market for CDO securities. Our competitive advantages in the CDO business include a large permanent capital base, the ability to acquire and hold CDO CES, a well-developed real estate investment infrastructure, access to collateral, access to warehouse and other inventory financings, a strong track record, and a good reputation.
- In addition, given our modeling and collateral evaluation capabilities, in the current environment we believe we will be able to source an new opportunities to invest in CDO assets issued from securitizations sponsored by others.

Acacia CDO ABS Issued and Outstanding
(face value in $\$$ billions)


Acacia CDO ABS Issued Ratings Distribution (at March 31, 2007)


## Acacia Collateral Rating History

| As of 3/31/07 | Acacia 4 | Acacia 5 | $\begin{gathered} \text { Acacia } \\ 6 \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | Acacia 7 | $\begin{gathered} \text { Acacia } \\ 8 \end{gathered}$ | Acacia CRE 1 | Acacia 9 | $\begin{gathered} \text { Acacia } \text { Acacia } \\ 10 \quad 11 \end{gathered}$ |  | AllAcaciasthru Mar07 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Upqrades | 47 | 48 | 22 | 7 | 7 | 5 | 7 | 4 | 2 | 149 |
| Downarades | 1 | - | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | 4 |
| Positive | 6 | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 7 |
| Negat ive | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Watch Up/down | 47 to 1 | 48 to 0 | 22 to 0 | 7 to 1 | 7 to 1 | 5 to 1 | 7 to 0 | 4 to 0 | 2 to 0 | 149 to 4 |

## CDO Market Issuance

(by deal type)

*Source - Merrill Lych - CDO issuance represents HG SF, Mezzanine SF and CRE CDO transactions HG SF - High Grade Structure Finance transactions, Mezz SF - Mezzanine Structured Finance transactions, and CRE - Commercial Real Estate CDO transactions

ABS ISSUED

## Acacia CDO ABS Issued

## Quarterly Update:

> Acacia CDO ABS outstanding increased from $\$ 2.3$ billion to $\$ 2.8$ billion during the first quarter of 2007, an increase of 19\%. Acacia issued one new CDO ABS during the quarter, Acacia 11, which experienced very good investor participation and attractive funding costs for Redwood. Paydowns of Acacia CDO securities were $\$ 44$ million for the first quarter.
> In April, we priced Acacia Option ARM CDO 1, and we expect to close this $\$ 500$ million transaction in May. These CDO bonds priced at wider spreads (higher cost of funds) than Acacia 11 and consequently the CDO CES securities Redwood acquired from this transaction will likely have lower returns than initially expected. Since we have acquired and continue to acquire investment-grade rated option ARM-backed assets at wide spreads as collateral for this transaction, we still expect to earn attractive returns on our investment in the CDO CES from this transaction (even though some of the collateral we acquired for this transaction was accumulated in a tighter spread environment and we have had to mark down the value of these assets for GAAP reporting).
$>$ We currently expect to price an additional $\$ 500$ million CDO bonds in the second quarter. While our cost of funds for this transaction will not be known until pricing, we expect that our economics on this transaction will be favorable if we can price at today's spreads (which already reflect substantial illiquidity and turmoil in the CDO markets), although it is possible that the transaction could be priced with wider spreads less favorable to Redwood, delayed, or even cancelled due unfavorable market conditions.
$>$ Spreads have widened (yields increased) for both collateral assets and CDO liabilities. We believe the resulting spread that can be earned for new assets and new liabilities is attractive, although there is substantial uncertainty as to where CDO liabilities will actually price.
$>$ The cost of funds of issued Acacia CDO ABS was $6.20 \%$ in the first quarter of 2007 as compared to $6.08 \%$ for the fourth quarter of 2006. Interest expense, net of interest rate agreements, for Acacia ABS issued was $\$ 39$ million for the first quarter of 2007.
$>$ At March 31, 2007, the credit ratings for Acacia bonds outstanding were $\$ 2.2$ billion AAA, $\$ 292$ million AA, $\$ 172$ million A, and $\$ 151$ million BBB. In addition, Acacia has sold a portion of its unrated CDO CES (CDO equity) to third parties, of which $\$ 21$ million was outstanding at March 31, 2007.
$>$ Our collateral rating history continues to be strong. To date, we have had 149 rating upgrades and four rating downgrades on all collateral within the existing Acacia program.
$>$ Relative to most other real estate CDO programs, Acacia has limited subprime risk. We have concentrated our subprime investments for Acacia collateral in AA and A rated securities, with limited exposure to BBB and BBB- rated securities from recent vintages. We sold some assets that appeared they might under-perform and losses related to

## Quarterly Update (Continued):

these sales were de minimis. Overall, we believe Acacia's CDO bonds are likely to perform well for their investors, on an absolute basis and also relative to other CDO bonds. This should allow us to continue to use the sale of Acacia bonds as a form of financing except in the most difficult markets.
$>$ The Acacia CDO CES Redwood has acquired from Acacia had a market value of \$135 million at March 31, 2007. Redwood's economic risk with respect to Acacia's assets and liabilities is generally limited to our cost basis in these assets, which at March 31, 2007 totaled $\$ 82$ million. For accounting purposes, we account for Acacia transactions as financings, so the assets owned by Acacia are consolidated with our assets and the CDO bonds issued by Acacia are consolidated with our liabilities. As a result, the Acacia CDO CES securities we issue and then acquire do not appear on our GAAP balance sheet, but rather are implicitly represented as the excess of consolidated Acacia assets over consolidated Acacia liabilities.
$>$ For GAAP balance sheet purposes, we mark-to-market most of the assets and derivatives owned by the Acacia entities, but none of Acacia's liabilities. For GAAP purposes, if market values for Acacia's $\$ 2.8$ billion assets declined sufficiently, we could be required to record balance sheet charges in excess of the total maximum economic amount ( $\$ 82$ million) that Redwood actually has invested. Conversely, we would not be permitted to reflect an offsetting improvement in Acacia liability MTM results in our GAAP financials. None of these market value changes would affect the cash flows we expect to earn from our Acacia investments, however. The net balance sheet market value markdown for assets and derivatives in closed Acacia transactions was \$49 million for the first quarter.
$>$ For managing the outstanding Acacia transactions, Redwood's taxable asset management subsidiaries earned $\$ 1.2$ million asset management fees in the first quarter of 2007. This income was sourced from the assets owned by Acacia, and these assets are consolidated on our GAAP balance sheet, for GAAP purposes so we currently include this asset management income as part of the interest income generated by those assets.
$>$ Additional information about Acacia CDO ABS issued can be found in Table 21 of the Appendix.

## ABS ISSUED

## Sequoia ABS Issued

## What is this?

We finance a portion of our residential whole loans by securitizing them. We sell loans to an independent securitization entity (typically called Sequoia) that creates and issues asset-backed securities (ABS) backed by these loans. Most of the investment-grade rated Sequoia ABS are sold to third party investors. Redwood usually acquires most of the credit-enhancement securities (CES) and the interest-only securities (IO) that Sequoia creates, as well as a portion of Sequoia's investment-grade securities. When Redwood acquires Sequoia IO, we earn the net interest income created when the yield on Sequoia's loans exceeds cost of funds of Sequoia ABS issued. Sequoia ABS are not obligations of Redwood Trust, although they are shown on our consolidated balance sheet as part of ABS issued liabilities.

## Highlights

- We completed one Sequoia securitization in the first quarter and have priced another Sequoia securitization that will close in May.
- Recent Sequoia ABS debt issued has been backed by prime hybrid mortgages, as prime ARMs have gone out of favor.
- We called an older Sequoia transaction that was issued in 2004 and we expect to call more transactions in 2007 and 2008.
- We expect to expand our residential conduit's activities and commence acquiring alt-a and subprime loans to be funded primarily through securitization.


## Graph

Total Sequoia ABS Outstanding


## Sequoia ABS Issued

## Quarterly Update:

$>$ Sequoia ABS outstanding decreased from $\$ 7.7$ billion to $\$ 7.2$ billion in the first quarter, a decline of $6 \%$. The primary reason for the decline in the outstanding balance was fast prepayment speeds on the underlying Sequoia loans. In the first quarter, the CPR for the loans owned by Sequoia entities was $37 \%$.
$>$ We completed one securitization during the first quarter, financing $\$ 885$ million prime hybrid mortgages. In conjunction with the securitization, Sequoia issued $\$ 850$ million AAA-rated ABS debt and another $\$ 25$ million of investment-grade ABS debt. The ABS debt had similar interest rate characteristics to the underlying loans, thus minimizing our interest rate risk. The cost of funds on the newly issued ABS debt was $5.91 \%$.
$>$ We called and retired $\$ 0.3$ billion ABS debt associated with a Sequoia securitization issued in early 2004. When we exercise the call option, Redwood acquires all the ABS debt that remains outstanding at the par value. This debt is canceled, the Sequoia entity is collapsed, and Redwood reacquires the underlying loans.
$>$ Interest expense for Sequoia ABS issued was $\$ 96$ million for the first quarter for a cost of funds of $5.60 \%$.
$>$ Redwood's economic risk with respect to Sequoia's assets and liabilities is generally limited to the value of Sequoia ABS we have acquired, which included $\$ 21$ million market value IO securities rated AAA, $\$ 88$ million CES, and $\$ 76$ million investmentgrade securities at March 31, 2007. For GAAP accounting purposes, we account for Sequoia transactions as financings, so the assets owned by Sequoia are consolidated with our assets and the ABS bonds issued by Sequoia are consolidated with our liabilities. As a result, the Sequoia ABS we acquire do not appear on our GAAP balance sheet, but rather are implicitly represented as the excess of consolidated Sequoia assets over consolidated Sequoia liabilities.
$>$ Total ABS issued on our March 31, 2007 balance sheet included $\$ 7.2$ billion Sequoia ABS, $\$ 2.7$ billion Acacia CDO ABS, and $\$ 5$ million ABS issued by our Madrona CP issuance facility.
$>$ Additional information about Sequoia ABS issued can be found in Tables 19 and 20 of the Appendix.

## Glossary

NOTE: All companies and analysts do not calculate non-GAAP measures in the same fashion. As a result, certain measures as calculated by Redwood may not be comparable to similarly titled measures reported by other companies.

## ACACIA

Acacia is the brand name for the collateralized debt obligation (CDO) securitizations Redwood sponsors. The underlying pool of assets for these CDO securitizations consists primarily of investment-grade and the more senior of the below investment-grade rated securities backed by residential prime, residential subprime, and commercial real estate loans. Acacia also owns related assets such as CDO securities issued by other real estate oriented CDOs, corporate debt issued by equity REITs, commercial real estate loans, and synthetic assets derived from commercial real estate assets. Redwood typically acquires a portion of the CDO creditenhancement (or "equity") securities issued by Acacia; these are the securities that are in the firstloss (highest risk) position with respect to absorbing any credit losses that may occur within the assets owned by the Acacia entities. Redwood also earns asset management fees for ongoing management of the Acacia entities.

## ADJUSTABLE-RATE MORTGAGES (ARMs)

Adjustable-rate mortgages are loans that have coupons that adjust at least once per year. We make a distinction between ARMs (loans with a rate adjustment at least annually) and hybrids (loans that have a fixed-rate period of 3 to 10 years and then become adjustable rate).

## ALT-A SECURITIES

Alt-a securities are residential mortgage-backed securities backed by loans that have higher credit quality than subprime and lower credit quality than prime. Alt-a originally represented loans with alternative documentation, but the definition has shifted over time to include loans with additional risk characteristics and a higher percentage of investor loans. For example, the borrower's income may not be verified, and in some cases, may not be disclosed on the loan application. Expanded criteria also allows for higher debt-to-income ratios with higher accompanying LTV than otherwise would be permissible for prime loans.

## ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES (ABS)

Securities backed by financial assets that generate cash flows. Each ABS security issued from an asset-backed securitization entity has a unique priority with respect to receiving principal and interest cash flows from the assets owned by the entity.

## BOOK VALUE

Book value is the value of our common equity. As measured for GAAP, reported book value generally incorporates mark-to-market adjustments for securities and interest rate agreements, but not for loans or liabilities.

## COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS (CDO)

ABS securities issued from the securitization of a diverse pool of assets. See "Acacia".

## APPENDIX

## Glossary

## CDO EQUITY SECURITIES

CDO equity securities (or CDO CES) are credit-enhancement securities that bear the initial credit losses of the assets owned by CDO securitization entities.

## COMMERCIAL B-NOTE LOANS

Commercial $b$-note loans are structured loans that are subordinated to the more senior portions of loans secured by the same income-producing commercial real estate.

## COMMERCIAL MEZZANINE LOANS

Commercial mezzanine loans are junior subordinated loans that are not secured by a lien on income-producing commercial real estate; rather, they are secured by a pledge from an equity entity of its equity interests in the property.

## COMMERCIAL WHOLE LOANS

Commercial whole loans are unsecuritized first-lien loans that are secured by income-producing commercial real estate.

## CONDUIT

An entity that acquires closed loans from originators, accumulates loans over a period, and sells these loans, seeking to generate a gain on sale. Sales are usually made via securitization, but also can be made through bulk whole loan sales.

## CORE EARNINGS

Core earnings is not a measure of earnings in accordance with GAAP. In calculating core earnings, we attempt to strip some of the elements out of GAAP earnings that are temporary, one-time, or non-economic in nature, or that primarily relate to the past with little relevance to the future. In calculating core earnings, we are trying to show the trend of underlying ongoing earnings. We exclude realized gains (and losses) resulting from asset sales and calls that are included in income. We sell assets from time to time as part of our ongoing portfolio management activities. These sales can produce material gains and losses that could obscure the underlying trend of our long-term portfolio earnings. Similarly, we exclude gains from calls of residential credit-enhancement securities, as these are essentially sales of assets that produce a highly variable stream of income that may obscure some underlying income generation trends. GAAP earnings also include mark-to-market income and expenses for certain of our assets and interest rate agreements. These are unrealized market value fluctuations, and we exclude them from core earnings.
Management believes that core earnings provide relevant and useful information regarding results from operations. This information can be used in conjunction with and in addition to GAAP measures of performance. Core earnings can be useful, in part, because market valuation adjustments on only a portion of our assets and none of our liabilities are recognized through the income statement under GAAP. Thus, GAAP valuation adjustments may not be fully indicative of changes in market values on the balance sheet as a whole and may not be a reliable guide to

## APPENDIX

## Glossary

current operating performance. Furthermore, gains or losses realized upon sales of assets vary based on portfolio management decisions; a sale of an asset for a gain or a loss may or may not affect ongoing earnings from operations. A reconciliation of core earnings to GAAP income appears in Table 2 of the Appendix.

## CORE EQUITY (CORE BOOK VALUE)

Core equity is not a measure calculated in accordance with GAAP. Core equity is GAAP equity with mark-to-market gains and losses ("accumulated other comprehensive income") excluded. GAAP equity includes mark-to-market adjustments for certain of our assets and interest rate agreements. Core equity in some ways approximates what our equity value would be if we used historical amortized cost accounting exclusively. A reconciliation of core equity to GAAP equity appears in Table 7 of the Appendix.

## CORE REIT TAXABLE INCOME

Core REIT taxable income is REIT taxable income before gains and losses on asset sales and calls and before certain other expenses such as tax deductions for stock option exercises. It represents that portion of our REIT taxable income that may be more ongoing in nature.

## CORE TAXABLE INCOME

Core taxable income is total taxable income before gains and losses on asset sales and calls and before certain other expenses such as tax deductions for stock option exercises. It represents that portion of our total taxable income that may be more ongoing in nature.

## CPR

Constant (or conditional) prepayment rate (CPR) is an industry-standard measure of the speed at which mortgage loans prepay. It approximates the annual percentage rate at which a pool of loans is paying down due to prepayments.

## CREDIT-ENHANCEMENT SECURITIES (CES)

Credit-enhancement securities (CES) absorb the initial credit losses generated by a pool of securitized assets. As a result, the more senior securities issued from that securitization are credit-enhanced (have less credit risk). Our definition of CES includes all the below investmentgrade rated bonds issued from a securitization. These securities are also referred to as subordinated securities and B-pieces. For a typical securitization of prime residential loans, there are three CES - the first-loss, second-loss, and third-loss bonds. The first-loss security takes the initial risk. If credit losses within the securitized asset pool exceed the principal value of the firstloss security, the second-loss security is at risk. If cumulative losses exceed the principal value of the first- and second-loss securities, then the third-loss security is at risk. Generally, for these securitizations, the third-loss security has a credit rating of BB, the second-loss has a credit rating of B , and the first-loss is not rated. Other types of securitizations, such as commercial, CDO, subprime residential, and some alt-a residential transactions, are structured differently. Nevertheless, the below-IGS issued from these securitizations function as credit-enhancement securities for these transactions.

## APPENDIX

## Glossary

## GAAP

Generally Accepted Accounting Principles in the United States.

## INTEREST-ONLY SECURITIES (IOs)

Interest-only securities (IOs) are specialized securities that are backed by real estate loans. They receive interest payments calculated by a formula wherein IO cash flows vary as a function of interest payments generated by the underlying loans within a securitization or as a function of the spread between the yield on the loans owned by a securitization entity and the cost of funds of the securities (ABS) issued by that entity. Typically, IO securities do not have a principal balance and they will not receive principal payments. Interest payments to IO securities usually equal the IO interest rate formula multiplied by a "notional" principal balance. The notional principal balance for an IO is typically reduced over time as the actual principal balance of the underlying pool of real estate loans pays down, thus reducing IO cash flows over time. IO cash flows are typically reduced more quickly if loan prepayments accelerate. The IO securities that Redwood has acquired from some Sequoia residential securitizations typically earn an interest amount that varies as a function of the remaining principal balance of Sequoia loans and the spread between the yield on the residential loans owned by Sequoia and the cost of the asset-backed securities issued by Sequoia.

## LEVERAGE RATIOS

We use collateralized debt to finance on a temporary basis the accumulation of inventory assets prior to sale to a securitization entity and to finance ongoing investments in high-quality loans and investment-grade securities. As we increase these investments, Redwood debt is growing, although balances are still at what would be considered by many analysts to be low levels for financial institutions. However, because of the consolidation of independent securitization entities, it appears on our GAAP consolidated financial statements that Redwood is highly leveraged, with total liabilities significantly greater than equity. The obligations of these securitization entities are not obligations of Redwood. When determining the degree of financial leverage Redwood has, traditional leverage ratios may be misleading in some respects if consolidated ABS issued from securitization entities are included as part of Redwood's obligations when calculating the ratio.

