LETTER TO STOCKHOLDERS **May 4, 2020**

Dear Fellow Stockholder,

Had this letter gone to press in February or early March, the dominant theme would have been the impact of climate change on our different businesses - both the expectations of customers, and our efforts to reduce our own carbon footprints. COVID-19 has, understandably, chased climate issues from the headlines. Nevertheless, pursuing reduction of our carbon output and developing services that help customers to do so is very much core to strategic thinking about our businesses.

In "real time" the outlook for 2020 is shrouded in COVID-19 "unknowns" and the duration of their fallout on global and domestic economic activity. This letter highlights what I, and our managers, see today as the most likely impacts on our businesses, both short and long term. Next week's updates could bring either good or disappointing news, causing us to change our view.

Overall, however, with the general business outlook so uncertain, I consider SEACOR's diversity of revenue streams comforting. I will discuss them in the following pages. Before beginning, I want to express deep appreciation for the commitment of the over 2,000 individuals who are the backbone and sinew of SEACOR's businesses.

FINANCIAL RESULTS

Earnings, Income Statement, and Balance Sheet

GAAP 2019 earnings were $27 million, or $1.38 per diluted share, a 3.8% return on beginning equity of $704 million. This is disappointing but given the persistent rains in the Midwest, which effectively shut down our inland operations in St. Louis for just over 10% of the year, and a trade war that strangled exports of U.S. grain, we were fortunate to have eked out a better yield than available from a 10-year tax free coupon at the beginning of January last year. (Not a good return even grading on a "curve.")

SEACOR produced $111 million of "cash earnings", $5.44 per diluted share.[1] Our seven most significant joint ventures had equity losses of $6 million.[2] These joint ventures produced $22 million in OIBDA, of which almost $12 million was SEACOR's share.

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[1] For the calculation of "cash earnings," see Appendix I. Our OIBDA, defined as operating income (loss) plus depreciation and amortization, expenses non-cash incentive compensation of $5 million for share awards (restricted stock awards and stock options) and all costs for periodic maintenance (surveys and special overhauls of machinery), the latter which some others exclude from their reported EBITDA and characterize as "maintenance CAPEX." (EBITDA is more commonly put forward as a financial metric than OIBDA, but it does not account for cash required for interest coupons and taxes.) On August 2, 2019, SEACOR acquired its partner's 49% ownership position in SEA-Vista, our tanker owning subsidiary. SEACOR issued 1,500,000 shares of Common Stock and paid about $108 million in cash. This acquisition added $9 million to "cash" OIBDA. SEA-Vista is part of the Seabulk "brand."

[2] The seven joint ventures that relate closely to our operating activities include Trailer Bridge, RF Vessel Holdings and Golfo de Mexico (collectively, dba CG Railway), KSM, SCFCo (dba InterBarge), Bunge-SCF Grain, SCF Bunge Marine, and O'Brien's do Brazil. For additional information, see Note 4 of our 2019 10-K on pages 89 to 92.

Balance Sheet and Liquidity

SEACOR's balance sheet is sound. Our liquidity is ample, and it will be boosted by the approximately $32 million of tax recovered from our 2019 net operating loss carryback, now permitted by recent legislation. Our treasury ended 2019 with $86 million of cash.[3] SEACOR also has an undrawn credit facility of $125 million. During the year, we purchased our 3.0% Convertible Senior Notes for $56 million. Total debt at yearend was $314 million.[4] The $22 million increase in receivables year-over-year relates to reimbursement from the government (Federal Emergency Management Agency – "FEMA").

Our discrete businesses are capable of financing their own operations. SEA-Vista, our Jones Act tanker subsidiary, has its own $200 million bank facility, divided between a term loan and line of credit with $100 million undrawn as of December 31. Our Waterman subsidiary, which services the U.S. military, leases all its key operating assets.[5] Our inland group is also largely self-financing and relies only occasionally on our corporate treasury. The operation with the largest advance from the parent company is Witt O'Brien's, our crisis and emergency management business. It is for expedience that it does not have its own credit line.

Capital Expenditures

Capital expenditures totaled $38 million in 2019. We took delivery of two inland river towboats, acquired real property, upgraded several inland river towboats, and purchased a previously leased-in harbor tug. We ended the year with capital commitments of $62 million, of which $51 million relate to four harbor tugs. In total, we had almost $13 million on deposit for equipment on order.[6]

OIBDA, "Free Cash Flow," and Enterprise Sustainability

By way of preface, I hope the general observations about depreciation, free cash flow, and business sustainability that follow are useful.

Successive letters have pointed out that OIBDA is a useful metric for comparing operating results of two companies, but also called attention to its limitations: depreciation can be a real expense. Hence, my discussion of OIBDA and operating cash is incomplete without a discussion of "free cash flow."[7] I think of "free cash

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[3] Cash includes cash, restricted cash, and their funds in money markets, and marketable securities.

[4] Since January 2020, we retired another $16 million of our notes; almost $35 million is due November 19, 2020. Pursuant to the terms of our line of credit, one year prior to the date holders of our 3% notes can put them to SEACOR we must hold and maintain cash to sufficiently satisfy the obligation.

[5] Although SEA-Vista has a $100 million term loan, which is included in our consolidated debt, SEACOR does not guarantee that obligation. Waterman's bareboat charters are not guaranteed by SEACOR.

[6] Since January 2020, we committed to an additional $5 million in capital expenditures.

[7] I have found several definitions of "free cash flow": one is OIBDA/EBITDA *less* capital expenditures and dividends, or, expressed somewhat differently, "money available to pay back debt, pay investors, or grow the business" after all expenses of operations of the company have been paid (including capital expenditures), and cash required for working capital. All the foregoing is relevant when assessing the quality of a company's reported earnings and its financial health. However, apart from thinking about free cash flow in context of several years, I also differentiate capital expenditures that are foreseeable and essential for the sustainability of an enterprise (and debt due in two

flow" in a multi-year context. I also compartmentalize in my head the cash generated in any one year into two categories. One cubby holds dollars that need to be accumulated to pay for, or be the down payment for, essential capital expenditures over a two-to-three-year period, or to redeem debt. The other bin holds money we can distribute, use for share repurchases, or invest for growth. Of course, access to capital is also a consideration. Debt can be refinanced, and growth opportunities can be funded by share issuances or debt, or a combination thereof.