## MARK-TO-MARKET ACCOUNTING

Mark-to-market accounting uses estimated current market values of assets, liabilities, and hedges to determine balance sheet values and/or income statement revenue recognition. For instance, many of our assets currently are carried on our balance sheet at their market value rather than historical amortized cost. For our income statement, mark-to-market accounting is used for some assets and hedges, and will be used for assets if they become impaired under various accounting definitions of that term. Increasingly in the future, we expect to use mark-to-market accounting for income statement purposes for a wider variety of assets and liabilities. This will likely make quarter-to-quarter GAAP earnings trends more volatile, although core earning and taxable income will not be affected to the same degree.

## APPENDIX

## Glossary

## NEGATIVE AMORTIZATION ADJUSTABLE-RATE MORTGAGES (NEG AM ARMS, OPTION ARMS, OR MTA ARMS)

Negative amortization ARMs (neg am ARMs, option ARMs, pay option ARMs, or monthly treasury average (MTA) ARMs) are adjustable-rate mortgages that allow the borrower to choose between different payment options. One of these options allows the borrower to make a minimum payment. This minimum payment is less than the interest accrued on the mortgage during that period and, in this instance, the borrower's loan balance will increase (causing negative amortization of the loan balance).

## NET INTEREST MARGIN SECURITIES

Net interest margin securities (NIMs) are securities backed by cash flows that otherwise would be payable to the residual security. Through a new securitization, cash flows are diverted from the residual to amortize the NIM principal in addition to paying a coupon on the NIM. Since NIMs receive cash flows immediately or soon after securitization and tend to have short-averaged lives, they are rated by a rating agency. Rating can range from AAA down to single-B. NIMs are mostly an interest only (IO) security because residuals (which back the NIMs) are mostly an IO security. Effectively, the IO-like cash flow is transformed into coupon and principal payments on the NIM.

## OPTION ARMS

See negative amortization adjustable-rate mortgages.

## PRIME RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE LOANS

Prime loans are residential loans with high-quality characteristics such as borrowers with high FICO credit scores, lower loan-to-value ratios, lower debt-to-income ratios, greater reserves, and more documentation.

## PRIME SECURITIES

Prime securities are residential mortgage-backed securities backed by high credit, quality loans, generally with balances greater than conforming loan limits. Prime securities are typically backed by loans that have relatively high weighted average FICO scores ( 700 or higher), low weighted averages LTVs ( $75 \%$ or less), limited concentrations of investor properties, and low percentages of loans with low FICO or high LTV.

## PROFITABILITY RATIOS

Many financial institution analysts use asset-based profitability ratios such as interest rate spread and interest rate margin in their work analyzing financial institutions. These are asset-based measures. Because we consolidate the assets and liabilities of securitization entities for GAAP purposes, our total GAAP assets and liabilities may vary strongly over time, and may not be comparable in economic reality to assets typically used in these calculations for other financial institutions. As a result, we believe equity-based profitability ratios may be more appropriate than asset-based measures for some analyses of Redwood's operations. We believe, for example, that net interest income as a percentage of equity is a useful measure of profitability. For operating

## APPENDIX

## Glossary

expenses, we believe useful measures are operating efficiency ratio (operating expenses as a percentage of net interest income) and operating expenses as a percentage of equity.

## REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUST (REIT)

An entity that makes a tax election to be taxed as a REIT, invests in real estate assets, and meets other REIT qualifications. By meeting certain tests, including the distribution as dividends of at least $90 \%$ of REIT taxable income, profits are not taxed at the corporate level for a REIT to the extent that these profits are distributed as dividends to stockholders. This provides an operating cost savings, as most profits are not taxed at the entity level. On the other hand, the requirement to pay out as dividends most of the REIT profits means it can be harder for a REIT to grow if using only internally-generated funds (as opposed to issuing new stock).

## REDWOOD DEBT

Redwood debt is all the debt that is an obligation of Redwood, with the exception of junior subordinated notes that we treat as part of our capital base. We obtain this debt from a variety of Wall Street firms, banks, and other institutions. As another form of Redwood debt, we issue collateralized commercial paper.

## REIT RETAINED TAXABLE INCOME

REIT retained taxable income is not a measure calculated in accordance with GAAP. REIT retained taxable income is the taxable income earned at the REIT after dividend distributions to our shareholders, less corporate income taxes and excise taxes paid at the REIT level. A reconciliation of REIT retained taxable income to GAAP income appears in Table 3 of the Appendix.

## REIT SUBSIDIARY

A REIT subsidiary is a subsidiary of a REIT that is taxed as a REIT.

## REIT TAXABLE INCOME

REIT taxable income is not a measure calculated in accordance with GAAP. REIT taxable income is pre-tax income calculated for tax purposes at Redwood including only its qualified REIT subsidiaries (excluding its taxable subsidiaries). REIT taxable income is an important measure as it is the basis of our dividend distributions to shareholders. We must distribute at least $90 \%$ of REIT taxable income as dividends to shareholders over time. As a REIT, we are not subject to corporate income taxes on the REIT taxable income we distribute. We pay income tax on the REIT taxable income we retain (we can retain up to $10 \%$ of the total). A reconciliation of REIT taxable income to GAAP income appears in Table 3 of the Appendix.

## RESIDUALS

Residuals are first-loss securities that are not rated by a rating agency. Residuals are called such because they get the last (or residual) claim on the cash flow from a securitization after ABS debt interest expense, losses, and servicing have been deducted from the interest due on the underlying mortgage loans. The value of residual securities can vary greatly and is highly

## Glossary

dependent on prepayment speeds. The value is also dependent on the level and timing of credit losses, but often is not as sensitive to losses as it is to prepayment speeds. These securities perform poorly when prepayments are fast and losses are higher than expected.

## RETURN ON EQUITY (ROE) AND ADJUSTED RETURN ON EQUITY

ROE is the amount of profit we generate each year per dollar of equity capital. Adjusted ROE is GAAP income divided by core equity. Core equity excludes those balance sheet mark-to-market adjustments that are not included in our income statement. Thus, only those asset market value changes that are included in our income statement will affect adjusted ROE. A reconciliation of GAAP ROE to adjusted ROE appears in Table 8 of the Appendix.

## SEQUOIA

Sequoia is the brand name for most of the securitizations of residential real estate loans we have sponsored.

## SUBPRIME SECURITIES

Subprime securities are residential mortgage-backed securities backed by loans to borrowers who have impaired credit histories, but who appear to exhibit the ability to repay the current loan. Typically, these borrowers have lower credit scores and/or other credit deficiencies that prevent them from qualifying for prime or alt-a mortgages. To compensate for the greater risks and higher costs to service the loans, subprime borrowers pay higher interest rates, points, and origination fees.

Subprime borrowers typically have experienced credit problems in the past, such as late payments or bankruptcies.
Typical characteristics of subprime loan pools are:

- More than $60 \%$ of loans with FICO < 680
- Weighted average LTV over 85\%
- More than 70\% of loans with LTV over 75\%
- Loans with LTV over $80 \%$ with no mortgage insurance


## TAXABLE SUBSIDIARY

A taxable subsidiary is a subsidiary of a REIT that is not taxed as a REIT and thus pays taxes on its income. A taxable subsidiary is not limited to investing in real estate and it can choose to retain all of its after-tax profits.

## TOTAL RETAINED TAXABLE INCOME

Total retained taxable income is not a measure calculated in accordance with GAAP. Total retained taxable income is the taxable income earned at the REIT after dividend distributions to

## Glossary

our shareholders, plus all of the taxable income earned at our taxable subsidiaries, less corporate income taxes and excise taxes paid. A reconciliation of total retained taxable income to GAAP income appears in Table 3 of the Appendix.

## TOTAL TAXABLE INCOME

Total taxable income is not a measure calculated in accordance with GAAP. Total taxable income is pre-tax income for Redwood and all its subsidiaries as calculated for tax purposes. Taxable income calculations differ significantly from GAAP income calculations. The remainder of our total taxable income is income we earn in taxable subsidiaries. We pay income tax on this income and we generally retain the after-tax income at the subsidiary level. A reconciliation of total taxable income to GAAP income appears in Table 3 of the Appendix.

FINANCIAL TABLES
[This Page Intentionally Left Blank]

| Table 1: GAAP Earnings (in thousands, except per share data) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Q1:2007 |  | Q4:2006 |  | Q3:2006 |  | Q2:2006 |  | Q1:2006 |  | Q4:2005 |  | Q3:2005 |  | Q2:2005 |  | Q1:2005 |  | $\begin{array}{\|l} \text { Full Year } \\ \underline{2006} \\ \hline \end{array}$ |  | Full year $\underline{2005}$ |  |
| Interest income | \$ | 207,906 | \$ | 213,504 | \$ | 217,504 | \$ | 214,544 | \$ | 224,795 | \$ | 234,531 | \$ | 246,810 | \$ | 248,786 | \$ | 237,714 | \$ | 870,347 | \$ | 967,840 |
| Net securities discount amortization income |  | 20,268 |  | 18,665 |  | 17,842 |  | 13,234 |  | 13,245 |  | 10,971 |  | 11,523 |  | 8,049 |  | 8,908 |  | 62,986 |  | 39,451 |
| Other real estate investment interest income |  | 2,465 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Net loan premium amortization expense |  | $(11,705)$ |  | $(13,272)$ |  | $(11,232)$ |  | $(12,046)$ |  | $(11,982)$ |  | $(13,486)$ |  | $(14,507)$ |  | $(9,857)$ |  | $(7,674)$ |  | $(48,532)$ |  | $(45,524)$ |
| (Provision for) reversal of credit reserve |  | $(3,829)$ |  | $(1,506)$ |  | (465) |  | 2,506 |  | (176) |  | (877) |  | 805 |  | 1,527 |  | $(1,025)$ |  | 359 |  | 430 |
| Total GAAP interest income |  | 215,105 |  | 217,391 |  | 223,649 |  | 218,238 |  | 225,882 |  | 231,139 |  | 244,631 |  | 248,505 |  | 237,923 |  | 885,160 |  | 962,197 |
| Interest expense on Redwood debt |  | $(31,094)$ |  | $(16,520)$ |  | $(9,422)$ |  | $(1,822)$ |  | $(2,072)$ |  | $(3,521)$ |  | $(3,789)$ |  | $(1,789)$ |  | $(2,694)$ |  | $(29,836)$ |  | $(11,793)$ |
| ABS interest expense consolidated from trusts |  | $(131,392)$ |  | $(152,043)$ |  | $(165,177)$ |  | $(171,659)$ |  | $(178,183)$ |  | $(186,433)$ |  | $(190,996)$ |  | $(191,966)$ |  | $(173,146)$ |  | $(667,061)$ |  | $(742,541)$ |
| ABS issuance expense amortization |  | $(7,068)$ |  | $(7,897)$ |  | $(5,786)$ |  | $(6,079)$ |  | $(5,907)$ |  | $(6,069)$ |  | $(5,162)$ |  | $(5,386)$ |  | $(5,273)$ |  | $(25,669)$ |  | $(21,890)$ |
| ABS interest agreement income |  | 1,646 |  | 2,497 |  | 3,317 |  | 3,678 |  | 2,980 |  | 3,573 |  | 623 |  | 876 |  | 1,469 |  | 12,472 |  | 6,541 |
| ABS issuance premium amortization income |  | 1,869 |  | 1,529 |  | 2,395 |  | 2,363 |  | 2,527 |  | 2,793 |  | 2,733 |  | 3,140 |  | 3,747 |  | 8,813 |  | 12,413 |
| Total consolidated ABS expense |  | $(134,945)$ |  | $(155,914)$ |  | $(165,251)$ |  | $(171,697)$ |  | $(178,583)$ |  | $(186,136)$ |  | $(192,802)$ |  | $(193,336)$ |  | $(173,203)$ |  | $(671,445)$ |  | $(745,477)$ |
| Junior subordinated notes interest expense |  | $(2,057)$ |  | (423) |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | (423) |  |  |
| GAAP net interest income |  | 47,009 |  | 44,534 |  | 48,976 |  | 44,719 |  | 45,227 |  | 41,481 |  | 48,040 |  | 53,380 |  | 62,026 |  | 183,456 |  | 204,927 |
| Fixed compensation expense |  | $(4,616)$ |  | $(3,688)$ |  | $(3,437)$ |  | $(3,309)$ |  | $(3,437)$ |  | $(2,879)$ |  | $(2,802)$ |  | $(2,623)$ |  | $(2,778)$ |  | $(13,871)$ |  | $(11,082)$ |
| Variable compensation expense |  | $(2,251)$ |  | $(1,666)$ |  | $(2,630)$ |  | $(1,900)$ |  | $(1,514)$ |  | $(2,110)$ |  | $(1,980)$ |  | $(2,420)$ |  | $(2,240)$ |  | $(7,710)$ |  | $(8,750)$ |
| Equity compensation expense |  | $(3,349)$ |  | $(3,233)$ |  | $(2,579)$ |  | $(2,991)$ |  | $(2,694)$ |  | $(2,793)$ |  | $(2,145)$ |  | $(2,657)$ |  | $(2,214)$ |  | $(11,497)$ |  | $(9,809)$ |
| Severance expense |  | $(2,380)$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | - |  |  |  |  |
| Other operating expense |  | $(4,479)$ |  | $(4,732)$ |  | $(4,425)$ |  | $(5,150)$ |  | $(4,505)$ |  | $(4,685)$ |  | $(4,362)$ |  | $(3,639)$ |  | $(3,809)$ |  | $(18,812)$ |  | $(16,495)$ |
| Due diligence expenses |  | (707) |  | (532) |  | (384) |  | $(2,687)$ |  | (432) |  | (298) |  | $(1,075)$ |  | (117) |  | (757) |  | $(4,035)$ |  | $(2,246)$ |
| Total GAAP operating expenses |  | $(17,782)$ |  | $(13,851)$ |  | $(13,455)$ |  | $(16,037)$ |  | $(12,582)$ |  | $(12,765)$ |  | $(12,364)$ |  | $(11,456)$ |  | $(11,798)$ |  | $(55,925)$ |  | $(48,382)$ |
| Realized gains on sales |  | 303 |  | 5,308 |  | 4,968 |  | 8,239 |  | 1,062 |  | 14,815 |  | 23,053 |  | 516 |  | 8,346 |  | 19,577 |  | 46,730 |
| Realized gains on calls |  | 843 |  | 1,511 |  | 722 |  | 747 |  | - |  | 4,265 |  | 2,914 |  | 4,421 |  | 7,548 |  | 2,980 |  | 19,149 |
| Unrealized market valuation adjustments |  | $(10,264)$ |  | $(1,404)$ |  | $(5,257)$ |  | $(2,993)$ |  | $(2,932)$ |  | $(1,205)$ |  | $(1,051)$ |  | $(1,892)$ |  | (883) |  | $(12,586)$ |  | $(5,031)$ |
| Net gains and valuation adjustments |  | $(9,118)$ |  | 5,415 |  | 433 |  | 5,993 |  | $(1,870)$ |  | 17,875 |  | 24,916 |  | 3,045 |  | 15,011 |  | 9,971 |  | 60,848 |
| Provision for income taxes |  | $(1,800)$ |  | (407) |  | $(3,538)$ |  | $(3,265)$ |  | $(2,760)$ |  | $(4,097)$ |  | $(4,693)$ |  | $(4,054)$ |  | $(4,677)$ |  | $(9,970)$ |  | $(17,521)$ |
| GAAP net income | \$ | 18,309 | \$ | 35,691 | \$ | 32,416 | \$ | 31,410 | \$ | 28,015 | \$ | 42,495 | \$ | 55,899 | \$ | 40,915 | \$ | 60,563 | \$ | 127,532 | \$ | 199,872 |
| Diluted average shares |  | 27,684 |  | 27,122 |  | 26,625 |  | 26,109 |  | 25,703 |  | 25,311 |  | 25,314 |  | 25,196 |  | 25,021 |  | 26,314 |  | 25,121 |
| GAAP earnings per share | \$ | 0.66 | \$ | 1.32 | \$ | 1.22 | \$ | 1.20 | \$ | 1.09 | \$ | 1.68 | \$ | 2.21 | \$ | 1.62 | \$ | 2.42 | \$ | 4.85 | \$ | 7.96 |

APPENDIX

| Table 2: Core Earnings (in thousands, except per share data) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Q1:2007 |  | Q4:2006 |  | Q3:2006 |  | Q2:2006 |  | Q1:2006 |  | Q4:2005 |  | Q3:2005 |  | Q2:2005 |  | Q1:2005 |  | Full Year $\underline{2006}$ |  | Full Year$\underline{2005}$ |  |
| GAAP net income | \$ | 18,309 | \$ | 35,691 | \$ | 32,416 | \$ | 31,410 | \$ | 28,015 | \$ | 42,495 | \$ | 55,899 | \$ | 40,915 | \$ | 60,563 |  | 127,532 | \$ | 199,872 |
| GAAP income items not included in core earnings |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Severance expense |  | $(2,380)$ |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |
| Realized gains on sales |  | 303 |  | 5,308 |  | 4,968 |  | 8,239 |  | 1,062 |  | 14,815 |  | 23,053 |  | 516 |  | 8,346 |  | 19,577 |  | 46,730 |
| Realized gains on calls |  | 843 |  | 1,511 |  | 722 |  | 747 |  | - |  | 4,265 |  | 2,914 |  | 4,421 |  | 7,548 |  | 2,980 |  | 19,149 |
| Unrealized market valuation adjustments |  | $(10,264)$ |  | $(1,404)$ |  | $(5,257)$ |  | $(2,993)$ |  | $(2,932)$ |  | $(1,205)$ |  | $(1,051)$ |  | $(1,892)$ |  | (883) |  | $(12,586)$ |  | $(5,031)$ |
| Variable stock option market value change |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | 25 |  | 16 |  | (2) |  | 84 |  | - |  | 123 |
| Total GAAP / core earnings differences |  | $(11,498)$ |  | 5,415 |  | 433 |  | 5,993 |  | $(1,870)$ |  | 17,900 |  | 24,932 |  | 3,043 |  | 15,095 |  | 9,971 |  | 60,971 |
| Core earnings | \$ | 29,807 | \$ | 30,276 | \$ | 31,983 | \$ | 25,417 | \$ | 29,885 | \$ | 24,594 | \$ | 30,967 | \$ | 37,872 | \$ | 45,468 |  | 117,561 | \$ | 138,901 |
| Per share analysis |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GAAP earnings per share | \$ | 0.66 | \$ | 1.32 | \$ | 1.22 | \$ | 1.20 | \$ | 1.09 | \$ | 1.68 | \$ | 2.21 | \$ | 1.62 | \$ | 2.42 | \$ | 4.85 | \$ | 7.96 |
| GAAP income items not included in core earnings |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Severance expense |  | (\$0.09) | \$ | 0.00 | \$ | 0.00 | \$ | 0.00 | \$ | 0.00 | \$ | 0.00 | \$ | 0.00 | \$ | 0.00 | \$ | 0.00 | \$ | 0.00 | \$ | 0.00 |
| Realized gains on sales |  | 0.01 |  | 0.20 |  | 0.19 |  | 0.32 |  | 0.04 |  | 0.59 |  | 0.91 |  | 0.02 |  | 0.33 |  | 0.74 |  | 1.86 |
| Realized gains on calls |  | 0.03 |  | 0.05 |  | 0.03 |  | 0.03 |  | - |  | 0.17 |  | 0.12 |  | 0.18 |  | 0.30 |  | 0.11 |  | 0.76 |
| Valuation adjustments |  | (0.37) |  | (0.05) |  | (0.20) |  | (0.11) |  | (0.11) |  | (0.05) |  | (0.04) |  | (0.08) |  | (0.04) |  | (0.48) |  | (0.20) |
| Variable stock option market value change |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |
| GAAP / Core earnings differences per share |  | (\$0.42) | \$ | 0.20 | \$ | 0.02 | \$ | 0.23 |  | (\$0.07) | \$ | 0.71 | \$ | 0.98 | \$ | 0.12 | \$ | 0.60 | \$ | 0.38 | \$ | 2.43 |
| Core earnings per share | \$ | 1.08 | \$ | 1.12 | \$ | 1.20 | \$ | 0.97 | \$ | 1.16 | \$ | 0.97 | \$ | 1.22 | \$ | 1.50 | \$ | 1.82 | \$ | 4.47 | \$ | 5.53 |