The discussion of our different revenue streams lays out foreseeable, obligatory reinvestments.

Leasing and OIBDA

Leasing equipment is one option for financing our assets. As a reminder, when we sell an asset and lease it back, we shed depreciation and interest expense. Those charges are incorporated into the lease rate, which becomes an expense of operations.[8] Leasing assets reduces OIBDA and operating income. Conversely, re-purchasing an asset that has been leased (exercising Early Buyout Option, "EBO") boosts OIBDA. Year-over-year or sequential period comparisons can be misleading as to the performance of our businesses unless OIBDA is adjusted for the impact of lease activity.

We have various reasons for selling and leasing equipment; dressing up OIBDA to flatter our returns on capital is not one of them. Our choice to lease usually relates to the relative value of tax depreciation to us, or to a buyer-lessor, and comparative cost with unsecured or mortgage debt.

OCEAN TRANSPORTATION & LOGISTICS SERVICES ("Ocean Services")

SEACOR has approximately $504 million invested in the Ocean Services group.[9] The group has five different revenue streams and three significant joint venture interests.

The group produced $63 million of operating income and $88 million of "cash" OIBDA.[10] Ocean Services' diversification effort has paid off: 65% of segment operating income and 57% of "cash" OIBDA were generated by our port and harbor services, logistics support for the U.S. government, and our Caribbean liner business. This compares with 49% and 54% respectively in 2018. Our goal is to continue optimizing our businesses adding and bundling more services with our assets, helping

years) from optional outlays, linked to growth or improving productivity. I do not see the latter as encroaching on "free cash flow," but rather as growth capital.

[8] The lease payment reflects the new owner-lessor's charge for capital, in effect embedding the new owner-lessor's depreciation and imputed "interest."

[9] In this letter, investment in a business line refers to the stockholders' equity in the business plus or minus the intercompany balances due to/from the parent company. We carry all Ocean Services' equipment on our books for $549 million net of accumulated depreciation from its original $929 million of cost. Our tankers and dry bulk ship activities require minimal working capital; vessels working on period charters are typically paid monthly in advance and affreightment is paid usually before a vessel discharges cargo. Ocean Services employs approximately 1,200 individuals, about 260 shore-based personnel and around 950 on board the vessels and tugs it owns and manages. Of the 950 seamen, 12% are non-U.S. citizens.

[10] For the calculation of "cash" OIBDA, see the Financial Highlights' page.

customers measure efficiency of port calls, putting more goods through our warehouses, expanding our customer base via our sales network, offering door to door logistics services, and emphasizing our logistics capabilities in the MSP to do more government work.

U.S. Coastwise Bulk Transportation ("Jones Act")

The Year in Review – About 50% of our investment in Ocean Services, or $250 million, is invested in Jones Act tankers, an ATB, and dry bulk vessels.[11]

Seabulk docked two tankers last year, expensing approximately $12 million, $10 million for shipyard work, and $2 million in crew costs. The 112 days out of service represented an estimated $6 million in lost revenue.

The Update and Outlook – As of March 31, 2020, Seabulk's tanker revenue backlog was $217 million, of which slightly less than $114 million is triple net (bareboat charter arrangements in shipping terminology). Looking ahead, no tankers come off charter prior to March 2021.

Seabulk has only its articulated chemical tug-barge ("ATB") operating in the spot market. As noted in last year's letter, this vessel is particularly well suited for parcel work given its ability to segregate ten grades of cargo. Of the nearly 90 vessels in the Jones Act tanker and ATB fleet, only five can handle more than seven distinct cargoes at the same time.

Seabulk completed a docking of one vessel earlier in 2020 and installed a mandated system to treat ballast water. We had planned to dock one additional vessel this year but, given the current circumstances with COVID-19, the work will be deferred to 2021.

Dry Bulk – We carry our two Jones Act early 1980's dry bulk vessels at scrap value. Some dry bulk commodities, such as fertilizer, petroleum coke and fly ash, are more economically transported coastwise by vessel than overland by rail. The two ships produced about $6 million in "cash" OIBDA, covering over 75% of the nearly $8 million cost for their dockings in 2018.[12] Of the calendar days available, the two ships were 90% utilized.[13] These ships will not require dockings again until 2021.
Sustainability – In GAAP, accounting for the useful life and residual value ascribed to an asset is management's "fielder's choice," (albeit auditor reviewed). Ocean Services depreciates all its vessels (ships and tugs) over 25 years from original build.[14] Our two bulk carriers and the *Seabulk Challenge* are 39 years old, all

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[11] The net book value of equipment in Jones Act tankers, ATB, and dry bulk vessels was $385 million. We also have $23 million invested in five 12-year-old Jones Act qualified tank barges (aggregate 220,000 barrels capacity with next docking due in 2022/2023) supporting a bunkering operation outside the U.S. The assets and their revenue are ascribed to port services.

[12] The decision to dock our bulk carriers in 2018 was based on our assessment that we could earn back the cost quickly and realize an attractive return for cash spent and risk incurred. I am hopeful we will recoup the rest of our investment in 2020 as well as make a handsome return. Thus far this year, we have earned $0.8 million.

[13] Last year the vessels were out of service for about 55 days for repairs for a collective cost of $4 million out of pocket and estimated $2 million of lost revenue (hazard of older ships).

[14] Other companies choose to depreciate their coastwise Jones Act ships and tank barges over as many as 40 years.

operating 14 years beyond their projected useful life. They demonstrate that "*useful life*" is not always synonymous with "*useable life.*" Fling enough dollars at old ships (or most equipment) and they will operate. What banishes equipment from service, more often than not, are changes in regulations, acceptability to customers, advances in technology, uncompetitive operating costs, and, of course always compelling, depressed market conditions.