프﹎APPENDIX


| Table 4: Retention and Distribution of Taxable Income (in thousands, except per share data) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Estimated |  | Estimated |  |  |  |  |  | Actual |  |  |  |  |  | Estimated Full Year $\underline{2006}$ |  | Actual Full Year $\underline{2005}$ |  |
|  | Q1:2007 |  | Q4:2006 | Q3:2006 | Q2:2006 |  | Q1:2006 |  | Q4:2005 Q3:2005 |  | Q2:2005 |  | Q1:2005 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Dividends declared | \$ | 20,347 | \$ 98,476 | \$ 18,237 | \$ | 17,967 | \$ | 17,767 | \$ 92,150 | \$ 17,335 | \$ | 17,253 | \$ | 17,160 | \$ | 152,447 |  | 143,898 |
| Dividend deduction on stock issued through DRIP |  | 660 | 812 | 177 |  | 239 |  | 176 | 263 | 128 |  | 112 |  | 56 |  | 1,404 |  | 559 |
| Total dividend deductions | \$ | 21,007 | \$ 99,288 | \$ 18,414 | \$ | 18,206 | \$ | 17,943 | \$ 92,413 | \$ 17,463 | \$ | 17,365 | \$ | 17,216 | \$ | 153,851 |  | 144,457 |
| Regular dividend per share | \$ | 0.75 | \$ 0.70 | \$ 0.70 | \$ | 0.70 | \$ | 0.70 | \$ 0.70 | \$ 0.70 | \$ | 0.70 | \$ | 0.70 | \$ | 2.80 | \$ | 2.80 |
| Special dividend per share |  | - | 3.00 | - |  | - |  | - | 3.00 | - |  | - |  | - |  | 3.00 |  | 3.00 |
| Total dividends per share | \$ | 0.75 | \$ 3.70 | \$ 0.70 | \$ | 0.70 | \$ | 0.70 | \$ 3.70 | \$ 0.70 | \$ | 0.70 | \$ | 0.70 | \$ | 5.80 |  | 5.80 |
| Undistributed REIT taxable income at beginning of period (pre-tax): | \$ | 48,909 | \$111,248 | \$ 88,257 | \$ | 65,687 |  | 51,568 | \$106,719 | \$ 80,166 | \$ | 62,218 | \$ | 37,291 | \$ | 51,568 |  | 37,291 |
| REIT taxable income (pre-tax) |  | 35,112 | 40,829 | 45,751 |  | 45,040 |  | 35,382 | 39,793 | 47,118 |  | 39,237 |  | 45,161 |  | 167,002 |  | 171,309 |
| Permanently retained (pre-tax) |  | $(3,336)$ | $(3,879)$ | $(4,346)$ |  | $(4,263)$ |  | $(3,320)$ | $(2,531)$ | $(3,102)$ |  | $(3,924)$ |  | $(3,018)$ |  | $(15,808)$ |  | $(12,575)$ |
| Dividend of 2004 income |  | - |  |  |  |  |  | - |  | $(2,710)$ |  | $(17,365)$ |  | $(17,216)$ |  |  |  | $(37,291)$ |
| Dividend of 2005 income |  | - | - | $(15,418)$ |  | $(18,207)$ |  | $(17,943)$ | $(92,413)$ | ) $(14,753)$ |  |  |  | - |  | $(51,568)$ |  | $(107,166)$ |
| Dividend of 2006 income |  | $(21,007)$ | $(99,288)$ | $(2,996)$ |  |  |  | - | - | - |  | - |  | - |  | $(102,284)$ |  |  |
| Dividend of 2007 income |  | - | - | - |  | - |  | - | - | - |  | - |  | - |  |  |  |  |
| Undistributed REIT taxable income at period end (pre-tax): | \$ | 59,678 | \$ 48,909 | \$ 111,248 | \$ | 88,257 |  | 65,687 | \$ 51,568 | \$ 106,719 | \$ | 80,166 | \$ | 62,218 | , | 48,909 |  | 51,568 |
| Undistributed REIT taxable income (pre-tax) at period end From 2004's income | \$ | - | \$ |  | \$ |  | \$ | - | \$ | \$ | \$ | 2,710 | \$ | 20,075 | \$ | - | \$ | - |
| From 2005's income |  | - | - | - |  | 15,418 |  | 33,625 | 51,568 | 106,719 |  | 77,456 |  | 42,143 |  | - |  | 51,568 |
| From 2006's income |  | 27,902 | 48,909 | 111,248 |  | 72,839 |  | 32,062 | - | - |  | - |  | - |  | 48,909 |  |  |
| From 2007's income |  | 31,776 | - | - |  | - |  | - | - | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  |  |
| Total | \$ | 59,678 | \$ 48,909 | \$ 111,248 | \$ | 88,257 |  | 65,687 | \$ 51,568 | \$ 106,719 | \$ | 80,166 | \$ | 62,218 | \$ | 48,909 |  | 51,568 |
| Shares outstanding at period end |  | 27,129 | 26,733 | 26,053 |  | 25,668 |  | 25,382 | 25,133 | 24,764 |  | 24,647 |  | 24,514 |  | 26,733 |  | 25,133 |
| Undistributed REIT taxable income (pre-tax) per share outstanding at period end | \$ | 2.20 | \$ 1.83 | \$ 4.27 | \$ | 3.44 | \$ | 2.59 | \$ 2.04 | \$ 4.31 | \$ | 3.25 | , | 2.54 | \$ | 1.83 |  | 2.05 |


| Table 5: Assets (in millions) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Q1:2007 |  | Q4:2006 |  | Q3:2006 |  | Q2:2006 |  | Q1:2006 |  | Q4:2005 |  | Q3:2005 |  | Q2:2005 |  | Q1:2005 |  |
| Residential CES owned by Redwood | \$ | 256 | \$ | 230 | \$ | 291 | \$ | 403 | \$ | 303 | \$ | 309 | \$ | 338 | \$ | 469 | \$ | 374 |
| Residential CES consolidated from Acacia |  | 496 |  | 492 |  | 424 |  | 274 |  | 292 |  | 284 |  | 305 |  | 215 |  | 214 |
| Total GAAP residential CES | \$ | 752 | \$ | 722 | \$ | 715 | \$ | 677 | \$ | 595 | \$ | 593 | \$ | 643 | \$ | 684 | \$ | 588 |
| Residential loans owned by Redwood | \$ | 1,256 | \$ | 1,339 | \$ | 520 | \$ | 351 | \$ | 87 | \$ | 45 | \$ | 17 | \$ | 300 | \$ | 256 |
| Residential loans consolidated from Sequoia |  | 7,424 |  | 7,985 |  | 9,323 |  | 10,102 |  | 11,903 |  | 13,830 |  | 16,539 |  | 19,330 |  | 21,516 |
| Total GAAP residential loans | \$ | 8,680 | \$ | 9,324 | \$ | 9,843 | \$ | 10,453 | \$ | 11,990 | \$ | 13,875 | \$ | 16,556 | \$ | 19,630 | \$ | 21,772 |
| Residential IGS owned by Redwood | \$ | 106 | \$ | 318 | \$ | 105 | \$ | 206 | \$ | 42 | \$ | 151 | \$ | 139 | \$ | 140 | \$ | 22 |
| Residential IGS consolidated from Acacia |  | 1,920 |  | 1,379 |  | 1,369 |  | 1,184 |  | 1,305 |  | 1,109 |  | 1,140 |  | 1,053 |  | 1,066 |
| Total GAAP residential IGS | \$ | 2,026 | \$ | 1,697 | \$ | 1,474 | \$ | 1,390 | \$ | 1,347 | \$ | 1,260 | \$ | 1,279 | \$ | 1,193 | \$ | 1,088 |
| Commercial CES owned by Redwood | \$ | 189 | \$ | 224 | \$ | 156 | \$ | 93 | \$ | 68 | \$ | 59 | \$ | 98 | \$ | 79 | \$ | 73 |
| Commercial CES consolidated from Acacia |  | 246 |  | 224 |  | 224 |  | 178 |  | 156 |  | 160 |  | 89 |  | 59 |  | 55 |
| Total GAAP commercial CES | \$ | 435 | \$ | 448 | \$ | 380 | \$ | 271 | \$ | 224 | \$ | 219 | \$ | 187 | \$ | 138 | \$ | 128 |
| Commercial loans owned by Redwood | \$ | 0 | \$ | 2 | \$ | 2 | \$ | 2 | \$ | 2 | \$ | 7 | \$ | 21 | \$ | 16 | \$ | 22 |
| Commercial loans consolidated from securitization |  | 26 |  | 26 |  | 30 |  | 36 |  | 53 |  | 53 |  | 35 |  | 26 |  | 35 |
| Total GAAP commercial loans | \$ | 26 | \$ | 28 | \$ | 32 | \$ | 38 | \$ | 55 | \$ | 60 | \$ | 56 | \$ | 42 | \$ | 57 |
| Commercial IGS owned by Redwood | \$ | 9 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 1 | \$ | 3 | \$ | 6 | \$ | 23 | \$ | 10 | \$ | 1 |
| Commercial IGS consolidated from Acacia |  | 107 |  | 120 |  | 135 |  | 130 |  | 182 |  | 179 |  | 200 |  | 208 |  | 205 |
| Total GAAP commercial IGS | \$ | 116 | \$ | 120 | \$ | 135 | \$ | 131 | \$ | 185 | \$ | 185 | \$ | 223 | \$ | 218 | \$ | 206 |
| CDO CES owned by Redwood | \$ | 4 | \$ | 9 | \$ | 10 | \$ | 5 | \$ | 5 | \$ | 5 | \$ | 12 | \$ | 2 | \$ | 2 |
| CDO CES consolidated from Acacia |  | 12 |  | 13 |  | 13 |  | 10 |  | 9 |  | 7 |  | - |  | - |  | - |
| Total GAAP CDO CES | \$ | 16 | \$ | 22 | \$ | 23 | \$ | 15 | \$ | 14 | \$ | 12 | \$ | 12 | \$ | 2 | \$ | 2 |
| CDO IGS owned by Redwood | \$ | 20 | \$ | 14 | \$ | 2 | \$ | 17 | \$ | 4 | \$ | 6 | \$ | 5 | \$ | 6 | \$ | 0 |
| CDO IGS consolidated from Acacia |  | 234 |  | 210 |  | 183 |  | 160 |  | 160 |  | 145 |  | 141 |  | 143 |  | 133 |
| Total GAAP CDO IGS | \$ | 254 | \$ | 224 | \$ | 185 | \$ | 177 | \$ | 164 | \$ | 151 | \$ | 146 | \$ | 149 | \$ | 133 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |


| Table 5: Assets (in millions) (continued) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Q1:2007 |  | Q4:2006 |  | Q3:2006 |  | Q2:2006 |  | Q1:2006 |  | Q4:2005 |  | Q3:2005 |  | Q2:2005 |  | Q1:2005 |  |
| Other real estate investments owned by Redwood Other real estate investments consolidated from Acacia | \$ | 47 3 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 |
| Total other real estate investments | \$ | 50 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 |
| Cash owned by Redwood | \$ | 92 | \$ | 168 | \$ | 113 | \$ | 106 | \$ | 85 | \$ | 176 | \$ | 163 | \$ | 72 | \$ | 65 |
| Restricted cash consolidated from entities |  | 340 |  | 112 |  | 139 |  | 86 |  | 131 |  | 72 |  | 59 |  | 48 |  | 58 |
| Accrued interest receivable |  | 65 |  | 71 |  | 67 |  | 67 |  | 73 |  | 76 |  | 80 |  | 85 |  | 82 |
| Principal receivable |  | 7 |  | 4 |  | 1 |  | 1 |  | 2 |  | - |  | 2 |  | - |  | - |
| Derivative assets |  | 18 |  | 27 |  | 30 |  | 54 |  | 48 |  | 31 |  | 25 |  | 13 |  | 29 |
| Deferred tax asset |  | 6 |  | 5 |  | 3 |  | 5 |  | 5 |  | 5 |  | 8 |  | 7 |  | 8 |
| Deferred asset-backed security issuance costs |  | 41 |  | 42 |  | 47 |  | 46 |  | 52 |  | 54 |  | 56 |  | 59 |  | 63 |
| Other assets |  | 23 |  | 16 |  | 13 |  | 13 |  | 10 |  | 8 |  | 10 |  | 6 |  | 6 |
| Total GAAP assets | \$ | 12,947 | \$ | 13,030 | \$ | 13,200 | \$ | 13,530 | \$ | 14,979 | \$ | 16,777 | \$ | 19,505 | \$ | 22,346 | \$ | 24,285 |
| Residential CES owned by Redwood | \$ | 256 | \$ | 230 | \$ | 291 | \$ | 403 | \$ | 303 | \$ | 309 | \$ | 338 | \$ | 469 | \$ | 374 |
| Residential loans owned by Redwood |  | 1,256 |  | 1,339 |  | 520 |  | 351 |  | 87 |  | 45 |  | 17 |  | 300 |  | 256 |
| Residential IGS owned by Redwood |  | 106 |  | 318 |  | 105 |  | 206 |  | 42 |  | 151 |  | 139 |  | 140 |  | 22 |
| Commercial CES owned by Redwood |  | 189 |  | 224 |  | 156 |  | 93 |  | 68 |  | 59 |  | 98 |  | 79 |  | 73 |
| Commercial loans owned by Redwood |  | - |  | 2 |  | 2 |  | 2 |  | 2 |  | 7 |  | 21 |  | 16 |  | 22 |
| Commercial IGS owned by Redwood |  | 9 |  | - |  | - |  | 1 |  | 3 |  | 6 |  | 23 |  | 10 |  | 1 |
| CDO CES owned by Redwood |  | 4 |  | 9 |  | 10 |  | 5 |  | 5 |  | 5 |  | 12 |  | 2 |  | 2 |
| CDO IGS owned by Redwood |  | 20 |  | 14 |  | 2 |  | 17 |  | 4 |  | 6 |  | 5 |  | 6 |  | - |
| Other real estate investments owned by Redwood |  | 47 |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |
| Cash owned by Redwood |  | 92 |  | 168 |  | 113 |  | 106 |  | 85 |  | 176 |  | 163 |  | 72 |  | 65 |
| Total assets owned by Redwood |  | 1,979 |  | 2,304 |  | 1,199 |  | 1,184 |  | 599 |  | 764 |  | 816 |  | 1,094 |  | 815 |
| Assets of securitizations for GAAP |  | 10,468 |  | 10,449 |  | 11,701 |  | 12,074 |  | 14,060 |  | 15,767 |  | 18,449 |  | 21,034 |  | 23,224 |
| ABS liabilities of entities for GAAP |  | $(9,947)$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $(18,237)$ |  | $(20,815)$ |  | $(23,057)$ |
| Redwood earning assets - GAAP basis | \$ | 2,500 | \$ | 2,774 | \$ | 1,346 | \$ | 1,360 | \$ | 729 | \$ | 946 | \$ | 1,028 | \$ | 1,313 | \$ | 982 |