Given the $150-160 million fully outfitted price tag for new Jones Act tankers such as ours, or $150 million for a geared Jones Act dry bulk carrier, paying several million dollars for a survey can, depending on market prospects, make sense. Surprisingly, there is still one 1969 steam-powered tanker in operation. It serves customers in the chemical trades.[15] Four of Seabulk's tanker fleet (including the chemical ATB) are less than four years old. Three of its tankers are in the top quintile of fuel efficiency in the Jones Act fleet.[16]

I view each ship in our Jones Act fleet as an investment in a discrete "business." Each is an independent profit center. Of course, overhead is spread more efficiently when operating a larger group of ships but any decision to acquire (or dispose) of ships would be based on its/their return on investment relative to risk.

Port Services ("Seabulk")

Our investment in Port Services is approximately $143 million.[17] Operations produced $20 million of operating income and approximately $30 million of "cash" OIBDA. The group operates 23 harbor tugs serving seven ports in the U.S.[18]

The Year in Review - "Cash" OIBDA grew by 20% (30% from U.S. harbor towing operations) from the prior year. We increased our customer base in 2019 by over 8%. Last year, our tugs serviced almost 325 of its 400 clients, safely completing close to 22,000 escorts and dockings, about 5% more than 2018. Tanker assists accounted for just over half these jobs. Our tugs handled in round numbers 4,000 transits for container vessels and 2,900 for bulk carriers. In addition, they do "project work," some of the missions on "need to know" basis.[19]

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[15] The survey cost for a Jones Act tanker in the latter years of its first decade of life is typically approximately $3-4 million trending up to $5 million for third special docking and climbing to $6-7 million or more for a 25-year-old ship undergoing a fifth special survey. Costs to meet regulations can boost this number.

[16] These three tankers burn 21 metric tons of fuel per day and they are capable of being converted to consume liquefied natural gas. This consumption compares with 32 tons per day for same size vessels that were built post 2000-2009.

[17] We carry our U.S.-flag harbor tug fleet on our books for $86 million net of accumulated depreciation from its original $133 million of cost. The net book value of our foreign-flag harbor tug fleet was $29 million net of accumulated depreciation from its original $45 million. Our oldest tugs are around 40 years old. In the last 10 years, we have sold 11 tugs that were over 25 years in age, and for over 55% more than end-of-life book value.

[18] We operate in Port Arthur, Texas; Port of Lake Charles, Louisiana; Port of Mobile, Alabama; Port Canaveral, Florida; Port of Tampa, Florida; Port Everglades, Florida; and Port of Miami, Florida. We also have four tugs operating in our Bahamas joint venture, two of which we own. We have four operating in the St. Eustatius bunkering operation. We support our Trailer Bridge, Inc. joint venture with an offshore tug that tows barges to and from Puerto Rico. Seabulk's Port Services group employs approximately 186 tug crew members and 46 shore-based personnel dedicated to Port Services, most of them in the U.S. There are more shore-based personnel who share responsibilities within the Ocean Services business.

[19] For the very "curious," year-over-year increases in activity by port (in order of number of tug jobs) were as follows: Total 5% increase; Port Arthur, Texas 5% increase; Port Everglades, Florida 5% decrease; Port Tampa, Florida

During 2019, Port Services put eight tugs through dockings and major overhauls for an aggregate expense just over $4 million.[20] It is a rare year when the group does not put four or more of its assets through regulatory dockings or main engine overhauls, but there can be large variations in expense year over year or sequential periods.[21] Over 200 days were lost due dockings and periodic extended maintenance on main engines due to service hours. We maintain surge capacity in our system because customers expect us to handle peak traffic; consequently, there is no revenue loss specific to any one asset.

***The Update and Outlook* –** After a good beginning to 2020, activity for our port support services is slowing. The short-term outlook is clouded by the COVID-19 outbreak. Once world trade normalizes and the glut of gasoline and jet fuel inventory is reduced, I would anticipate our ports will again be busy. I expect Florida's population to grow and with that the importance of its ports and demand for goods. It may, however, require more time for cruise lines to regain confidence of vacationers. I am not counting on them to call at Florida ports with the same frequency as in 2019 or the first two months of this year. Although every dollar of revenue is precious, cruise vessels account for less than 5% of our overall business. Looking back over the last five years, activity at our ports has grown considerably and so has productivity per tug, about 4% per year. Assisting ships that call is basic to trade infrastructure.

***Sustainability* –** Our tug assets, although discrete vessels and individually identifiable revenue producers, are integral to a business worth more than the sum of its parts. Multiple ports and tugs of differing capabilities contribute to a service ensemble. Servicing ports is akin to a franchise business, and the Seabulk name is a "brand." As a result, we enjoy a diverse and repeat customer base. Seabulk markets reliability of service and prompt execution. As mentioned previously, part of our service is maintaining capacity to handle peak traffic.

In order to protect the value in the franchise it is periodically necessary to upgrade our asset base. We have, as mentioned, ordered four new tugs. Timing of actual delivery will depend on the timeframe for business recovery from the Coronavirus global recession. These tugs will have higher horsepower required for the larger ships now calling at our ports. Of the four tugs we have on order, two are capable of being fitted with batteries when technology permits.[22] Once COVID-19 is relegated to inside page news (hopefully soon), I believe carbon emissions will come back into headline. These new tugs should also be cheaper to maintain than the vessels they replace and experience fewer out-of-service days.

22% increase; Port Mobile, Alabama 8% increase; Port Lake Charles, Louisiana 4% decrease; Port Canaveral, Florida 2% increase; and Port Miami, Florida 35% increase.

[20] As with tankers, there is substantial differential in the cost for docking and major overhauls for tugs ten years old or younger compared with tugs over 10 years old. The range would typically be $150,000 to $350,000 compared with $500,000 to $800,000. Main engine overhauls are usually based on hours of service.

[21] Depending on the age of vessels whose surveys fall due there can also be meaningful year-to-year differences in maintenance expenses.

[22] We will either fund the purchase with a lease finance arrangement once the vessels have delivered, or simply incorporate them into our portfolio of owned assets.

After adding these new tugs, unless we acquire other ports, or expand into adjacent services, I would not anticipate any significant need to reinvest for quite a few years.

Caribbean Island Logistics ("SEACOR Island Lines" or "Island Lines")

SEACOR has approximately $23 million invested in SEACOR Island Lines.[23] It produced slightly over $8 million of operating income and "cash" OIBDA of nearly $12 million, almost three times that of 2018.[24]

The Year in Review - SEACOR Island Lines' key markets continued to grow last year. The Bahamian islands have been a popular destination for cruise ships. In 2019, Island Lines executed 1,391 voyages to 43 ports of call. I consider having a broad customer base beneficial. Our ten largest customers account for less than 30% of our business.

The Update and Outlook – Before COVID-19 shut down the Bahamas, SEACOR Island Lines started 2020 on a high note. The unfortunate storms of 2019 necessitated rebuilding many homes and infrastructure in the Bahamas. In the short run, the Coronavirus has suffocated travel for leisure and the hospitality market. Most development projects of private islands as recreation layover destinations for cruise ships have been put on hold. Cargo volumes to both Bahamas/Turks & Caicos is off 50% due to reduced occupancy of second homes, the drop in tourism, and government mandated shut down on the islands. Pending a resolution to the Coronavirus pandemic, Island Lines has reduced its voyages and consolidated sailings to run more efficiently by combining multiple island destinations. To respond to the surge in demand from *Hurricane Dorian*, SEACOR Island Lines had relied heavily on chartered-in vessels over the last 3-6 months. The final vessel on charter was returned to its owner at the end of March. Two of the core fleet are currently sitting idle.

Looking beyond the immediate impact of COVID-19, we expect volumes to the Bahamas will run 60-70% of prior year levels until confidence in travel and tourism returns or work to rebuild homes destroyed last year resumes. Islands impacted by *Hurricane Dorian* will have to rebuild and this will be an on-going requirement into 2021 and beyond.

I would think that the islands will remain a sanctuary for many Americans and Europeans. Rebuilding homes and communities and adding new ones will continue to be a source of demand; 2021 or 2022; it remains to be seen.

Sustainability – Island Lines strategic infrastructure includes ownership of its Dania marine terminal (and a long-term lease of its cargo receiving and warehouse facility),

[23] SEACOR Island Lines owns eight vessels and other equipment for an original cost of $47 million and net property and equipment of $25 million. It has 132 shore-based personnel, including 98 working in its warehouse facilities, and 115 on its vessels.

[24] The 2018 results were negatively impacted due to over $2 million in defending a frivolous lawsuit that was eventually dismissed by the judge.

which sit just outside Port Everglades boundaries in South Florida, and additional owned and leased facilities both in the Bahamas and Turks and Caicos. Like Seabulk's port services business, it has strong customer relationships. From time to time we must replace equipment or repair facilities. We do contemplate upgrading the Dania facility over the next several years. After these outlays, I do not envision any required capital investment unless we expand into new services, experience meaningful growth, acquire a competitor, or choose to purchase real estate we now lease. The 50-500 mile trip from South Florida to Bahamian outer islands or Turks and Caicos is usually not taxing and older vessels are fit for purpose. SEACOR Island Lines' eight vessels have an average age of 15 years. The oldest was originally delivered from its builder in 1998. It cost us over $3 million to purchase, refurbish it, and upgrade it with a loading ramp and improved cargo lifting capacity.

Sealift Logistics ("Waterman")

Waterman's business is carried on our books for about $7 million.[25] It produced almost $7 million of operating income and approximately $8 million of "cash" OIBDA last year.

The Year in Review **–** Waterman operates four pure car/truck carriers ("PCTCs"). These vessels are used to transport automobiles, mostly from Japan to the Pacific Coast of the U.S. In addition to this regular automobile service, Waterman handled 28 voyages for the military, nine of which also had on board commercial cargo. Two ships underwent surveys for over $6 million in direct expense, including deviation to the shipyards, and experienced just shy of 55 days out of service and lost revenue of about $1 million.

The Update and Outlook – COVID-19 is impacting military movements. Most equipment deployments that had been scheduled a few months ago have been cancelled or deferred. I anticipate cargo that needed to be positioned for strategic reasons will eventually get moved; I just don't know when that will occur.

Sustainability - The MSP has slots for 60 vessels. I think about them as akin to a license.[26] Nine operators hold the MSP slots; three operate PCTCs competing with those in the Waterman fleet. The MSP program is authorized through 2035. At some time in the foreseeable future, the four ships we now market will have to be replaced. Any capital we invest would be predicated on improved productivity, i.e., more fuel efficient, and commercial demand.[27] While we believe MSP is critical to our nation's security and a sound business in the long run, such investment, much as buying a

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[25] Waterman charters in all four of its PCTCs on a bareboat basis. It capitalizes the stream of lease obligations and it shows up on the balance sheet as both a $17 million asset and liability. Waterman employs eight shore-based personnel. Its vessels are manned and serviced by Seabulk's technical management group. About 160 merchant seamen are employed on Waterman's vessels.

[26] The 60 MSP enrolled vessels have an average age of 14 years. The breakdown by vessel type is the following: 23 containerships (average age of 13 years), 11 geared containerships (average age of 17 years), 6 heavy lift (average age of 8 years), 18 ROROs (average age of 16 years), and 2 tankers (average age of 10 years). Waterman's four vessels have an average age of a little over 19 years.

[27] We might choose to build new vessels, acquire vessels in the second-hand market, or pursue a combination. Given the capital required, we would address funding once we decide on a way forward.

tanker or bulk vessel, would depend on our anticipated return on investment relative to risk and cost of capital.