| Table 6：Liabilities and Equity（all \＄in millions） |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Q1：2007 |  | Q4：2006 |  | Q3：2006 |  | Q2：2006 |  | Q1：2006 |  | Q4：2005 |  | Q3：2005 |  | Q2：2005 |  | Q1：2005 |  |
| Redwood debt | \＄ | 1，630 | \＄ | 1，556 | \＄ | 510 | \＄ | 529 | \＄ | － | \＄ | 170 | \＄ | 162 | \＄ | 453 | \＄ | 199 |
| Madrona commercial paper |  | 250 |  | 300 |  | － |  | － |  | － |  | － |  | － |  | － |  | － |
| Total Redwood debt |  | 1，880 |  | 1，856 |  | 510 |  | 529 |  | － |  | 170 |  | 162 |  | 453 |  | 199 |
| ABS issued，consolidated from entities |  | 9，890 |  | 9，907 |  | 11，466 |  | 11，775 |  | 13，788 |  | 15，422 |  | 18，049 |  | 20，598 |  | 22，821 |
| Unamortized IO issuance premium |  | 62 |  | 75 |  | 90 |  | 106 |  | 124 |  | 143 |  | 163 |  | 186 |  | 202 |
| Unamortized ABS issuance premium（discount） |  | （5） |  | （3） |  | （2） |  | 17 |  | 18 |  | 20 |  | 25 |  | 31 |  | 34 |
| ABS obligations of entities |  | 9，947 |  | 9，979 |  | 11，554 |  | 11，898 |  | 13，930 |  | 15，585 |  | 18，237 |  | 20，815 |  | 23，057 |
| Junior subordinated notes |  | 100 |  | 100 |  | － |  | － |  | － |  | － |  | － |  | － |  | － |
| Accrued interest payable |  | 52 |  | 50 |  | 51 |  | 47 |  | 43 |  | 41 |  | 42 |  | 43 |  | 38 |
| Interest rate agreements |  | 7 |  | 6 |  | 6 |  | 4 |  | － |  | 1 |  | 1 |  | 3 |  | － |
| Accrued expenses and other liabilities |  | 17 |  | 17 |  | 18 |  | 29 |  | 21 |  | 28 |  | 30 |  | 23 |  | 26 |
| Dividends payable |  | 20 |  | 19 |  | 18 |  | 18 |  | 18 |  | 17 |  | 17 |  | 17 |  | 17 |
| Total GAAP liabilities |  | 12，023 |  | 12，027 |  | 12，157 |  | 12，525 |  | 14，012 |  | 15，842 |  | 18，489 |  | 21，354 |  | 23，337 |
| Common stock and paid－in capital |  | 928 |  | 904 |  | 875 |  | 854 |  | 839 |  | 825 |  | 808 |  | 803 |  | 795 |
| Accumulated other comprehensive income |  | （6） |  | 93 |  | 95 |  | 91 |  | 82 |  | 74 |  | 117 |  | 137 |  | 125 |
| Cumulative GAAP earnings |  | 827 |  | 809 |  | 773 |  | 740 |  | 709 |  | 681 |  | 639 |  | 583 |  | 542 |
| Cumulative distributions to shareholders |  | （825） |  | （803） |  | （700） |  | （681） |  | （663） |  | （645） |  | （548） |  | （531） |  | （514） |
| GAAP stockholders＇equity |  | 924 |  | 1，003 |  | 1，043 |  | 1，004 |  | 967 |  | 935 |  | 1，016 |  | 992 |  | 948 |
| Total GAAP liabilities and equity | \＄ | 12，947 | \＄ | 13，030 | \＄ | 13，200 | \＄ | 13，530 | \＄ | 14，979 | \＄ | 16，777 | \＄ | 19，505 | \＄ | 22，346 | \＄ | 24，285 |
| Total Redwood debt | \＄ | 1，880 | \＄ | 1，856 | \＄ | 510 | \＄ | 529 | \＄ | 0 | \＄ | 170 | \＄ | 162 | \＄ | 453 | \＄ | 199 |
| Junior subordinated notes |  | 100 |  | 100 |  | － |  | － |  | － |  | － |  | － |  | － |  | － |
| Redwood obligations | \＄ | 1，980 | \＄ | 1，956 | \＄ | 510 | \＄ | 529 | \＄ | 0 | \＄ | 170 | \＄ | 162 | \＄ | 453 | \＄ | 199 |
| GAAP stockholders＇equity | \＄ | 924 | \＄ | 1，003 | \＄ | 1，043 | \＄ | 1，004 | \＄ | 967 | \＄ | 935 | \＄ | 1，016 | \＄ | 992 | \＄ | 948 |
| Redwood obligations to equity |  | 2.1 |  | 2.0 |  | 0.5 |  | 0.5 |  | － |  | 0.2 |  | 0.2 |  | 0.5 |  | 0.2 |
| Redwood obligations to（equity＋Redwood obligations） |  | 68\％ |  | 66\％ |  | 33\％ |  | 35\％ |  | 0\％ |  | 15\％ |  | 14\％ |  | $31 \%$ |  | 17\％ |
| Redwood obligations | \＄ | 1，980 | \＄ | 1，956 | \＄ | 510 | \＄ | 529 | \＄ | 0 | \＄ | 170 | \＄ | 162 | \＄ | 453 | \＄ | 199 |
| ABS obligations of consolidated entities |  | 9，947 |  | 9，979 |  | 11，554 |  | 11，898 |  | 13，930 |  | 15，585 |  | 18，237 |  | 20，815 |  | 23，057 |
| GAAP debt | \＄ | 11，927 | \＄ | 11，935 | \＄ | 12，064 | \＄ | 12，427 | \＄ | 13，930 | \＄ | 15，755 | \＄ | 18，399 | \＄ | 21，268 | \＄ | 23，256 |
| GAAP debt to equity |  | 12.9 |  | 11.9 |  | 11.6 |  | 12.4 |  | 14.4 |  | 16.9 |  | 18.1 |  | 21.4 |  | 24.5 |
| GAAP debt to（equity＋GAAP debt） |  | 93\％ |  | 92\％ |  | 92\％ |  | 93\％ |  | $94 \%$ |  | 94\％ |  | 95\％ |  | 96\％ |  | 96\％ |



| Table 8: Average Balance Sheet (in thousands) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Average GAAP balances Q1:2007 |  | Q4:2006 | Q3:2006 | Q2:2006 | Q1:2006 | Q4:2005 | Q3:2005 | Q2:2005 | Q1:2005 | $\begin{gathered} \text { Full Year } \\ \underline{\mathbf{2 0 0 6}} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Full Year } \\ \underline{2005} \end{gathered}$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Residential CES | \$ 673,114 | \$ 654,909 | \$ 641,694 | \$ 573,253 | \$ 516,962 | 517,138 | \$ 567,689 | \$ 531,456 | \$ 473,562 | \$ 597,206 | \$ 522,704 |
| Residential loans | 8,704,147 | 9,212,346 | 9,947,068 | 10,789,275 | 12,542,519 | 14,821,587 | 17,597,906 | 20,312,485 | 21,925,643 | 10,611,827 | 18,642,020 |
| Residential IGS | 1,795,130 | 1,513,794 | 1,404,281 | 1,358,453 | 1,299,933 | 1,263,277 | 1,219,034 | 1,122,945 | 1,030,406 | 1,393,736 | 1,158,785 |
| Commercial CES | 426,121 | 364,405 | 328,211 | 253,429 | 215,769 | 191,586 | 152,641 | 123,390 | 102,699 | 290,964 | 142,850 |
| Commercial loans | 28,186 | 29,571 | 32,194 | 42,912 | 56,777 | 59,049 | 47,703 | 45,214 | 56,080 | 40,267 | 52,008 |
| Commercial IGS | 122,099 | 106,902 | 128,355 | 132,154 | 181,549 | 188,445 | 215,109 | 204,247 | 198,437 | 138,425 | 202,594 |
| CDO CES | 18,348 | 19,539 | 20,999 | 13,950 | 14,709 | 12,231 | 11,892 | 2,816 | 6,302 | 17,245 | 8,155 |
| CDO IGS | 230,684 | 198,749 | 174,363 | 171,687 | 157,570 | 149,660 | 138,996 | 138,777 | 124,747 | 175,358 | 138,207 |
| Other real estate investments | 37,169 |  |  | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |  |
| Cash and cash equivalents | 244,816 | 398,674 | 183,323 | 246,597 | 244,002 | 339,379 | 134,422 | 124,707 | 124,685 | 268,340 | 181,259 |
| Earning assets | 12,279,814 | 12,498,889 | 12,860,488 | 13,581,710 | 15,229,790 | 17,542,352 | 20,085,392 | 22,606,037 | 24,042,561 | 13,533,367 | 21,048,582 |
| Other assets | 586,165 | 542,905 | 619,873 | 587,045 | 609,693 | 806,329 | 905,907 | 759,516 | 520,623 | 589,782 | 749,342 |
| Total assets | \$ 12,865,979 | \$13,041,794 | \$13,480,361 | \$ 14,168,755 | \$15,839,483 | \$18,348,681 | \$20,991,299 | \$23,365,553 | \$24,563,184 | \$14,123,149 | \$21,797,922 |
| Redwood debt | \$ 2,188,561 | \$ 1,090,480 | \$ 647,978 | \$ 85,616 | \$ 137,181 | \$ 253,302 | \$ 297,788 | \$ 216,639 | \$ 277,423 | \$ 493,357 | \$ 261,322 |
| Junior subordinated notes | 97,013 | 21,401 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 5,336 |  |
| ABS obligations of entities | 9,338,053 | 10,724,837 | 11,684,412 | 12,969,801 | 14,663,134 | 16,941,243 | 19,542,413 | 22,067,276 | 23,324,111 | 12,497,551 | 20,448,735 |
| Other liabilities | 233,664 | 196,214 | 136,362 | 132,936 | 86,938 | 154,823 | 136,769 | 111,294 | 66,188 | 138,409 | 117,597 |
| Total liabilities | 11,857,291 | 12,032,931 | 12,468,752 | 13,188,353 | 14,887,253 | 17,349,368 | 19,976,970 | 22,395,209 | 23,667,722 | 13,134,653 | 20,827,654 |
| Core equity | 925,128 | 923,856 | 932,030 | 898,409 | 877,212 | 880,329 | 880,482 | 840,098 | 794,866 | 908,071 | 849,257 |
| Balance sheet mark-to-market adjustments | 83,560 | 85,007 | 79,579 | 81,993 | 75,018 | 118,984 | 133,847 | 130,246 | 100,596 | 80,424 | 121,011 |
| Total equity | 1,008,688 | 1,008,863 | 1,011,609 | 980,402 | 952,230 | 999,313 | 1,014,329 | 970,344 | 895,462 | 988,495 | 970,268 |
| Total liabilities and equity | \$ 12,865,979 | \$13,041,794 | \$13,480,361 | \$ 14,168,755 | \$15,839,483 | \$18,348,681 | \$20,991,299 | \$23,365,553 | \$24,563,184 | \$14,123,149 | \$21,797,922 |

## APPENDIX





| Residential CES |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Q1: 2007 |  | Q4: 2006 |  | Q3: 2006 |  | Q2: 2006 |  | Q1: 2006 |  | Q4: 2005 |  | Q3: 2005 |  | Q2: 2005 |  | Q1: 2005 |  |
| Current face | \$ | 1,259,446 | \$ | 1,180,605 | \$ | 1,183,142 | \$ | 1,168,602 | \$ | 1,034,069 | \$ | 1,013,793 | \$ | 1,029,786 | \$ | 1,079,323 | \$ | 952,925 |
| Unamortized premium/ (discount) |  | $(158,664)$ |  | $(144,842)$ |  | $(140,585)$ |  | $(116,702)$ |  | $(108,371)$ |  | $(121,824)$ |  | $(84,084)$ |  | $(90,716)$ |  | $(83,263)$ |
| Credit protection |  | $(392,768)$ |  | $(372,247)$ |  | $(384,397)$ |  | $(425,578)$ |  | $(373,781)$ |  | $(354,610)$ |  | $(382,862)$ |  | $(404,180)$ |  | $(365,998)$ |
| Unrealized market value gains |  | 44,263 |  | 58,015 |  | 57,495 |  | 50,854 |  | 43,522 |  | 55,193 |  | 80,867 |  | 99,380 |  | 84,096 |
| Net book value | \$ | 752,277 | \$ | 721,531 | \$ | 715,655 | \$ | 677,176 | \$ | 595,439 | \$ | 592,552 | \$ | 643,707 | \$ | 683,807 | \$ | 587,760 |
| Average balance | \$ | 673,114 | \$ | 654,909 | \$ | 641,694 | \$ | 573,253 | \$ | 516,962 | \$ | 517,138 | \$ | 567,689 |  | 531,456 | \$ | 473,562 |
| Interest income | \$ | 37,664 | \$ | 35,650 | \$ | 34,585 | \$ | 28,059 | \$ | 26,245 | \$ | 22,556 | \$ | 23,640 | \$ | 18,778 | \$ | 18,850 |
| Yield |  | 22.38\% |  | 21.77\% |  | 21.56\% |  | 19.58\% |  | 20.31\% |  | 17.45\% |  | 16.66\% |  | 14.13\% |  | 15.92\% |

\footnotetext{

Average balance
Interest income Yield

## Residential IGS

ount)
Current face
Unamortized
Credit protection
Unrealized market value gains
Net book value
Yia
Yield

## APPENDIX

| Q1： 2007 | Q4： 2006 | Q3： 2006 | Q2： 2006 | Q1：2006 | Q4： 2005 | Q3： 2005 | Q2： 2005 | Q1： 2005 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| \＄8，582，964 | \＄9，212，002 | \＄9，718，985 | \＄10，318，641 | \＄11，846，454 | \＄13，719，242 | \＄16，386，833 | \＄19，443，387 | \＄21，579，671 |
| 117，477 | 132，052 | 143，135 | 155，101 | 166，134 | 178，206 | 191，513 | 210，137 | 217，852 |
| $(19,954)$ | $(20,119)$ | $(19,326)$ | $(19,450)$ | $(22,372)$ | $(22,656)$ | $(22,029)$ | $(22,959)$ | $(24,827)$ |


| $\$ 8,680,487$ | $\$ 9,323,935$ | $\$ 9,842,794$ | $\$ 10,454,292$ | $\$ 11,990,216$ | $\$ 13,874,792$ | $\$ 16,556,317$ | $\$ 19,630,565$ | $\$ 21,772,696$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

$\begin{array}{cccccccccc}\$ 8,704,147 & \$ 9,212,346 & \$ 9,947,068 & \$ & 10,789,275 & \$ 12,542,519 & \$ 14,821,587 & \$ 17,597,906 & \$ 20,312,485 & \$ 21,925,643 \\ \$ & 129,143 & \$ & 137,568 & \$ & 148,494 & \$ & 154,160 & \$ & 165,664 \\ & \$ .93 \% & 5.97 \% & 5.97 \% & 176,599 & \$ & 193,621 & \$ & 206,263 & 197,701 \\ & 5.72 \% & 5.28 \% & 4.77 \% & 4.40 \% & 4.06 \% & 3.61 \%\end{array}$
Q1：2007 Q4：2006

$\begin{array}{lllll} \\ \text { Q1：} 2006 & \text { Q4：} 2005 & \text { Q3：} 2005 & \text { Q2：} 2005 & \text { Q1：2005 }\end{array}$

Nio sio
$\begin{array}{lllll} & \$ 121,737 & \$ & 122,869 & \$ 133,361\end{array}$
－ N
－
－
$(2,936)$ § 184,400

$$
\begin{array}{rlrlrlr}
188,445 & \$ & 215,109 & \$ & 204,247 & \$ & 198,437 \\
3,102 & \$ & 3,398 & \$ & 3,036 & \$ & 2,922
\end{array}
$$

$$
\begin{array}{cc}
204,244 & \$ \\
3,036 & \$ 88,437 \\
5.95 \% & 2,922 \\
5.89 \%
\end{array}
$$

 | 128,355 | $\$$ | 132,154 | $\$$ |
| ---: | :--- | ---: | :--- | 6．46\％ 6．35\％

$$
\begin{gathered}
8,445 \$ \$ \\
3,102 \$ \\
6.58 \%
\end{gathered}
$$

$$
\begin{array}{cc}
3,398 \$ \$ & 3,036 \\
6.32 \% & 5.95 \%
\end{array}
$$

## APPENDIX

| Table 9: Balances \& Yields by Portfolio (in thousands) (continued) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Commercial Loans |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Q1: 2007 |  | Q4: 2006 |  | Q3: 2006 |  | Q2: 2006 |  | Q1: 2006 |  | Q4: 2005 |  | Q3: 2005 |  | Q2: 2005 |  | Q1: 2005 |  |
| Current face | \$ | 38,394 | \$ | 38,360 | \$ | 42,384 | \$ | 46,959 | \$ | 65,508 | \$ | 70,091 | \$ | 66,348 | \$ | 51,778 | \$ | 67,365 |
| Unamortized premium/ (discount) |  | $(2,022)$ |  | $(2,047)$ |  | $(2,073)$ |  | $(2,096)$ |  | $(2,200)$ |  | $(2,258)$ |  | $(2,105)$ |  | $(1,843)$ |  | $(2,305)$ |
| Credit protection |  | $(10,489)$ |  | $(8,141)$ |  | $(8,141)$ |  | $(8,141)$ |  | $(8,141)$ |  | $(8,141)$ |  | $(8,141)$ |  | $(8,141)$ |  | $(8,456)$ |
| Unrealized market value gains |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |
| Net book value | \$ | 25,883 | \$ | 28,172 | \$ | 32,170 | \$ | 36,722 | \$ | 55,167 | \$ | 59,692 | \$ | 56,102 | \$ | 41,794 | \$ | 56,604 |
| Average balance | \$ | 28,186 | \$ | 29,571 | \$ | 32,194 | \$ | 42,912 | \$ | 56,777 | \$ | 59,049 | \$ | 47,703 | \$ | 45,214 | \$ | 56,080 |
| Interest (loss) income |  | -\$2,293 | \$ | 409 | \$ | 524 | \$ | 812 | \$ | 1,238 | \$ | 1,281 | \$ | 1,209 | \$ | 1,208 | \$ | 1,587 |
| Yield |  | -32.54\% |  | 5.53\% |  | 6.51\% |  | 7.57\% |  | 8.72\% |  | 8.68\% |  | 10.14\% |  | 10.69\% |  | 11.32\% |
| CDO CES |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | 1:2007 |  | 4: 2006 |  | $3: 2006$ |  | 2: 2006 |  | 1: 2006 |  | 4: 2005 |  | 3: 2005 |  | 2: 2005 |  | 12005 |
| Current face | \$ | 23,731 | \$ | 28,731 | \$ | 29,231 | \$ | 22,226 | \$ | 23,226 | \$ | 20,226 | \$ | 20,226 | \$ | 10,184 | \$ | 10,184 |
| Unamortized premium/ (discount) |  | $(7,004)$ |  | $(6,889)$ |  | $(7,298)$ |  | $(7,978)$ |  | $(8,048)$ |  | $(8,004)$ |  | $(7,907)$ |  | $(7,232)$ |  | $(7,113)$ |
| Credit protection |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |
| Unrealized market value gains |  | (575) |  | 122 |  | 326 |  | 470 |  | (436) |  | (484) |  | 144 |  | (187) |  | (287) |
| Net book value | \$ | 16,152 | \$ | 21,964 | \$ | 22,259 | \$ | 14,718 | \$ | 14,742 | \$ | 11,738 | \$ | 12,463 | \$ | 2,765 | \$ | 2,784 |
| Average balance | \$ | 18,348 | \$ | 19,539 | \$ | 20,999 | \$ | 13,950 | \$ | 14,709 | \$ | 12,231 | \$ | 11,892 | \$ | 2,816 | \$ | 6,302 |
| Interest income | \$ | 497 | \$ | 570 | \$ | 609 | \$ | 236 | \$ | 439 | \$ | 125 | \$ | 131 | \$ | 127 | \$ | 246 |
| Yield |  | 10.84\% |  | 11.67\% |  | 11.60\% |  | 6.77\% |  | 11.94\% |  | 4.09\% |  | 4.41\% |  | 18.04\% |  | 15.61\% |
| CDO IGS |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Q1: 2007 |  | Q4: 2006 |  | Q3: 2006 |  | Q2: 2006 |  | Q1: 2006 |  | Q4: 2005 |  | Q3: 2005 |  | Q2: 2005 |  | Q1:2005 |  |
| Current face | \$ | 263,237 | \$ | 222,413 | \$ | 182,352 | \$ | 175,586 | \$ | 162,844 | \$ | 149,812 | \$ | 144,246 | \$ | 145,933 | \$ | 130,686 |
| Unamortized premium/ (discount) |  | (945) |  | (238) |  | (236) |  | (241) |  | (249) |  | (257) |  | (264) |  | (470) |  | (485) |
| Credit protection |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |
| Unrealized market value gains |  | $(7,985)$ |  | 2,174 |  | 2,826 |  | 1,718 |  | 944 |  | 1,092 |  | 2,362 |  | 3,221 |  | 2,922 |
| Net book value | \$ | 254,307 | \$ | 224,349 | \$ | 184,942 | \$ | 177,063 | \$ | 163,539 | \$ | 150,647 | \$ | 146,344 | \$ | 148,684 | \$ | 133,123 |
| Average balance | \$ | 230,684 | \$ | 198,749 | \$ | 174,363 | \$ | 171,687 | \$ | 157,570 | \$ | 149,660 | , | 138,996 | \$ | 138,777 | \$ | 124,747 |
| Interest income | \$ | 3,862 | \$ | 3,335 | \$ | 2,881 | \$ | 2,099 | \$ | 2,491 | \$ | 2,571 | \$ | 1,953 | \$ | 1,569 | \$ | 1,184 |
| Yield |  | 6.70\% |  | 6.71\% |  | 6.61 \% |  | 4.89\% |  | 6.32\% |  | 6.87\% |  | 5.62\% |  | 4.52\% |  | 3.80\% |