Segment Joint Ventures

Ocean Services' three joint ventures collectively hurt segment profit by $0.7 million. Trailer Bridge and KSM, our Bahamian terminal servicing joint venture, contributed a token sum to segment profit.[28] Unfortunately, CG Railway ("CGR," our shortline railroad/rail ferry) cost us $1.4 million. Although CGR's vessels performed better operationally than the prior year, preventative maintenance costs to improve reliability weighed on results, as did the lag in gaining back our customers after the previous year's erratic service. Fortunately, CGR has a loyal customer base of approximately 50 clients.

Outlook and Sustainability – Trailer Bridge, the largest of the three joint ventures, employs Jones Act barges, roll-on/roll-off and deck, to move containers, cars, and specialized cargo (i.e. boats, construction equipment, etc.) to Puerto Rico. Its cost, inclusive of capital, are the lowest of the three carriers serving the island, but it is also not suited for perishable or refrigerated cargo. In the wake of the 2017 hurricane, demand surged. Last year, it trended back to more normal levels just as two additional vessels started working in the trade.

Trailer Bridge's key assets are its roll-on-roll-off (car and container carrier) vessels (due for a special survey in 2021), its containers, and its leases in the ports of Jacksonville, Florida and San Juan, Puerto Rico. It also owns five deck barges. It charters third party tugs and having spent just shy of $8 million for containers and chassis in the last seven months, I do not envision any mandatory capital being required from its owners.[29]

CGR runs a marine rail ferry between Mobile, Alabama and Coatzacoalcos, Mexico. It is a highly efficient marine highway (or "bridge") for moving commodities like pulp and other products to Mexico and transporting sugar, chemicals, and other products back to the United States facilities east of the Mississippi River. CGR has been struggling with two superannuated vessels that had been neglected for several years due to the prior owner having cash flow issues. Two years ago, we, and our partner in CGR, determined that the business warranted investment. Those ships are scheduled to enter service in the first half of 2021 based on the shipyard's current work schedule.

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[28] We own 55% of Trailer Bridge and carry it on our books for $57 million. Our attributable share of Trailer Bridge's OIBDA was $5 million. It had $23 million of cash at yearend, some of which was subsequently used to purchase containers. Trailer Bridge has invested in a network of logistics offices. We carry KSM on our books for $2 million. KSM has contracts with approximately seven years to go and serves customers using four tugs, two chartered from each of its two owners. The charter payments to our tugs return 8.4% on our original cost and are expenses before profit to the partners.

[29] Trailer Bridge had about $17 million in its bank account as of March 31 of this year.

INLAND TRANSPORTATION & LOGISTICS SERVICES ("SCF")

SEACOR has about $297 million invested in its inland transport businesses.[30] Operating income for SCF was $3 million. "Cash" OIBDA was approximately $25 million, of which almost 70%, in round numbers, came from operating our barge pool.

SCF owns 591 covered hopper barges and leases in 50. Third parties own 473 barges. These 1,114 barges operate in a pool. It operates 11 terminals that are hubs for bulk, agricultural and industrial cargoes, such as salt, iron ore, aluminum ingots, steel and containers, by way of example. These terminals unload rail cars and trucks and transfer cargo to warehouses or liquid storage tanks or to barges, or unload barges and transfer to rail and truck. It also has 31 separate fleeting areas, which can accommodate approximately 725 barges, mostly in the St. Louis region. Fleets generate multiple revenue streams. They are staging areas for barges and our fleet boats move them to loading docks or group them into "tows" for transit. We also get paid by the day when a barge occupies a space in the fleet. Fleet personnel clean and repair barges.[31]

The Year in Review – Results for the barge pool were in line with 2018, but considerably below the average since we began tracking the data (14 years ago). In last year's letter I pointed out that high water had helped results in the early months of 2019, allowing us to load to deeper drafts and carry more cargo, but also noted that there can be "too much of a good thing." I probably should not have let the "river gods" know that they had bestowed a blessing. The rains continued. By late spring, St. Louis harbor had to shut down and remained effectively in "lockdown" for 40 days. Considering that SCF encountered flooding in a warehouse, marginal access to its fleets, and disrupted logistics during transits, 2019 results were not terrible. I don't like making any excuse for mediocre results, but it is difficult to perform when weather creates *force majeure* circumstances. The pool barges made an average of seven trips during the year. In a year with more normal weather we would expect a barge to make eight trips and the average number of barges per trip handled by our boats to be 20-30% greater. Now we face the COVID-19 challenge.

The pool handled approximately 5,000 loadings of agricultural products and almost 2,000 trips with industrial cargo (fertilizer, steel, scrap, and ore). We worked for just under 300 different customers, including operators of tank barges and oil companies

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[30] In the U.S., Inland owns warehouses, fleeting sites (riparian rights), cranes, locomotives, forklifts, fleet boats, line haul towboats, specialty barges, and dry-cargo barges operating in the pool. As of December 31, 2019, the net book value of our dry-cargo barges was approximately $107 million (original cost $225 million) and the average age was 11 years old. We depreciate them over 20 years. At yearend SCF had $69 million of receivables, $55 million invested in joint ventures, $2 million in goodwill, and over $7 million in intangible assets. Our most expensive barge was purchased in 2011 for slightly less than $520,000 and our lowest cost acquisition was for $260,000 in 2004. Our 18 fleet support boats have an approximate average age of 40 years. They should be serviceable for another ten, but we are studying options for replacing them with "clean," electric driven propulsion. SCF employs approximately 480 in the United States, of which 54 people are on shore working in administration, marketing, and operations. We also have about 60 personnel working in our Colombian operations.

[31] We have just over 200 people in our terminals, fleets and warehouses although this number depends on activity levels. Note that although we have 700+ spaces for barges at full occupancy, when there is active movement on the river, maneuvering barges in and out of tows requires some open space and we can accommodate 450.

who park barges at our fleet, and financial investors who store commodities at SCF warehouses.