## 프﹎APPENDIX

|  | Q1: 2007 |  | Q4: 2006 |  | Q3: 2006 |  | Q2: 2006 |  | Q1: 2006 |  | Q4: 2005 |  | Q3: 2005 |  | Q2: 2005 |  | Q1: 2005 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Current face | \$ | 91,656 | \$ | 168,016 | \$ | 112,926 | \$ | 106,491 | \$ | 85,466 | \$ | 175,885 | \$ | 163,160 | \$ | 72,193 | \$ | 64,714 |
| Unamortized premium/ (discount) |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |
| Credit protection |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |
| Unrealized market value gains |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |
| Net book value | \$ | 91,656 | \$ | 168,016 | \$ | 112,926 | \$ | 106,491 | \$ | 85,466 | \$ | 175,885 | \$ | 163,160 | \$ | 72,193 | \$ | 64,714 |
| Average balance | \$ | 244,816 | \$ | 398,674 | \$ | 183,323 | \$ | 246,597 | \$ | 244,002 | \$ | 339,379 | \$ | 134,422 | \$ | 124,707 | \$ | 124,685 |
| Interest income | \$ | 2,332 | \$ | 3,719 | \$ | 1,872 | \$ | 2,871 | \$ | 2,477 | \$ | 2,830 | \$ | 990 | \$ | 804 | \$ | 580 |
| Yield |  | 3.81\% |  | 3.73\% |  | 4.08\% |  | 4.66\% | \% | 4.06\% | \% | $3.34 \%$ |  | 2.95\% |  | 2.58\% |  | 1.86\% |
| Total Earning Assets (GAAP) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Q1: 2007 |  | Q4: 2006 |  | Q3: 2006 |  | Q2: 2006 |  | Q1: 2006 |  | Q4: 2005 |  | Q3: 2005 |  | Q2: 2005 |  | Q1: 2005 |  |
| Current face | \$ 13,306,569 |  | \$ 13,475,346 |  | \$ 13,553,988 |  | \$ 13,865,566 |  | \$ 15,168,319 |  | \$ 16,986,581 |  | \$ 19,625,979 |  | \$ 22,414,484 |  | \$ 24,301,643 |  |
| Unamortized premium/ (discount) | $(129,027)$ |  | $(113,137)$ |  | $(72,430)$ |  | $(18,161)$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 12,214 \\ (572,066) \end{gathered}$ |  | 13,375 |  | $94,058$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 103,778 \\ (522,490) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 122,952 \\ (487,952) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| Credit protection | $(717,677)$ |  | $(695,847)$ |  | $(670,246)$ |  | $\begin{gathered} (645,303) \\ 56,653 \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} (527,213) \\ 56,541 \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |  |  | $(551,562)$ |  |  |  |  |
| Unrealized market value gains |  | $(11,320)$ |  | 86,528 |  | 88,943 |  |  | $\begin{gathered} (572,066) \\ 50,479 \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  | $98,873$ |  | $133,207$ |  | 102,712 |  |
| Net book value | \$ 12,448,545 |  | \$ 12,752,890 |  | \$ 12,900,255 |  | \$ 13,258,755 |  | \$ 14,658,946 |  | \$ 16,529,284 |  | \$ 19,267,348 |  | \$ 22,128,979 |  | \$ 24,039,355 |  |
| Average balance | \$ 12,279,814 |  | \$ 12,498,889 |  | \$ 12,860,487 |  | \$ 13,581,710 |  | \$ 15,229,790 |  | \$ 17,542,352 |  | \$ 20,085,392 |  | \$ 22,606,037 |  | \$ 24,042,561 |  |
| Interest income | \$ | 215,105 | \$ | 217,391 | \$ | 223,649 | \$ | 218,238 | \$ | 225,882 | \$ | 231,139 | \$ | 244,631 | \$ | 248,505 | \$ | 237,922 |
| Yield | 7.01\% |  |  | 6.96\% | 6.96\% |  | 6.43\% |  | 5.93\% |  | 5.27\% |  | 4.87\% |  | 4.40\% 3.96\% |  |  |  |

訔 APPENDIX
Table 10: Portfolio Activity (in thousands)

| Table 10: Portfolio Activity (in thousands) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Residential IGS |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Q1: 2007 |  | Q4: 2006 |  | Q3: 2006 |  | Q2: 2006 |  | Q1: 2006 |  | Q4: 2005 |  | Q3: 2005 |  | Q2: 2005 |  | Q1: 2005 |  |
| Beginning balance | \$ | 1,697,250 | \$ | 1,475,002 | \$ | 1,390,015 | \$ | 1,346,674 | \$ | 1,260,089 | \$ | 1,279,243 | \$ | 1,193,293 | \$ | 1,087,396 | \$ | 973,884 |
| Acquisitions |  | 535,346 |  | 352,292 |  | 120,316 |  | 179,115 |  | 80,970 |  | 116,987 |  | 114,699 |  | 128,708 |  | 120,709 |
| Upgrades / downgrades |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | - |  | 30,667 |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | 23,701 |
| Transfer to other portfolios |  | $(13,816)$ |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |
| Sales |  | $(108,372)$ |  | $(97,124)$ |  | $(12,669)$ |  | $(104,442)$ |  | $(3,984)$ |  | $(95,328)$ |  | 4,000 |  | $(3,012)$ |  | $(11,488)$ |
| Principal payments |  | $(32,248)$ |  | $(31,398)$ |  | $(29,997)$ |  | $(31,136)$ |  | $(25,445)$ |  | $(29,834)$ |  | $(27,627)$ |  | $(22,961)$ |  | $(22,345)$ |
| Discount / (premium) amortization |  | 1,321 |  | 1,023 |  | 1,943 |  | 1,446 |  | 853 |  | 790 |  | 761 |  | 347 |  | 547 |
| Net mark-to-market adjustment |  | $(53,631)$ |  | $(2,545)$ |  | 5,394 |  | $(1,642)$ |  | 3,524 |  | $(11,769)$ |  | $(5,883)$ |  | 2,815 |  | 2,388 |
| Ending Balance | \$ | 2,025,850 | \$ | 1,697,250 | \$ | 1,475,002 | \$ | 1,390,015 | \$ | 1,346,674 | \$ | 1,260,089 | \$ | 1,279,243 | \$ | 1,193,293 | \$ | 1,087,396 |


| Residential CES |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Q1: 2007 |  | Q4: 2006 |  | Q3: 2006 |  | Q2: 2006 |  | Q1: 2006 |  | Q4: 2005 |  | Q3: 2005 |  | Q2: 2005 |  | Q1: 2005 |  |
| Beginning balance | \$ | 721,531 | \$ | 715,655 | \$ | 677,176 | \$ | 595,439 | \$ | 592,552 | \$ | 566,450 | \$ | 470,403 | \$ | 510,503 | \$ | 561,658 |
| Acquisitions |  | 73,725 |  | 20,870 |  | 87,305 |  | 89,217 |  | 52,822 |  | 67,796 |  | 87,864 |  | 57,479 |  | 54,664 |
| Upgrades / downgrades |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | $(30,667)$ |  | $(23,701)$ |  | - |  | - |  | - |
| Transfer to other portfolios |  | $(4,480)$ |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |
| Sales |  | $(5,214)$ |  | (962) |  | $(47,585)$ |  | $(4,035)$ |  | $(9,650)$ |  | $(27,293)$ |  | - |  | $(98,775)$ |  | $(81,292)$ |
| Principal payments |  | $(35,672)$ |  | $(32,639)$ |  | $(28,835)$ |  | $(23,302)$ |  | $(14,110)$ |  | $(23,156)$ |  | $(18,931)$ |  | $(17,013)$ |  | $(21,523)$ |
| Discount / (premium) amortization |  | 18,892 |  | 17,412 |  | 15,917 |  | 11,684 |  | 12,391 |  | 8,252 |  | 7,424 |  | 10,766 |  | 10,098 |
| Net mark-to-market adjustment |  | $(16,505)$ |  | 1,195 |  | 11,677 |  | 8,173 |  | $(7,899)$ |  | 24,204 |  | 19,690 |  | 7,443 |  | $(13,102)$ |
| Ending balance | \$ | 752,277 | \$ | 721,531 | \$ | 715,655 | \$ | 677,176 | \$ | 595,439 | \$ | 592,552 | \$ | 566,450 | \$ | 470,403 | \$ | 510,503 |

\footnotetext{
Other Real Estate Investments


## APPENDIX

Table 10: Portfolio Activity (in thousands) (continued)

| Table 10: Portfolio Activity (in thousands) (continued) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Real Estate Loans |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Q1: 2007 |  | Q4: 2006 |  | Q3: 2006 |  | Q2: 2006 |  | Q1: 2006 |  | Q4: 2005 |  | Q3: 2005 |  | Q2: 2005 |  | Q1: 2005 |  |
| Beginning balance | \$ | 9,323,935 | \$ | 9,842,794 | \$ | 10,454,292 | \$ | 11,990,216 | \$ | 13,874,792 | \$ | 16,556,317 | \$ | 19,630,565 |  | 21,772,696 |  | \$ 22,504,765 |
| Acquisitions |  | 415,283 |  | 725,695 |  | 966,673 |  | 272,627 |  | 52,691 |  | 271,875 |  | 332,049 |  | 426,933 |  | 832,383 |
| Sales |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | $(240,987)$ |  | $(263,079)$ |  | $(3,378)$ |  | - |
| Principal payments |  | (1,047,170) |  | $(1,230,545)$ |  | $(1,567,041)$ |  | $(1,799,401)$ |  | $(1,925,475)$ |  | (2,698,500) |  | $(3,129,492)$ |  | $(2,557,675)$ |  | $(1,555,752)$ |
| Discount / (premium) amortization |  | $(11,726)$ |  | $(13,298)$ |  | $(11,254)$ |  | $(12,073)$ |  | $(12,075)$ |  | $(13,334)$ |  | $(14,438)$ |  | $(9,758)$ |  | $(7,644)$ |
| Credit provision |  | $(1,481)$ |  | $(1,505)$ |  | (465) |  | 2,507 |  | (141) |  | (877) |  | 805 |  | 1,527 |  | $(1,210)$ |
| Net charge-offs / (recoveries) |  | 1,646 |  | 794 |  | 589 |  | 416 |  | 424 |  | 250 |  | 125 |  | (34) |  | 154 |
| Net mark-to-market adjustment |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | 48 |  | (218) |  | 254 |  | - |
| Ending balance | \$ | 8,680,487 | \$ | 9,323,935 | \$ | 9,842,794 | \$ | 10,454,292 | \$ | 11,990,216 | \$ | 13,874,792 | \$ | 16,556,317 | \$ | 19,630,565 |  | \$ 21,772,696 | Ending balance

Commercial CES

| Commercial CES |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Q1: 2007 |  | Q4: 2006 |  | Q3: 2006 |  | Q2: 2006 |  | Q1: 2006 |  | Q4: 2005 |  | Q3: 2005 |  | Q2: 2005 |  | Q1: 2005 |  |
| Beginning balance | \$ | 448,060 | \$ | 379,867 | \$ | 271,243 | \$ | 223,302 | \$ | 218,856 | \$ | 187,228 | \$ | 138,029 | \$ | 127,687 | \$ | 87,250 |
| Acquisitions |  | 2,743 |  | 76,496 |  | 99,065 |  | 51,978 |  | 11,130 |  | 30,293 |  | 55,941 |  | 4,263 |  | 41,072 |
| Upgrades / downgrades |  | $(3,501)$ |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | $(3,966)$ |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | $(2,192)$ |
| Sales |  | - |  | $(9,914)$ |  | $(4,216)$ |  | $(2,820)$ |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |
| Principal payments |  | - |  | (13) |  | (9) |  | (9) |  | (10) |  | (9) |  | (8) |  | (8) |  | (10) |
| Discount / (premium) amortization |  | (9) |  | (289) |  | (451) |  | (257) |  | (564) |  | (276) |  | (416) |  | 68 |  | (174) |
| Net mark-to-market adjustment |  | $(11,911)$ |  | 1,913 |  | 14,235 |  | (951) |  | $(2,144)$ |  | 1,620 |  | $(6,318)$ |  | 6,019 |  | 1,741 |
| Ending Balance | \$ | 435,382 | \$ | 448,060 | \$ | 379,867 | \$ | 271,243 | \$ | 223,302 | \$ | 218,856 | \$ | 187,228 | \$ | 138,029 | \$ | 127,687 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Commercial Loans |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Q1: 2007 |  | Q4: 2006 |  | Q3: 2006 |  | Q2: 2006 |  | Q1: 2006 |  | Q4: 2005 |  | Q3: 2005 |  | Q2: 2005 |  | Q1: 2005 |  |
| Beginning balance | \$ | 28,172 | \$ | 32,170 | \$ | 36,722 | \$ | 55,167 | \$ | 59,692 | \$ | 56,102 | \$ | 41,794 | \$ | 56,604 | \$ | 54,479 |
| Acquisitions |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | 4,248 |  | 14,219 |  | - |  | 6,732 |
| Sales |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | $(8,408)$ |  | - |  | - |  | (17) |  | $(11,192)$ |  | - |
| Principal payments |  | 38 |  | $(4,024)$ |  | $(4,574)$ |  | $(10,049)$ |  | $(4,583)$ |  | (506) |  | 158 |  | $(3,769)$ |  | $(5,267)$ |
| Discount / (premium) amortization |  | 21 |  | 26 |  | 22 |  | 27 |  | 93 |  | (152) |  | (69) |  | (99) |  | (30) |
| Credit provision |  | $(2,348)$ |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | (35) |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | 185 |
| Net mark-to-market adjustment |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | (14) |  | - |  | - |  | 17 |  | 250 |  | 505 |
| Ending Balance | \$ | 25,883 | \$ | 28,172 | \$ | 32,170 | \$ | 36,722 | \$ | 55,167 | \$ | 59,692 | \$ | 56,102 | \$ | 41,794 | \$ | 56,604 |