The other headline story, apart from biblical weather, was the trade war with China. Early in the year, China stopped importing grain from the United States. South America had a good crop and benefitted from weak currency, allowing its farmers to make further inroads into markets previously covered by the U.S. SCF's pool transported 14% less grain in 2019 than 2018. Although some of the shipments that might have gone to China were ultimately purchased by customers that would otherwise have taken grain from South America, river volumes were off significantly.

Colombian operations last year contributed approximately $4 million to SCF's "cash" OIBDA, a $1 million decrease from 2018.[32] Our contract with Ecopetrol runs through December 2020.

There is some good news. We launched a "container-on-barge" service in 2016 and last year there was a significant increase in movement. SEACOR AMH ("AMH" is short for America's Marine Highway), transported approximately 55,000 containers between SCF's facility in Memphis and the greater New Orleans port, both loaded and empty. We are building six specialty barges for this service. AMH supports the federal government's "marine highway" program designed to reduce CO_2 and other emissions.

Although AMH is a small part of SCF's business today, it is potentially a beacon for the future and merits a description of its business. We move empty barges from our Memphis property to Port Allen (Baton Rouge port district) and then load them with resin for transit to New Orleans where outbound container vessels pick them up. We estimate this displaces 14,000 truck moves from Baton Rouge to New Orleans, and it saves a total of 1.4 million gallons of diesel fuel curtailing emission of multiple tons of particulate and nitrous oxide emissions and about 14,500 metric tons of CO_2.[33]

The Update and Outlook – If proof were required for the colloquialized adage that the "Lord giveth and the Lord taketh,"[34] there would be no need to look beyond the barge business. The announcement that the trade war ended (Lord giveth) occurred on the eve of the widespread outbreak of COVID-19 (Lord taketh). Weather is a "routine" hazard for the inland business; plague is a new one.

To date, barge pool activity and throughput at our fleets and terminals are consistent with last year's levels. The critical period that usually determines earnings for the year is August-December. Given COVID-19 and Washington's "love-hate" relationship with China, any prediction is futile. It is much easier to track equipment

[32] SCF has approximately $26 million invested in our Colombian operations.
[33] The loaded barges are stacked three high and the empties four high. We use standard inland hopper barges and have ordered special equipment that will allow us to turn barges faster. America's Marine Highway program is supported by government grants matched by recipients.
[34] The phrase is a derivative of Job's comment, "The *Lord* gave and the *Lord* has taken away . . ."

availability than to predict demand.[35] The good news is that the hopper barge fleet contracted for the second year in a row. Approximately 190 hopper barges were delivered and 622 retired. Capacity to build new barges has been reduced. There are only two yards today producing hopper barges. The quoted "rack rate" for a new covered hopper barge in early April was $580,000, only modestly cheaper than last year despite an almost 30% drop in the price of steel.[36] A well-maintained barge can last 30, perhaps even 35 years, if it has spent limited service time hauling "hard" cargoes such as salt or scrap. Nevertheless, barges do encounter expenses as they age. A paint job now costs $26,000 and regular maintenance expenses tend to increase. Today's difficult market environment should give owners pause before spending money rather than parking or scrapping older equipment.

Segment Joint Ventures

SCF's share of their aggregate loss was almost $7 million. Collectively, the four joint ventures produced $13 million of "cash" OIBDA, our share was nearly $7 million. The culprit of the loss was SCFCo, owner of Interbarge, which operates a dry-cargo barge fleet in South America. It continues to struggle with a market weighed down by excess equipment split among too many owners. Our grain elevators, like our U.S. barge operations, wound up with less throughput than normal due to the trade war and weather. Grain elevators charge for storing product but the most profitable business is the "in and out", "throughput" which is higher margin revenue.[37] Our towing operations in the lower river made a few dollars.

Sustainability and Brand

We control our barges through a combination of outright ownership, leasing, and management agreements with third parties.[38] The average age of our owned dry-cargo barges is slightly over 11 years. An individual barge, like a tanker or a tug, is its own independent revenue stream and a discrete capital investment. We do not subscribe to regularity of fleet renewal, an approach, taken by some of the other industry participants which add a few barges every year, irrespective of cost. Our approach is opportunistic. Given the average age of our fleet and its expected longevity, there is no foreseeable requirement to invest in barges. Our four new line haul towboats typically working the St. Louis to New Orleans corridor are less than three years old. Were LNG to become readily available, we would consider modifying their engines, adapting them to cleaner fuel, but that opportunity appears still to be several years off and would also require retrofit to handle the fuel.[39] I do not envision adding more boats unless our managed barge fleet were to grow.

[35] Prognosticating utilization for a given year requires not only guessing volumes needing to be moved, and forecasting "ton miles" (distance), but also anticipating transit times, storage programs, and efficiency (days) at load ports and destinations. All influence demand.

[36] There are approximately 320 tons of steel in a hopper barge and the cover, which is fiber glass, costs $58,000. The balance of the cost is labor and attributed overhead and profit for the shipyard. The current price of steel plate is approximately $700/ton, compared with $980/ton last year at this time.

[37] SCF has an ownership interest in three grain elevators and a fertilizer storage facility.

[38] Over 70% of our third-party investor managed barges are owned by a large customer.

[39] There are roughly 235 towboats operating over 6,000 horsepower with approximately 200 built prior to 2000.

I do anticipate that modernizing our fleet boats, upgrading equipment at our terminals and warehouses such as cranes, and improving the real estate – protection from flooding - will be on-going efforts and require capital outlays over the next several years. We are examining possibilities to convert some of our fleet boats to electric power and using batteries. In this regard we try to obtain quick payback for dollars laid out. For the last three years we have invested $11.3 million to improve operations in our fleets and terminals, expenditures exceeded by depreciation.

We are studying opportunities to reduce AMH's carbon footprint, in particular, the use of LNG to power its vessels.

CRISIS AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ("Witt O'Brien's")

SEACOR's investment in Witt O'Brien's is $126 million, over 60% represented by parent company advances to fund working capital pending collection of receivables.[40] Witt O'Brien's produced operating income and "cash" OIBDA of $7 million and $8 million, respectively.[41]

The Year in Review - Witt O'Brien's continued to diversify its services and broaden its base of private sector clients. However, a significant percent of its revenues relates to "event" driven responses and helping clients navigate programs in support of the public sector. The nearly $16 million decrease from the prior year "cash" OIBDA was attributable to the successful completion of major task orders related to long-term hurricane recovery programs in Texas and the U.S. Virgin Islands, as well as fewer major weather disturbances. Witt O'Brien's also invested in personnel to offer clients advisory expertise in hazard mitigation, crisis communications, and support for accessing programs funded by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's Community Development Block Program.

The Update and Outlook – Witt O'Brien's continues as lead advisor for the U.S. Virgin Islands' recovery from back-to-back hurricanes in 2017, implementing the complex program that it helped the Territory design two years ago.

The firm is also supporting COVID-19 response for dozens of organizations. In the public sector, this includes municipalities, counties, hospitals, health systems and universities across the U.S. Services include assistance maximizing access to Federal response funding (from FEMA and other agencies) and augmentation of emergency operations. The firm is also supporting multinational businesses in financial services, transportation, technology, manufacturing, energy, media and other sectors.
In the private sector, Witt O'Brien's provides outsourced support for emergency management functions in the shipping and energy sectors. These services include planning, training, exercises, compliance and response support, to meet the requirements of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and a range of other regulations. Clients

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[40] As of December 31, Witt O'Brien's had receivables of $107 million, goodwill of almost $29 million, and $6 million in intangible assets.

[41] In addition to the operating business, Witt O'Brien's has a 50% interest in O'Brien's do Brasil Consultoria em Emergencias e Meio Ambiente S.A, which is a Brazilian company involved in disaster response. It contributed $0.9 million to segment profit.

include over 1,000 companies and 8,500 vessels. Early this year, it purchased Navigate, which has an overlapping customer base and provides crisis communications and public relations on a retainer basis. Navigate has consultants in Singapore and London. The hope is that two plus two will add up to more than four.[42]

Last year's comments continue to hold true. COVID-19 is unfortunate proof that the concept of resilience – encompassing crisis-readiness, business continuity, risk mitigation, disaster response and recovery – is more relevant than ever. This will drive demand for new services and expertise across both governments and the private sector.

CLEANCOR

CLEANCOR is on our books for $7.5 million. Although still small, it is part of our overall strategy to develop our commercial footprint in support of customers seeking to migrate their operations to cleaner – and eventually renewable – sources of energy, and, when attractively priced, invest in related infrastructure. CLEANCOR's mobile fleet of liquefied and compressed natural gas storage, transport and processing equipment worked for an expanding customer base of agriculture, asphalt, mining and transportation operations. Its assets also supported project-based activity, providing gas supply and pressure stabilization for pipelines when maintenance projects require shutdowns, or when they run short of supply during peak demand periods. LNG sales volumes grew by 40% to over 5 million gallons and frequency of calls for CLEANCOR's equipment and services also increased.

CLEANCOR also expanded its geographical footprint. It now supplies trucks with clean fuel on both the east and west coast, having launched a service providing LNG to drayage trucks running out of Jacksonville, Florida. Although demand in the past month is running behind the first quarter of this year, I am optimistic that the growth CLEANCOR enjoyed up through March will resume. We are also focusing on the integration of renewable natural gas into our gas supply program. Renewable natural gas is derived from range of organic sources, including dairy farms, landfills, and wastewater treatment facilities that, when substituted for conventional fossil fuels, contributes to a dramatic reduction in greenhouse gas and other harmful emissions. The switch to natural gas from diesel is only a first step in California, which looks back to the carbon intensity of the fuel supply chain as well as emissions of end users.

FINAL OBSERVATIONS

As noted at the beginning of this letter, I am comforted by the diversity of SEACOR's businesses. Although this diversity may be confounding to analysts, I believe it serves SEACOR well in the good times and the bad.

We follow a disciplined approach to internal growth and acquisitions and are willing to build businesses like AMH and CLEANCOR from scratch and nurture businesses that tend to have variability in year to year earnings, such as SCF and Witt O'Brien's.

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[42] Navigate is a small acquisition, involving less than $1 million of net cash and an earnout.

Acquisitions or asset purchases that add accretion to earnings or operating income in the short run are only interesting if they do not produce a hang-over in out years. We also regularly consider small acquisitions, although I would much prefer if big opportunities would come along at valuations we can accept. Finding them requires patience. Fortunately, except for me, our management group is young. Our managers are ambitious, but also thoughtful about value and aware of the risk of being in a hurry.

Throughout my discussion of our businesses above, I have sought to focus on cash generation and sustainability. I want to reiterate that what we can take from any one year's cash we deposit in the bank - (to use for dividends, share-repurchase or invest for growth) - is those dollars that do not foreseeably need to be reserved to sustain the businesses or deal with repayment of debt. Our brands and franchises endure and prosper only if we invest as necessary to meet customers' expectations and improve our own productivity. My time horizon is multi-year and that is how I measure ours (or any) business.

It bears repeating that our priorities are the health and safety of our people, that of customers and vendors with whose personnel we frequently interact, and concern for the environment. More important than any financial information or operating metric – at least to me – is the fact that SEACOR's work force has experienced only a few documented cases of Corona virus and everyone has recovered.