APPENDIX


| CDO CES |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Q1: 2007 |  | Q4: 2006 |  | Q3: 2006 |  | Q2: 2006 |  | Q1: 2006 |  | Q4: 2005 |  | Q3: 2005 |  | Q2: 2005 |  | Q1: 2005 |  |
| Beginning balance | \$ | 21,964 | \$ | 22,259 | \$ | 14,718 | \$ | 14,742 | \$ | 11,738 | \$ | 12,463 | \$ | 2,765 | \$ | 2,784 | \$ | 3,052 |
| Acquisitions |  | (149) |  | - |  | 7,714 |  | (87) |  | 3,000 |  | (97) |  | 9,970 |  | (119) |  | (71) |
| Upgrades / downgrades |  | $(5,000)$ |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | 430 |
| Sales |  | - |  | - |  | (722) |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |
| Principal payments |  | - |  | (769) |  | (29) |  | $(1,017)$ |  | (44) |  | - |  | 42 |  | - |  | 35 |
| Discount / (premium) amortization |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | 36 |  | - |  | 48 |
| Net mark-to-market adjustment |  | (663) |  | 474 |  | 578 |  | 1,080 |  | 48 |  | (628) |  | (350) |  | 100 |  | (710) |
| Ending Balance | \$ | 16,152 | \$ | 21,964 | \$ | 22,259 | \$ | 14,718 | \$ | 14,742 | \$ | 11,738 | \$ | 12,463 | \$ | 2,765 | \$ | 2,784 |


| CDO IGS |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Q1: 2007 |  | Q4: 2006 |  | Q3: 2006 |  | Q2: 2006 |  | Q1: 2006 |  | Q4: 2005 |  | Q3: 2005 |  | Q2: 2005 |  | Q1: 2005 |  |
| Beginning balance | \$ | 224,349 | \$ | 184,942 | \$ | 177,063 | \$ | 163,539 | \$ | 150,647 | \$ | 146,344 | \$ | 148,684 | \$ | 133,123 | \$ | 110,032 |
| Acquisitions |  | 35,496 |  | 45,388 |  | 7,000 |  | 13,000 |  | 13,500 |  | 5,900 |  | 9,553 |  | 15,485 |  | 23,913 |
| Upgrades / downgrades |  | 5,000 |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | (430) |
| Sales |  | - |  | $(5,350)$ |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |
| Principal payments |  | (376) |  | (338) |  | (235) |  | (257) |  | (468) |  | (335) |  | $(11,240)$ |  | (237) |  | (227) |
| Discount / (premium) amortization |  | (3) |  | 9 |  | 5 |  | 7 |  | 8 |  | 7 |  | 10 |  | 18 |  | (41) |
| Net mark-to-market adjustment |  | $(10,159)$ |  | (302) |  | 1,109 |  | 774 |  | (148) |  | $(1,269)$ |  | (663) |  | 295 |  | (124) |
| Ending Balance | \$ | 254,307 | \$ | 224,349 | \$ | 184,942 | \$ | 177,063 | \$ | 163,539 | \$ | 150,647 | \$ | 146,344 | \$ | 148,684 | \$ | 133,123 |



|  | Managed <br> Loans (1) |  | Internally- <br> Designated <br> Credit <br> Reserve |  | Total Credit Reserve as \% of Loans | Seriously Delinquent Loans |  | Seriously <br> Delinquent <br> Loan \% of Current Balance | Redwood's Share of losses |  | Total Credit <br> Losses As \% <br> of Loans <br> (Annualized) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Q1: 2005 | \$ | 117,121,507 | \$ | 390,475 | 0.33\% | \$ | 185,027 | 0.16\% | \$ | 1,377 | 0.00\% |
| Q2: 2005 |  | 130,690,357 |  | 426,834 | 0.33\% |  | 194,431 | 0.15\% |  | 544 | 0.00\% |
| Q3: 2005 |  | 125,971,360 |  | 404,191 | 0.32\% |  | 230,263 | 0.18\% |  | 1,592 | 0.00\% |
| Q4: 2005 |  | 129,833,862 |  | 377,259 | 0.29\% |  | 318,112 | 0.25\% |  | 1,175 | 0.00\% |
| 2005 |  | 129,833,862 |  | 377,259 | 0.29\% |  | 318,112 | 0.25\% |  | 4,688 | 0.00\% |
| Q1: 2006 |  | 150,039,853 |  | 433,658 | 0.29\% |  | 432,120 | 0.29\% |  | 3,002 | 0.00\% |
| Q2: 2006 |  | 159,800,662 |  | 444,323 | 0.28\% |  | 402,617 | 0.25\% |  | 1,464 | 0.00\% |
| Q3: 2006 |  | 141,357,008 |  | 402,655 | 0.28\% |  | 463,911 | 0.33\% |  | 2,593 | 0.00\% |
| Q4: 2006 |  | 134,696,897 |  | 392,366 | 0.29\% |  | 549,860 | 0.41\% |  | 4,862 | 0.00\% |
| 2006 |  | 134,696,897 |  | 392,366 | 0.29\% |  | 549,860 | 0.41\% |  | 11,921 | 0.01\% |
| Q1: 2007 | \$ | 114,624,260 | \$ | 412,717 | 0.36\% | \$ | 682,892 | 0.60\% | \$ | 5,451 | 0.02\% |


| Q1: 2005 | \$ | 11,612,670 | \$ | 51,791 | 0.45\% | \$ | 26,578 | 0.23\% | \$ | 5 | 0.00\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Q2: 2005 |  | 15,865,802 |  | 67,319 | 0.42\% |  | 28,293 | 0.18\% |  | 225 | 0.01\% |
| Q3: 2005 |  | 14,615,816 |  | 58,323 | 0.40\% |  | 34,698 | 0.24\% |  | 271 | 0.01\% |
| Q4: 2005 |  | 15,778,989 |  | 58,241 | 0.37\% |  | 58,614 | 0.37\% |  | 53 | 0.00\% |
| 2005 |  | 15,778,989 |  | 58,241 | 0.37\% |  | 58,614 | 0.37\% |  | 554 | 0.00\% |
| Q1: 2006 |  | 15,660,444 |  | 68,077 | 0.43\% |  | 86,641 | 0.55\% |  | 174 | 0.00\% |
| Q2: 2006 |  | 19,960,837 |  | 115,170 | 0.58\% |  | 106,953 | 0.54\% |  | 225 | 0.00\% |
| Q3: 2006 |  | 19,200,967 |  | 107,140 | 0.56\% |  | 132,968 | 0.69\% |  | 178 | 0.00\% |
| Q4: 2006 |  | 18,127,353 |  | 115,315 | 0.64\% |  | 187,465 | 1.03\% |  | 1,311 | 0.03\% |
| 2006 |  | 18,127,353 |  | 115,315 | 0.64\% |  | 187,465 | 1.03\% |  | 1,887 | 0.01\% |
| Q1: 2007 | \$ | 18,577,577 | \$ | 128,772 | 0.69\% | \$ | 278,021 | 1.50\% | \$ | 1,331 | 0.03\% |
| Q1: 2005 | \$ | 83,929,166 | \$ | 313,857 | 0.37\% | \$ | 142,383 | 0.17\% | \$ | 1,218 | 0.01\% |
| Q2: 2005 |  | 95,381,168 |  | 336,556 | 0.35\% |  | 149,624 | 0.16\% |  | 353 | 0.00\% |
| Q3: 2005 |  | 94,968,711 |  | 323,839 | 0.34\% |  | 172,609 | 0.18\% |  | 1,231 | 0.01\% |
| Q4: 2005 |  | 100,335,631 |  | 296,362 | 0.30\% |  | 222,162 | 0.22\% |  | 871 | 0.00\% |
| 2005 |  | 100,335,631 |  | 296,362 | 0.30\% |  | 222,162 | 0.22\% |  | 3,673 | 0.00\% |
| Q1: 2006 |  | 122,532,955 |  | 343,209 | 0.28\% |  | 296,802 | 0.24\% |  | 2,403 | 0.01\% |
| Q2: 2006 |  | 129,521,184 |  | 309,703 | 0.24\% |  | 248,502 | 0.19\% |  | 816 | 0.00\% |
| Q3: 2006 |  | 112,437,056 |  | 276,189 | 0.25\% |  | 269,496 | 0.24\% |  | 1,826 | 0.01\% |
| Q4: 2006 |  | 107,357,542 |  | 256,932 | 0.24\% |  | 288,159 | 0.27\% |  | 2,840 | 0.01\% |
| 2006 |  | 107,357,542 |  | 256,932 | 0.24\% |  | 288,159 | 0.27\% |  | 7,886 | 0.01\% |
| Q1: 2007 | \$ | 87,463,719 | \$ | 263,991 | 0.30\% | \$ | 325,581 | 0.37\% | \$ | 2,474 | 0.01\% |


| Table 11B: Managed Residential Loans Credit Performance (in thousands) (continued) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | Managed <br> Loans (1) |  | nally- <br> nated <br> Reserve | Total Credit Reserve as \% of Loans |  | usly quent ns | Seriously Delinquent Loan \% of Current Balance |  |  | Total Credit Losses As \% of Loans (Annualized) |
| Residential Real | Q1: 2005 | \$ | 21,579,671 | \$ | 24,827 | 0.12\% | \$ | 16,066 | 0.07\% | \$ | 154 | <0.01\% |
| Estate Loans | Q2: 2005 |  | 19,443,387 |  | 22,959 | 0.12\% |  | 16,514 | 0.08\% |  | (34) | 0.00\% |
|  | Q3: 2005 |  | 16,386,833 |  | 22,029 | 0.13\% |  | 22,956 | 0.14\% |  | 90 | <0.01\% |
|  | Q4: 2005 |  | 13,719,242 |  | 22,656 | 0.17\% |  | 37,335 | 0.27\% |  | 251 | <0.01\% |
|  | 2005 |  | 13,719,242 |  | 22,656 | 0.17\% |  | 37,335 | 0.27\% |  | 461 | <0.01\% |
|  | Q1: 2006 |  | 11,846,454 |  | 22,372 | 0.19\% |  | 48,677 | 0.41\% |  | 425 | <0.01\% |
|  | Q2: 2006 |  | 10,318,641 |  | 19,450 | 0.19\% |  | 47,162 | 0.46\% |  | 423 | 0.02\% |
|  | Q3: 2006 |  | 9,718,985 |  | 19,326 | 0.20\% |  | 61,447 | 0.63\% |  | 589 | 0.02\% |
|  | Q4: 2006 |  | 9,212,002 |  | 20,119 | 0.22\% |  | $74,236$ | $0.81 \%$ |  | 711 | 0.03\% |
|  | 2006 |  | 9,212,002 |  | 20,119 | 0.22\% |  | 74,236 | 0.81\% |  | 2,148 | 0.02\% |
|  | Q1: 2007 | \$ | 8,582,964 | \$ | 19,954 | 0.23\% | \$ | 79,290 | 0.92\% | \$ | 1,646 | 0.08\% |
|  | (1) The credit reserve on residential real estate loans is only available to absorb losses on our residential real estate loan portfolio. The managed loans amount for residential CES prime and alt-a portfolios represents the loan balances for the securities where Redwood is first in line to absorb losses. The internally designated credit reserve is established to protect Redwood against losses suffered from these underlying loan balances. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |


| Residential Prime CES | Q1 2007 |  | Q4 2006 |  | Q3 2006 |  | Q2 2006 |  | Q1 2006 |  | Q4 2005 |  | Q3 2005 |  | Q2 2005 |  | Q1 2005 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Principal value | \$ | 899,856 | \$ | 871,984 | \$ | 900,358 | \$ | 925,212 | \$ | 849,556 | \$ | 858,999 | \$ | 885,264 | \$ | 908,780 | \$ | 826,789 |
| Unamortized premium |  | $(115,563)$ |  | $(117,016)$ |  | $(113,398)$ |  | $(105,707)$ |  | $(52,906)$ |  | $(105,078)$ |  | $(76,264)$ |  | $(80,172)$ |  | $(74,657)$ |
| Credit protection |  | $(263,991)$ |  | $(256,932)$ |  | $(276,189)$ |  | $(309,703)$ |  | $(343,209)$ |  | $(296,362)$ |  | $(323,839)$ |  | $(336,556)$ |  | $(313,857)$ |
| Unrealized market value |  | 50,847 |  | 57,333 |  | 57,459 |  | 51,733 |  | 43,276 |  | 55,293 |  | 74,925 |  | 93,954 |  | 79,710 |
| Market value (book value) | \$ | 571,149 | \$ | 555,369 | \$ | 568,230 | \$ | 561,535 | \$ | 496,717 | \$ | 512,852 | \$ | 560,086 | \$ | 586,006 | \$ | 517,985 |
| Market value / principal value | \$ | 63.47 | \$ | 63.69 | \$ | 63.11 | \$ | 60.69 | \$ | 58.47 | \$ | 59.70 | \$ | 63.27 | \$ | 64.48 | \$ | 62.65 |
| Current Rating |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| BB | \$ | 315,865 | \$ | 307,713 | \$ | 314,279 | \$ | 286,321 | \$ | 255,488 | \$ | 271,389 | \$ | 270,770 | \$ | 259,922 | \$ | 233,505 |
| B |  | 131,224 |  | 118,836 |  | 119,458 |  | 133,410 |  | 108,574 |  | 107,091 |  | 156,951 |  | 194,911 |  | 167,554 |
| Non Rated |  | 124,060 |  | 128,820 |  | 134,493 |  | 141,804 |  | 132,655 |  | 134,372 |  | 132,365 |  | 131,173 |  | 116,926 |
| Total market value | \$ | 571,149 | \$ | 555,369 | \$ | 568,230 | \$ | 561,535 | \$ | 496,717 | \$ | 512,852 | \$ | 560,087 | \$ | 586,006 | \$ | 517,985 |
| Security Type |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Option ARM | \$ | 235,959 | \$ | 226,014 | \$ | 227,349 | \$ | 202,377 | \$ | 188,202 | \$ | 197,411 | \$ | 178,816 | \$ | 156,537 | \$ | 136,237 |
| ARM |  | 48,424 |  | 48,610 |  | 53,596 |  | 72,806 |  | 65,937 |  | 76,658 |  | 93,613 |  | 94,983 |  | 77,557 |
| Hybrid |  | 226,520 |  | 221,094 |  | 227,093 |  | 223,716 |  | 183,392 |  | 174,886 |  | 216,545 |  | 254,741 |  | 226,543 |
| Fixed |  | 60,246 |  | 59,651 |  | 60,193 |  | 62,636 |  | 59,185 |  | 63,896 |  | 71,112 |  | 79,745 |  | 77,648 |
| Total market value | \$ | 571,149 | \$ | 555,369 | \$ | 568,230 | \$ | 561,535 | \$ | 496,717 | \$ | 512,852 | \$ | 560,087 | \$ | 586,006 | \$ | 517,985 |
| Interest income | \$ | 14,443 | \$ | 13,776 | \$ | 16,745 | \$ | 14,629 | \$ | 11,619 | \$ | 10,535 | \$ | 11,143 | \$ | 9,845 | \$ | 8,967 |
| Discount amortization |  | 15,644 |  | 14,084 |  | 13,987 |  | 10,205 |  | 10,957 |  | 9,523 |  | 10,311 |  | 7,051 |  | 7,603 |
| Total interest income | \$ | 30,087 | \$ | 27,860 | \$ | 30,732 | \$ | 24,834 | \$ | 22,576 | \$ | 20,058 | \$ | 21,454 | \$ | 16,896 | \$ | 16,570 |
| Avg Balance | \$ | 511,659 | \$ | 491,576 | \$ | 497,983 | \$ | 466,605 | \$ | 424,723 | \$ | 439,171 | \$ | 489,342 | \$ | 447,454 | \$ | 412,098 |
| Interest income \% |  | 11.29\% |  | 11.21\% |  | 13.45\% |  | 12.54 \% |  | 10.94\% |  | 9.60\% |  | 9.11\% |  | 8.80\% |  | 8.70\% |
| Discount amort \% |  | 12.23\% |  | 11.46\% |  | 11.23\% |  | 8.75\% |  | 10.32\% |  | 8.67\% |  | 8.43\% |  | 6.30\% |  | 7.38\% |
| Yield |  | 23.52\% |  | 22.67 \% |  | 24.69\% |  | 21.29 \% |  | 21.26\% |  | 18.27 \% |  | 17.54 \% |  | 15.10\% |  | 16.08\% |
| Underlying Loan Characteristics |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Number of loans |  | 600,406 |  | 551,613 |  | 569,884 |  | 559,587 |  | 508,003 |  | 464,904 |  | 451,718 |  | 436,791 |  | 368,201 |
| Total Loan Face | \$ | 213,261,566 | \$ | 186,501,498 | \$ | 197,336,150 | \$ | 197,813,355 | \$ | 170,935,424 | \$ | 161,295,244 | \$ | 161,719,044 | \$ | 154,885,307 | \$ | 42,258,296 |
| Average loan size | \$ | 355 | \$ | 338 | \$ | 346 | \$ | 353 | \$ | 336 | \$ | 347 | \$ | 358 | \$ | 355 | \$ | 386 |
| Southern CA |  | 24 \% | 25\% |  |  | 25\% | 25\% |  |  | 26\% | 24\% |  |  | 23\% |  | 23\% |  | 23\% |
| Northern CA |  | $21 \%$ | 22\% |  |  | 22\% | 22\% |  |  | 24\% | 21\% |  |  | 20\% |  | 20\% |  | 20\% |
| Florida |  | 6\% | 6\% |  |  | 6\% | 6\% |  |  | 5\% | 5\% |  |  | 5\% |  | 5\% |  | 5\% |
| New York |  | 5\% | 5\% |  |  | 5\% | 5\% |  |  | 5\% | 5\% |  |  | 5\% |  | 5\% |  | 5\% |
| Georgia |  | 2\% | 2\% |  |  | 2\% | 2\% |  |  | 2\% | 2\% |  |  | 2\% |  | 2\% |  | 2\% |
| New Jersey |  | 3\% | 3\% |  |  | 4\% | 4\% |  |  | 3\% | 4\% |  |  | 4\% |  | 4\% |  | 4\% |
| Texas |  | 3\% | 3\% |  |  | 3\% | 3\% |  |  | 3\% | 3\% |  |  | 3\% |  | 3\% |  | 3\% |
| Arizona |  | 2\% | 2\% |  |  | 2\% | 2\% |  |  | 2\% | 2\% |  |  | 2\% |  | 2\% |  | 2\% |
| Illinois |  | 3\% | 3\% |  |  | 3\% | 3\% |  |  | 3\% | 3\% |  |  | 3\% |  | 3\% |  | 3\% |
| Colorado |  | 2\% | 2\% |  |  | 2\% | 2\% |  |  | 2\% | 2\% |  | 3\% |  |  | 3\% |  | 3\% |
| Virginia |  | $4 \%$ | 4\% |  |  | 4\% | 4\% |  |  | 4\% | 4\% |  |  | 4\% |  | 4\% |  | 4\% |
| Other states |  | 25\% | 23\% |  |  | 22\% | 22\% |  |  | 21\% | 25\% |  | 26\% |  |  | 26\% |  | 26\% |

Table 12A: Residential CES Prime and Underlying Loan Characteristics (all \$ in thousands) (continued)

|  | Q1 2007 | Q4 2006 | Q3 2006 | Q2 2006 | Q1 2006 | Q4 2005 | Q3 2005 | Q2 2005 | Q1 2005 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Year 2007 origination | 2\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Year 2006 origination | 20\% | 11\% | 14\% | 11\% | 1\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Year 2005 origination | 28\% | 28\% | 27\% | 29\% | 32\% | 23\% | 16\% | 7\% | 1\% |
| Year 2004 origination and earlier | 50\% | 61\% | 59\% | 60\% | 67\% | 77\% | 84\% | 93\% | 99\% |
| Wtd Avg Original LTV | 68\% | 68\% | 68\% | 68\% | 68\% | 67\% | 67\% | 67\% | 68\% |
| Original LTV: 0-50 | 13\% | 14\% | 13\% | 13\% | 14\% | 14\% | 14\% | 14\% | 13\% |
| Original LTV: 50.01-60 | 12\% | 12\% | 12\% | 12\% | 12\% | 13\% | 13\% | 12\% | 12\% |
| Original LTV: 60.01-70 | 22\% | 22\% | 22\% | 22\% | 22\% | 23\% | 23\% | 23\% | 23\% |
| Original LTV: 70.01-80 | 50\% | 49\% | 50\% | 50\% | 49\% | 47\% | 47\% | 48\% | 49\% |
| Original LTV: 80.01-90 | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% |
| Original LTV: 90.01-100 | 1\% | 1\% | 1\% | 1\% | 1\% | 1\% | 1\% | 1\% | 1\% |
| Unknown | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Wtd Avg FICO | 737 | 735 | 734 | 734 | 734 | 729 | 729 | 727 | 731 |
| FICO: <= 600 | 1\% | 1\% | 1\% | 1\% | 1\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| FICO: 601-620 | 1\% | 1\% | 1\% | 1\% | 1\% | 1\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| FICO: 621-640 | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% |
| FICO: 641-660 | 3\% | 3\% | 3\% | 3\% | 3\% | 4\% | 4\% | 4\% | 4\% |
| FICO: 661-680 | 6\% | 6\% | 7\% | 6\% | 6\% | 7\% | 7\% | 7\% | 7\% |
| FICO: 681-700 | 10\% | 10\% | 10\% | 10\% | 11\% | 11\% | 11\% | 11\% | 11\% |
| FICO: 701-720 | 12\% | 12\% | 13\% | 13\% | 12\% | 12\% | 13\% | 13\% | 13\% |
| FICO: 721-740 | 14\% | 13\% | 13\% | 13\% | 13\% | 14\% | 14\% | 14\% | 14\% |
| FICO: 741-760 | 15\% | 15\% | 15\% | 15\% | 15\% | 15\% | 15\% | 15\% | 16\% |
| FICO: 761-780 | 18\% | 18\% | 17\% | 17\% | 17\% | 17\% | 18\% | 18\% | 18\% |
| FICO: 781-800 | 14\% | 14\% | 13\% | 13\% | 13\% | 13\% | 12\% | 12\% | 12\% |
| FICO: >= 801 | 4\% | 4\% | 4\% | 4\% | 4\% | 3\% | 3\% | 3\% | 2\% |
| Unknown | 0\% | 1\% | 1\% | 2\% | 2\% | 1\% | 1\% | 1\% | 1\% |
| Conforming at Origination \% | 31\% | 34\% | 34\% | 33\% | 35\% | 25\% | 23\% | 23\% | 21\% |
| > \$1 MM \% | 9\% | 8\% | 9\% | 9\% | 7\% | 7\% | 6\% | 6\% | 6\% |
| 2nd Home \% | 7\% | 6\% | 6\% | 6\% | 6\% | 6\% | 6\% | 5\% | 5\% |
| Investment Home \% | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% |
| Purchase | 42\% | 39\% | 39\% | 39\% | 38\% | 36\% | 36\% | 35\% | 35\% |
| Cash Out Refi | 27\% | 27\% | 29\% | 30\% | 28\% | 27\% | 26\% | 25\% | 25\% |
| Rate-Term Refi | 30\% | 33\% | 31\% | 31\% | 33\% | 36\% | 37\% | 39\% | 39\% |
| Construction | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Other | 1\% | 1\% | 1\% | 0\% | 1\% | 1\% | 1\% | 1\% | 1\% |
| Full Doc | 45\% | 46\% | 44\% | 44\% | 47\% | 47\% | 53\% | 52\% | 54\% |
| No Doc | 6\% | 7\% | 6\% | 5\% | 5\% | 4\% | 5\% | 5\% | 5\% |
| Other Doc (Lim, Red, Stated, etc) | 49\% | 47\% | 50\% | 51\% | 48\% | 49\% | 42\% | 43\% | 41\% |
| 2-4 Family | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% |
| Condo | 9\% | 8\% | 8\% | 8\% | 8\% | 4\% | 3\% | 3\% | 3\% |
| Single Family | 88\% | 89\% | 89\% | 89\% | 89\% | 55\% | 56\% | 53\% | 52\% |
| Other | 1\% | 1\% | 1\% | 1\% | 1\% | 39\% | 39\% | 42\% | 43\% |

APPENDIX

| Table 12B: Residential CES Alt A and Underlying Loan Characteristics (all \$ in thousands) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Residential CES AIt A | Q1 2007 |  | Q4 2006 |  | Q3 2006 |  | Q2 2006 |  | Q1 2006 |  | Q4 2005 |  | Q3 2005 |  | Q2 2005 |  | Q1 2005 |  |
| Principal value | \$ | 348,371 | \$ | 298,780 | \$ | 272,957 | \$ | 243,391 | \$ | 184,513 | \$ | 154,794 | \$ | 144,521 | \$ | 170,543 | \$ | 126,137 |
| Unamortized premium |  | $(41,680)$ |  | $(26,440)$ |  | $(26,849)$ |  | $(11,700)$ |  | $(17,960)$ |  | $(16,752)$ |  | $(8,520)$ |  | $(10,849)$ |  | $(8,956)$ |
| Credit protection |  | $(128,772)$ |  | $(115,315)$ |  | $(107,140)$ |  | $(115,170)$ |  | $(68,077)$ |  | $(58,241)$ |  | $(58,323)$ |  | $(67,319)$ |  | $(51,791)$ |
| Unrealized market value |  | $(5,932)$ |  | (166) |  | 52 |  | (879) |  | 246 |  | (99) |  | 5,942 |  | 5,427 |  | 4,386 |
| Market value (book value) | \$ | 171,987 | \$ | 156,859 | \$ | 139,020 | \$ | 115,642 | \$ | 98,722 | \$ | 79,702 | \$ | 83,620 | \$ | 97,802 | \$ | 69,776 |
| Market value / principal value | \$ | 49.37 | \$ | 52.50 | \$ | 50.93 | \$ | 47.51 | \$ | 53.50 | \$ | 51.49 | \$ | 57.86 | \$ | 57.35 | \$ | 55.32 |
| Current Rating |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| BB | \$ | 100,895 | \$ | 94,239 | \$ | 85,874 | \$ | 62,063 | \$ | 63,244 | \$ | 51,175 | \$ | 55,065 | \$ | 50,983 | \$ | 35,752 |
| B |  | 30,989 |  | 22,861 |  | 19,722 |  | 22,122 |  | 13,377 |  | 7,969 |  | 8,451 |  | 27,370 |  | 20,756 |
| Non Rated |  | 40,103 |  | 39,759 |  | 33,424 |  | 31,457 |  | 22,101 |  | 20,558 |  | 20,104 |  | 19,449 |  | 13,268 |
| Total market value | \$ | 171,987 | \$ | 156,859 | \$ | 139,020 | \$ | 115,642 | \$ | 98,722 | \$ | 79,702 | \$ | 83,620 | \$ | 97,802 | \$ | 69,775 |
| Security Type |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Option ARM | \$ | 158,116 | \$ | 133,411 | \$ | 117,908 | \$ | 92,209 | \$ | 76,868 | \$ | 60,635 | \$ | 59,978 | \$ | 53,459 | \$ | 34,575 |
| ARM |  | 837 |  | 990 |  | 4,483 |  | 7,318 |  | 6,457 |  | 2,671 |  | 6,823 |  | 23,549 |  | 19,191 |
| Hybrid |  | 10,701 |  | 21,835 |  | 16,012 |  | 15,589 |  | 14,867 |  | 15,741 |  | 16,000 |  | 18,871 |  | 13,654 |
| Fixed |  | 2,333 |  | 623 |  | 616 |  | 526 |  | 529 |  | 654 |  | 819 |  | 1,922 |  | 2,355 |
| Total market value | \$ | 171,987 | \$ | 156,859 | \$ | 139,019 | \$ | 115,642 | \$ | 98,721 | \$ | 79,701 | \$ | 83,620 | \$ | 97,801 | \$ | 69,775 |
| Interest income | \$ | 4,143 | \$ | 4,312 | \$ | 1,872 | \$ | 1,746 | \$ | 2,235 | \$ | 1,926 | \$ | 1,732 | \$ | 1,508 | \$ | 1,630 |
| Discount amortization |  | 3,197 |  | 3,307 |  | 1,915 |  | 1,479 |  | 1,434 |  | 575 |  | 455 |  | 373 |  | 649 |
| Total interest income | \$ | 7,340 | \$ | 7,619 | \$ | 3,787 | \$ | 3,225 | \$ | 3,669 | \$ | 2,501 | \$ | 2,187 | \$ | 1,881 | \$ | 2,279 |
| Avg Balance | \$ | 151,740 | \$ | 154,988 | \$ | 135,489 | \$ | 106,648 | \$ | 92,239 | \$ | 70,315 | \$ | 78,347 | \$ | 84,002 | \$ | 61,484 |
| Interest income \% |  | 10.92\% |  | 11.13\% |  | 5.53\% |  | 6.55\% |  | 9.69\% |  | 10.96\% |  | 8.84\% |  | 7.18\% |  | 10.60\% |
| Discount amort \% |  | 8.43\% |  | 8.53\% |  | 5.65\% |  | 5.55\% |  | 6.22\% |  | 3.27\% |  | 2.32\% |  | 1.78\% |  | 4.22\% |
| Yield |  | 19.35\% |  | 19.66\% |  | 11.18\% |  | 12.10\% |  | 15.91\% |  | 14.23\% |  | 11.17\% |  | 8.96\% |  | 14.83\% |
| Underlying Loan Characteristics |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Number of loans |  | 58,960 |  | 54,599 |  | 67,132 |  | 60,471 |  | 50,168 |  | 49,596 |  | 46,682 |  | 58,163 |  | 38,421 |
| Total Loan Face | \$ | 19,620,740 | \$ | 18,026,078 | \$ | 22,126,922 | \$ | 19,796,509 | \$ | 15,470,805 | \$ | 15,555,706 | \$ | 14,262,580 | \$ | 17,962,707 | \$ | 11,612,670 |
| Average loan size | \$ | 333 | \$ | 330 | \$ | 330 | \$ | 327 | \$ | 308 | \$ | 314 | \$ | 306 | \$ | 309 | \$ | 302 |
| Southern CA |  | 31\% |  | 32\% |  | 31\% |  | 34\% |  | 35\% |  | 35\% |  | 35\% |  | 36\% |  | 33\% |
| Northern CA |  | 21\% |  | 22\% |  | 22\% |  | 23\% |  | 24\% |  | 22\% |  | 21\% |  | 21\% |  | 19\% |
| Florida |  | 10\% |  | 10\% |  | 9\% |  | 9\% |  | 8\% |  | 8\% |  | 7\% |  | 7\% |  | 8\% |
| New York |  | 2\% |  | 2\% |  | 2\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |
| Georgia |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |
| New Jersey |  | 3\% |  | 3\% |  | 3\% |  | 2\% |  | 2\% |  | 2\% |  | 3\% |  | 2\% |  | 2\% |
| Texas |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |
| Arizona |  | 4\% |  | 4\% |  | 4\% |  | 3\% |  | 3\% |  | 2\% |  | 2\% |  | 2\% |  | 2\% |
| Illinois |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 2\% |  | 2\% |  | 2\% |  | 2\% |
| Colorado |  | 3\% |  | 3\% |  | 3\% |  | 3\% |  | 3\% |  | 3\% |  | 4\% |  | 3\% |  | 4\% |
| Virginia |  | 3\% |  | 3\% |  | 3\% |  | 3\% |  | 2\% |  | 2\% |  | 2\% |  | 2\% |  | 2\% |
| Other states |  | 20\% |  | 18\% |  | 20\% |  | 19\% |  | 19\% |  | 21\% |  | 21\% |  | 22\% |  | 25\% |



| $\begin{array}{lc} & \text { Table 12C: Residenti } \\ \text { Residential CES Subprime } & \text { Q1 } 2007\end{array}$ |  |  | Q4 2006 |  | Q3 2006 |  |  | Char |  | tics |  | tho |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | Q2 2006 | Q1 2006 |  | Q4 2005 |  | Q3 2005 |  | Q2 2005 |  | Q1 2005 |  |
| Principal value | $\$$ | $\overline{11,219}$ |  |  |  | 9,841 |  | 9,841 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 |
| Unamortized premium |  | $(1,426)$ |  | $(1,387)$ |  |  |  | $(1,407)$ |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |
| Credit protection |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |
| Unrealized market value |  | (652) |  | 849 |  | (15) |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |
| Market value (book value) | \$ | 9,141 |  | 9,303 |  | 8,419 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 |
| Market value / principal value | \$ | 81.48 | \$ | 94.53 | \$ | 85.55 | \$ | 0.00 | \$ | 0.00 | \$ | 0.00 | \$ | 0.00 | \$ | 0.00 | \$ | 0.00 |
| Current Rating |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| BB | \$ | 9,141 | \$ | 6,678 | \$ | 5,919 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 |
| B |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |
| Non Rated |  | - |  | 2,625 |  | 2,500 |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |
| Total market value | \$ | 9,141 | \$ | 9,303 | \$ | 8,419 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 |
| Security Type |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Option ARM | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 |
| ARM |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |
| Hybrid |  | 1,013 |  | 4,127 |  | 4,064 |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |
| Fixed |  | 8,128 |  | 5,176 |  | 4,355 |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |
| Total market value | \$ | 9,141 | \$ | 9,303 | \$ | 8,419 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 |
| Interest income | \$ | 186 | \$ | 151 | \$ | 51 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 |
| Discount amortization |  | 51 |  | 22 |  | 15 |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |
| Total interest income | \$ | 237 | \$ | 173 | \$ | 66 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 |
| Avg Balance | \$ | 9,715 | \$ | 8,344 | \$ | 8,223 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 |
| Interest income \% |  | 7.66\% |  | 7.24 \% |  | 2.48\% |  | 0.00\% |  | 0.00\% |  | 0.00\% |  | 0.00\% |  | 0.00\% |  | 0.00\% |
| Discount amort \% |  | 2.10\% |  | 1.05\% |  | 0.73\% |  | 0.00\% |  | 0.00\% |  | 0.00\% |  | 0.00\% |  | 0.00\% |  | 0.00\% |
| Yield |  | 9.76\% |  | 8.29\% |  | 3.21\% |  | 0.00\% |  | 0.00\% |  | 0.00\% |  | 0.00\% |  | 0.00\% |  | 0.00\% |
| Underlying Loan Characteristics |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Number of loans |  | 25,001 |  | 31,873 |  | 34,841 |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |
| Total Loan Face | \$ | 3,614,761 | \$ | 5,439,260 | \$ | 5,945,868 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 |
| Average loan size | \$ | 145 | \$ | 171 | \$ | 171 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 |
| Southern CA |  | 18\% |  | 19\% |  | 19\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |
| Northern CA |  | 13\% |  | 14\% |  | 14\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |
| Florida |  | 12\% |  | 12\% |  | 12\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |
| New York |  | 4 \% |  | 4 \% |  | 4 \% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |
| Georgia |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |
| New Jersey |  | $4 \%$ |  | $4 \%$ |  | $4 \%$ |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |
| Texas |  | $4 \%$ |  | 4 \% |  | $4 \%$ |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |
| Arizona |  | $5 \%$ |  | 4 \% |  | $4 \%$ |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |
| Illinois |  | 6\% |  | 6\% |  | 6\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |
| Colorado |  | 2\% |  | 2\% |  | 2\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |
| Virginia |  | 2\% |  | 2\% |  | 2\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |
| Other states |  | 29\% |  | 28\% |  | 28\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |

APPENDIX

| Table 13: Other Real Estate Investments and Underlying Characteristics (all \$ in thousands) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Market Value | Q1 2007 |  | Q4 2006 |  | Q3 2006 |  | Q2 2006 |  | Q1 2006 |  | Q4 2005 |  | Q3 2005 |  | Q2 2005 |  | Q1 2005 |  |
|  | \$ | 50,057 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 |
| Current Rating |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| AAA | \$ | 2,038 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 |
| AA |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |
| A |  | 18,699 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |
| BBB |  | 5,729 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |
| BB |  | 4,185 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |
| B |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |
| Non Rated |  | 19,406 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |
| Total market value | \$ | 50,057 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 |
| Security Type |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ARM | \$ | 422 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 |
| Option ARM |  | 3,198 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |
| Hybrid |  | 43,969 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |
| Fixed |  | 2,468 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |
| Total market value | \$ | 50,057 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 |
| Interest income | \$ | 2,997 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 |
| Discount amortization |  | (532) |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |
| Total interest income | \$ | 2,465 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 |
| Avg Balance | \$ | 37,169 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 |
| Interest income \% |  | 32.25\% |  | 0.00\% |  | 0.00\% |  | 0.00\% |  | 0.00\% |  | 0.00\% |  | 0.00\% |  | 0.00\% |  | 0.00\% |
| Discount amort \% |  | -5.73\% |  | 0.00\% |  | 0.00\% |  | 0.00\% |  | 0.00\% |  | 0.00\% |  | 0.00\% |  | 0.00\% |  | 0.00\% |
| Yield |  | 26.53\% |  | 0.00\% |  | 0.00\% |  | 0.00\% |  | 0.00\% |  | 0.00\% |  | 0.00\% |  | 0.00\% |  | 0.00\% |


| Table 14: Residential Real Estate Loan Characteristics (all \$ in thousands) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Q1:2007 |  | Q4:2006 |  | Q3:2006 |  | Q2:2006 |  | Q1:2006 |  | Q4:2005 |  | Q3:2005 |  | Q2:2005 |  | Q1:2005 |  |
| Residential Loans | \$ | 8,582,964 | \$ | 9,212,002 | \$ | 9,718,985 | \$ | 10,318,641 | \$ | 11,846,454 | \$ | 13,719,242 | \$ | 16,386,833 | \$ | 19,443,387 | \$ | 21,579,671 |
| Number of loans |  | 25,579 |  | 27,695 |  | 31,744 |  | 34,013 |  | 37,458 |  | 33,863 |  | 51,593 |  | 58,941 |  | 62,060 |
| Average loan size | \$ | 336 | \$ | 333 | \$ | 306 | \$ | 303 | \$ | 316 | \$ | 405 | \$ | 318 | \$ | 330 | \$ | 348 |
| Adjustable \% |  | 79\% |  | 85\% |  | 89\% |  | 99\% |  | 99\% |  | 98\% |  | 100\% |  | 100 |  | 100\% |
| Hybrid \% |  | 20\% |  | 15\% |  | 11\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 2\% |  | 0\% |  | 0 |  | 0\% |
| Fixed \% |  | 1\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0 |  | 0\% |
| Amortizing \% |  | 4\% |  | 3\% |  | 3\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 0\% |  | 0 |  | 0\% |
| Interest-only \% |  | 96\% |  | 97\% |  | $97 \%$ |  | 99\% |  | 99\% |  | 99\% |  | 100\% |  | 100 |  | 100\% |
| Negatively amortizing \% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0 |  | 0\% |
| Southern California |  | 14\% |  | 13\% |  | 12\% |  | 11\% |  | 11\% |  | 11\% |  | 11\% |  | 12 |  | 12\% |
| Northern California |  | 10\% |  | 10\% |  | 10\% |  | 10\% |  | 10\% |  | 12\% |  | 11\% |  | 12 |  | 12\% |
| Florida |  | 13\% |  | 12\% |  | 12\% |  | 13\% |  | 12\% |  | 13\% |  | 12\% |  | 11 |  | 11 \% |
| New York |  | 6\% |  | 6\% |  | 6\% |  | 6\% |  | 6\% |  | 5\% |  | 5\% |  | 5 |  | 5\% |
| Georgia |  | 5\% |  | 5\% |  | 5\% |  | 5\% |  | 5\% |  | 5\% |  | 5\% |  | 5 |  | 5\% |
| New Jersey |  | 4 \% |  | 4 \% |  | 4\% |  | 4\% |  | 4 \% |  | $4 \%$ |  | $4 \%$ |  | 4 |  | $4 \%$ |
| Texas |  | 5\% |  | $5 \%$ |  | 5\% |  | 5\% |  | $5 \%$ |  | $4 \%$ |  | $4 \%$ |  | 4 |  | 4 \% |
| Arizona |  | 4 \% |  | $4 \%$ |  | 4\% |  | 4\% |  | $4 \%$ |  | $4 \%$ |  | $4 \%$ |  | 4 |  | $4 \%$ |
| Illinois |  | 3\% |  | 3\% |  | 3\% |  | 2\% |  | $2 \%$ |  | $2 \%$ |  | 3\% |  | 3 |  | 3\% |
| Colorado |  | 3\% |  | 4 \% |  | 4\% |  | $4 \%$ |  | 4 \% |  | $4 \%$ |  | $4 \%$ |  | 4 |  | 4 \% |
| Virginia |  | 3\% |  | 3\% |  | 3\% |  | 3\% |  | 3\% |  | $3 \%$ |  | 3\% |  | 3 |  | 3\% |
| Other states (none greater than 3\%) |  | 30\% |  | 31\% |  | 32\% |  | 33\% |  | $34 \%$ |  | 33\% |  | $34 \%$ |  | 33 |  | 33\% |
| Year 2007 origination |  | 3\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0 |  | 0\% |
| Year 2006 origination |  | 19\% |  | 17\% |  | 10\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0 |  | 0\% |
| Year 2005 origination |  | 5\% |  | 5\% |  | 5\% |  | 5\% |  | 5\% |  | $6 \%$ |  | 5\% |  | 4 |  | 3\% |
| Year 2004 origination or earlier |  | 73\% |  | 78\% |  | 85\% |  | 95\% |  | 95\% |  | 94\% |  | 95\% |  | 96 |  | 97\% |
| Wtd Avg Original LTV |  | 68\% |  | 68\% |  | 68\% |  | 68\% |  | 68\% |  | 69\% |  | 68\% |  | 69 |  | 68\% |
| Original LTV: 0-50 |  | 15\% |  | 16\% |  | 15\% |  | 15\% |  | 15\% |  | 13\% |  | 14\% |  | 13 |  | 13\% |
| Original LTV: 50-60 |  | 12\% |  | 12\% |  | 12\% |  | 12\% |  | 12\% |  | 11\% |  | 11\% |  | 11 |  | 11\% |
| Original LTV: 60-70 |  | 20\% |  | 20\% |  | 20\% |  | 21\% |  | 21\% |  | 21\% |  | 20\% |  | 20 |  | 20\% |
| Original LTV: 70-80 |  | 46\% |  | 45\% |  | 46\% |  | 45\% |  | 45\% |  | 48\% |  | 46\% |  | 47 |  | 46\% |
| Original LTV: 80-90 |  | 2\% |  | 2\% |  | 2\% |  | 2\% |  | 2\% |  | $2 \%$ |  | 2\% |  | 2 |  | 2\% |
| Original LTV: 90-100 |  | 5\% |  | 5\% |  | 5\% |  | 5\% |  | 5\% |  | 5 |  | $7 \%$ |  | 7 |  | 8\% |
| Wtg Avg FICO |  | 727 |  | 733 |  | 730 |  | 730 |  | 730 |  | 731 |  | 731 |  | 731 |  | 731 |
| FICO: <= 600 |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 1 |  | 1\% |
| FICO: 601-620 |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 1 |  | 1\% |
| FICO: 621-640 |  | 2\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 2\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |  | 1 |  | 1\% |
| FICO: 641-660 |  | 3\% |  | 3\% |  | 3\% |  | 3\% |  | 3\% |  | 3\% |  | 3\% |  | 3 |  | 3\% |
| FICO: 661-680 |  | $7 \%$ |  | 8\% |  | 8\% |  | 8\% |  | 8\% |  | 8\% |  | 8\% |  | 8 |  | 8\% |
| FICO: 681-700 |  | 12\% |  | 12\% |  | 12\% |  | 12\% |  | 12\% |  | 12\% |  | 12\% |  | 12 |  | 12\% |
| FICO: 701-720 |  | 14 \% |  | 14\% |  | 14\% |  | 14\% |  | 14 \% |  | 15\% |  | 14\% |  | 14 |  | 14 \% |
| FICO: 721-740 |  | 13\% |  | 13\% |  | 14\% |  | 13\% |  | 13\% |  | 13\% |  | 14\% |  | 14 |  | 14 \% |
| FICO: 741-760 |  | 15\% |  | 15\% |  | 15\% |  | 15\% |  | 15\% |  | 15\% |  | 15\% |  | 15 |  | 16\% |
| FICO: 761-780 |  | 17\% |  | 17\% |  | 17\% |  | 17\% |  | 17\% |  | 17\% |  | 17\% |  | 17 |  | 17\% |
| FICO: 781-800 |  | 12\% |  | 12\% |  | 12\% |  | 12\% |  | 11\% |  | 11\% |  | 11\% |  | 11 |  | 11\% |
| FICO: >= 801 |  | 3\% |  | 3\% |  | 2\% |  | 3\% |  | 3\% |  | 3\% |  | 3\% |  | 3 |  | 2\% |
| Conforming balance at origination \% |  | 37\% |  | 38\% |  | 41\% |  | 45\% |  | 37\% |  | 38\% |  | $37 \%$ |  | 37 |  | $36 \%$ |


|  |  | Managed Loans | InternallyDesignated Credit Reserve |  | External Credit Enhancement |  | Total Credit Protection (1) |  | Total Credit Protection as \% of Loans | Seriously Delinquent Loans |  | Seriously Delinquent Loan \% of Current Balance | Total Credit Losses |  | Third Parties' Share of Net Charge-offs/ (Recoveries) |  | Redwood's Share of Net Charge-offs/ (Recoveries) |  | Total Credit Losses As \% of Loans (Annualized) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Total Managed Commercial Portfolio |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Q1: 2005 | \$ 27,830,707 | \$ | 97,127 | \$ | 557,480 | \$ | 654,607 | 2.35\% | \$ | 15,305 | 0.05\% | \$ | 315 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 315 | 0.00\% |
|  | Q2: 2005 | 31,324,563 |  | 95,351 |  | 681,133 |  | 776,484 | 2.48\% |  | 35,971 | 0.11\% |  | 1,213 |  | 1,213 |  | - | 0.02\% |
|  | Q3: 2005 | 40,081,879 |  | 146,671 |  | 706,532 |  | 853,203 | 2.13\% |  | 20,690 | 0.05\% |  | 59 |  | 59 |  | - | 0.00\% |
|  | Q4: 2005 | 46,825,453 |  | 149,947 |  | 714,168 |  | 864,115 | 1.85\% |  | 40,916 | 0.09\% |  |  |  |  |  | - | 0.00\% |
|  | 2005 | 46,825,453 |  | 149,947 |  | 714,168 |  | 864,115 | 1.85\% |  | 40,916 | 0.09\% |  | 1,587 |  | 1,272 |  | 315 | 0.00\% |
|  | Q1: 2006 | 48,366,213 |  | 175,913 |  | 645,675 |  | 821,588 | 1.70\% |  | 38,124 | 0.08\% |  | 90 |  | 55 |  | 35 | 0.00\% |
|  | Q2: 2006 | 51,635,796 |  | 200,275 |  | 653,476 |  | 853,751 | 1.65\% |  | 44,632 | 0.09\% |  | 1,463 |  | 1,463 |  | - | 0.01\% |
|  | Q3: 2006 | 58,106,355 |  | 266,523 |  | 678,489 |  | 945,012 | 1.63\% |  | 70,586 | 0.12\% |  | 2,167 |  | 1,705 |  | 462 | 0.01\% |
|  | Q4: 2006 | 57,789,159 |  | 303,481 |  | 472,669 |  | 776,150 | 1.34\% |  | 64,367 | 0.11\% |  | 1,156 |  | 1,132 |  | 24 | 0.01\% |
|  | 2006 | 57,789,159 |  | 303,481 |  | 472,669 |  | 776,150 | 1.34\% |  | 64,367 | 0.11\% |  | 4,876 |  | 4,355 |  | 521 | 0.03\% |
|  | Q1: 2007 | \$ 57,450,042 | \$ | 304,955 | \$ | 551,917 | \$ | 856,872 | 1.49\% | \$ | 77,726 | 0.14\% | \$ | 1,471 | \$ | 1,417 | \$ | 24 | 0.01\% |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Commercial Real Estate Loans |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Q1: 2005 | \$ 67,365 | \$ | 8,456 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 8,456 | 12.55\% | \$ | 0 | 0.00\% | \$ | 315 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 315 | 1.87\% |
|  | Q2: 2005 | 51,778 |  | 8,141 |  |  |  | 8,141 | 15.72\% |  |  | 0.00\% |  |  |  |  |  | - | 0.00\% |
|  | Q3: 2005 | 66,348 |  | 8,141 |  |  |  | 8,141 | 12.27\% |  |  | 0.00\% |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.00\% |
|  | Q4: 2005 | 70,091 |  | 8,141 |  |  |  | 8,141 | 11.61\% |  |  | 0.00\% |  | - |  |  |  | - | 0.00\% |
|  | 2005 | 70,091 |  | 8,141 |  |  |  | 8,141 | 11.61\% |  |  | 0.00\% |  | 315 |  | - |  | 315 | 0.45\% |
|  | Q1: 2006 | 65,508 |  | 8,141 |  |  |  | 8,141 | 12.43\% |  |  | 0.00\% |  | 35 |  |  |  | 35 | 0.21\% |
|  | Q2: 2006 | 46,959 |  | 8,141 |  |  |  | 8,141 | 17.34\% |  |  | 0.00\% |  |  |  |  |  | - | 0.00\% |
|  | Q3: 2006 | 42,384 |  | 8,141 |  |  |  | 8,141 | 19.21\% |  |  | 0.00\% |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.00\% |
|  | Q4: 2006 | 38,360 |  | 8,141 |  |  |  | 8,141 | 21.22\% |  |  | 0.00\% |  |  |  |  |  | - | 0.00\% |
|  | 2006 | 38,360 |  | 8,141 |  |  |  | 8,141 | 21.22\% |  |  | 0.00\% |  | 35 |  |  |  | 35 | 0.36\% |
|  | Q1: 2007 | \$ 38,394 | \$ | 10,489 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 10,489 | 27.32\% | \$ | 0 | 0.00\% | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | 0.00\% |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Commercial CES | Q1: 2005 | \$ 27,763,342 | \$ | 88,671 | \$ | 557,480 | \$ | 646,151 | 2.33\% | \$ | 15,305 | 0.06\% | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | \$ | 0 | 0.00\% |
|  | Q2: 2005 | 31,272,785 |  | 87,210 |  | 681,133 |  | 768,343 | 2.46\% |  | 35,971 | 0.12\% |  | 1,213 |  | 1,213 |  | - | 0.02\% |
|  | Q3: 2005 | 40,015,531 |  | 138,530 |  | 706,532 |  | 845,062 | 2.11\% |  | 20,690 | 0.05\% |  | 59 |  | 59 |  | - | 0.00\% |
|  | Q4: 2005 | 46,755,362 |  | 141,806 |  | 714,168 |  | 855,974 | 1.83\% |  | 40,916 | 0.09\% |  | - |  | - |  | - | 0.00\% |
|  | 2005 | 46,755,362 |  | 141,806 |  | 714,168 |  | 855,974 | 1.83\% |  | 40,916 | 0.09\% |  | 1,272 |  | 1,272 |  | - | 0.00\% |
|  | Q1: 2006 | 48,300,705 |  | 167,772 |  | 645,675 |  | 813,447 | 1.68\% |  | 38,124 | 0.08\% |  | 55 |  | 55 |  | - | 0.00\% |
|  | Q2: 2006 | 51,588,837 |  | 192,134 |  | 653,476 |  | 845,610 | 1.64\% |  | 44,632 | 0.09\% |  | 1,463 |  | 1,463 |  | - | 0.01\% |
|  | Q3: 2006 | 58,063,971 |  | 258,382 |  | 678,489 |  | 936,871 | 1.61\% |  | 70,586 | 0.12\% |  | 2,167 |  | 1,705 |  | 462 | 0.01\% |
|  | Q4: 2006 | 57,750,799 |  | 295,340 |  | 472,669 |  | 768,009 | 1.33\% |  | 64,367 | 0.11\% |  | 1,156 |  | 1,132 |  | 24 | 0.01\% |
|  | 2006 | 57,750,799 |  | 295,340 |  | 472,669 |  | 768,009 | 1.33\% |  | 64,367 | 0.11\% |  | 4,841 |  | 4,355 |  | 486 | 0.01\% |
|  | Q1: 2007 | \$ 57,411,648 | \$ | 294,466 | \$ | 551,917 | \$ | 846,383 | 1.47\% | \$ | 77,726 | 0.14\% | \$ | 1,471 | \$ | 1,417 | \$ | 24 | 0.01\% |
|  | (1) The credit reserve on commercial real estate loans is only available to absorb losses on our commercial real estate loan portfolio. Internally-designated credit reserves and external credit enhancement are only available to absorb losses on the commercial CES. Much of the external credit enhancement will share loan losses with Redwood rather than protect Redwood from losses. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |


| Table 16: Commercial CES Underlying Loan Characteristics (all \$ in thousands) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Q1:2007 | Q4:2006 | Q3:2006 | Q2:2006 | Q1:2006 | Q4:2005 | Q3:2005 | Q2:2005 |  | Q1:2005 |  |
| Commercial CES Loans | \$ 57,411,648 | \$ 57,750,799 | \$ 58,063,971 | \$ 51,588,837 | \$ 48,300,705 | \$ 46,755,362 | \$ 40,015,531 |  | 31,272,785 | \$ | 27,763,342 |
| Number of loans | 3,968 | 3,889 | 4,032 | 3,456 | 3,737 | 3,618 | 2,866 |  | 2,248 |  | 2,059 |
| Average face value | \$ 14,469 | \$ 14,850 | \$ 14,401 | \$ 14,927 | \$ 12,925 | \$ 12,923 | \$ 13,962 | \$ | 13,911 | \$ | 13,484 |
| State Distribution |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CA | 17\% | 17\% | 18\% | 18\% | 17\% | 17\% | 16\% |  | 18\% |  | 17\% |
| NY | 13\% | 13\% | 11\% | 12\% | 12\% | 13\% | 13\% |  | 14\% |  | 16\% |
| TX | 8\% | 8\% | 5\% | 6\% | 6\% | 6\% | 7\% |  | $7 \%$ |  | 7\% |
| VA | 4\% | 4\% | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% | 3\% |  | 1\% |  | 1\% |
| FL | 6\% | 6\% | 5\% | 5\% | 5\% | 5\% | 5\% |  | $4 \%$ |  | $4 \%$ |
| Other | 52\% | 52\% | 59\% | $57 \%$ | 58\% | 57\% | 56\% |  | 56\% |  | $55 \%$ |
| Property Type Distribution |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Office | 35\% | 37\% | 30\% | 36\% | 32\% | 37\% | 39\% |  | 40\% |  | 40\% |
| Retail | 30\% | $31 \%$ | 32\% | 32\% | 33\% | 33\% | $34 \%$ |  | $34 \%$ |  | $34 \%$ |
| Multi-family | 12\% | 12\% | 11\% | 11\% | 16\% | 12\% | 10\% |  | 10\% |  | 12\% |
| Hospitality | 7\% | 7\% | 6\% | 5\% | 7\% | 3\% | 5\% |  | 4\% |  | 3\% |
| Self-storage | 3\% | 3\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |  | 0\% |  | 0\% |
| Industrial | 3\% | 3\% | 1\% | 1\% | 2\% | 2\% | 1\% |  | 2\% |  | 2\% |
| Other | 10\% | 7\% | 20\% | 15\% | 10\% | 13\% | 11\% |  | 10\% |  | 9\% |
| Weighted average LTV | 68\% | 69\% | 69\% | 69\% | 68\% | 68\% | 68\% |  | $67 \%$ |  | 68\% |
| Weighted average debt service coverage ratio | 1.73 | 1.60 | 1.72 | 1.75 | 1.99 | 2.05 | 1.88 |  | 1.79 |  | 1.86 |

## APPENDIX

Table 18: Securities Portfolios Credit Rating and Collateral Type (in millions)



|  | \| |
| :---: | :---: |
|  |  |


|  | $\leftrightarrow$ |
| :---: | :---: |


|  |  |
| :---: | :---: |
|  |  |




|  | $\leftrightarrow$ |
| :---: | :---: |



## Redwood Trust Corporate Information

## Executive Officers:

George E. Bull, III
Chairman of the Board and
Chief Executive Officer
Douglas B. Hansen
President
Martin S. Hughes
Chief Financial Officer
Brett D. Nicholas
Vice President
Andrew I. Sirkis
Vice President
Harold F. Zagunis
Vice President

## Directors:

George E. BuII, III
Chairman of the Board and
Chief Executive Officer
Douglas B. Hansen
President
Richard D. Baum
Chief Deputy Insurance
Commissioner for the
State of California
Thomas C. Brown
CEO, Urban Bay Properties, Inc.
Mariann Byerwalter
Chairman, JDN Corporate
Advisory, LLC
Greg H. Kubicek
President, The Holt Group, Inc.
Georganne C. Proctor
Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, TIAA-CREF

## Charles J. Toeniskoetter

Chairman, Toeniskoetter \& Breeding, Inc.
David L. Tyler
Private Investor

## Stock Listing:

The Company's common stock is traded on the
New York Stock Exchange under the symbol RWT.

## Corporate Office:

One Belvedere Place, Suite 300
Mill Valley, California 94941
Telephone: 415-389-7373

Transfer Agent:
Computershare
2 North LaSalle Street
Chicago, IL 60602
Telephone: 888-472-1955

## Investor Relations:

IR Hotline: $\quad 866-269-4976$
Telephone: 415-389-7373
Email: investorrelations@redwoodtrust.com
For more information about Redwood Trust, please visit our website at: www.redwoodtrust.com