Sincerely,

Charles Fabrikant
Executive Chairman and Chief Executive Officer

FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS FROM CONTINUING OPERATIONS (U.S. dollars, in thousands)

	Years Ended December 31,				
	2019	2018	2017	2016	2015
CONSOLIDATED BUSINESS[1]					
Operating Income (Loss)	**$ 45,155**	$ 85,999	$ 50,483	$ (9,700)	$ 43,289
(+) Depreciation and amortization	**68,571**	74,579	75,058	62,565	60,356
OIBDA[2]	**113,726**	160,578	125,541	52,865	103,645
(-) Amortization of deferred gains[3]	**(1,322)**	(25,737)	(17,352)	(17,493)	(17,548)
OIBDA less deferred gains	**112,404**	134,841	108,189	35,372	86,097
(+) Accelerated vesting of incentive compensation[4]	**-**	-	16,614	-	-
(-) Partner's portion of SEA-Vista's OIBDA less deferred gains[5]	**(15,999)**	(30,292)	(35,501)	(21,215)	(16,525)
"Cash" OIBDA[6]	**$ 96,405**	$ 104,549	$ 89,302	$ 14,157	$ 69,572
OCEAN TRANSPORTATION & LOGISTICS SERVICES[1]					
Operating Income	**$ 62,569**	$ 71,988	$ 74,647	$ 48,436	$ 45,592
(+) Depreciation and amortization	**40,986**	46,270	46,073	31,162	26,296
OIBDA[2]	**103,555**	118,258	120,720	79,598	71,888
(-) Amortization of deferred gains[3]	**-**	(22,592)	(14,480)	(15,004)	(14,086)
OIBDA less deferred gains	**103,555**	95,666	106,240	64,594	57,802
(+) Accelerated vesting of incentive compensation[4]	**-**	-	2,058	-	-
(-) Partner's portion of SEA-Vista's OIBDA less deferred gains[5]	**(15,999)**	(30,292)	(35,501)	(21,215)	(16,525)
"Cash" OIBDA[6]	**$ 87,556**	$ 65,374	$ 72,797	$ 43,379	$ 41,277
INLAND TRANSPORTATION & LOGISTICS SERVICES					
Operating Income	**$ 3,116**	$ 18,034	$ 11,166	$ 5,333	$ 33,136
(+) Depreciation and amortization	**23,262**	24,164	25,852	26,327	28,632
OIBDA[2]	**26,378**	42,198	37,018	31,660	61,768
(-) Amortization of deferred gains[3]	**(1,322)**	(3,077)	(2,869)	(2,489)	(3,462)
OIBDA less deferred gains	**25,056**	39,121	34,149	29,171	58,306
(+) Accelerated vesting of incentive compensation[4]	**-**	-	2,063	-	-
"Cash" OIBDA[6]	**$ 25,056**	$ 39,121	$ 36,212	$ 29,171	$ 58,306
WITT O'BRIEN'S					
Operating Income (Loss)	**$ 6,955**	$ 21,790	$ 2,882	$ (32,985)	$ 2,251
(+) Depreciation and amortization	**835**	1,944	819	1,539	1,711
OIBDA[2]	**7,790**	23,734	3,701	(31,446)	3,962
(+) Accelerated vesting of incentive compensation[4]	**-**	-	565	-	-
"Cash" OIBDA[6]	**$ 7,790**	$ 23,734	$ 4,266	$ (31,446)	$ 3,962

[1] On May 2, 2014, SEACOR issued a 49% noncontrolling interest to a financial investor in SEA-Vista, which owns and operates the Jones Act tanker fleet. On August 2, 2019, SEACOR acquired our partner's 49% ownership position in SEA-Vista. SEA-Vista's consolidated results are included in operating income, depreciation and amortization, and the amortization of deferred gains.

[2] SEACOR defines OIBDA, a non-GAAP financial measure, as operating income (loss) plus depreciation and amortization. For additional information, see SEACOR's disclosure regarding OIBDA, a non-GAAP financial measure, and the rationale for its use in SEACOR's earnings releases.

[3] Amortization of deferred gains may be included in operating expenses as a reduction to rental expense and/or included in gains (losses) on asset dispositions and impairments, net. On January 1, 2019, the Company adopted Topic 842 and reduced deferred gains associated with sale-leaseback transactions through a beginning period retained earnings adjustment.

[4] Non-recurring expenses associated with the accelerated vesting of incentive compensation related to the spin-off of SEACOR Marine Holdings Inc. and in advance of changes in the U.S. federal income tax code.

[5] Reflects our partner's portion of OIBDA less the amortization of deferred gains related to SEA-Vista. On August 2, 2019, SEACOR acquired our partner's 49% ownership position in SEA-Vista.

[6] "Cash" OIBDA is defined as OIBDA less the amortization of deferred gains in the period less our partner's portion of OIBDA less the amortization of deferred gains for SEA-Vista. In 2017, we added back the costs associated with the accelerated vesting of incentive compensation.

Forward-Looking Statement: *Certain statements discussed in this Letter to Stockholders constitute "forward-looking statements" within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Such forward-looking statements concerning management's expectations, strategic objectives, business prospects, anticipated economic performance and financial condition and other similar matters involve significant known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other important factors that could cause the actual results, performance or achievements of results to differ materially from any future results, performance or achievements discussed or implied by such forward-looking statements. Readers should refer to the Company's Form 10-K and particularly the "Risk Factors" section for a discussion of risk factors that could cause actual results to differ materially.*

APPENDIX I: "Cash Earnings" and Proxy for Cash Earned (U.S. dollars, in thousands)

	Years Ended December 31,	
	2019	**2018**
CONSOLIDATED BUSINESS[1]		
Operating Income	**$ 45,155**	$ 85,999
(+) Depreciation and amortization	**68,571**	74,579
OIBDA[2]	**113,726**	160,578
(-) Amortization of deferred gains[3]	**(1,322)**	(25,737)
OIBDA less deferred gains	**112,404**	134,841
(-) OIBDA less amortization of deferred gains attributable to noncontrolling interests[4]	**(15,999)**	(30,292)
"Cash" OIBDA[5]	**96,405**	104,549
(-) Cash interest paid, net[6]	**(4,220)**	(15,408)
(-) Income tax obligation	**(25)**	(18,915)
(+/-) Marketable security gains (losses), net	**18,394**	(12,431)
Cash Earnings	**110,554**	57,795
(-) Make-whole premium to redeem the 7.375% notes	**-**	(5,601)
(+) Return from sale of Hawker Pacific Airservices, Limited[7]	**-**	51,000
Proxy for cash earned	**$ 110,554**	$ 103,194

[1] On May 2, 2014, SEACOR issued a 49% noncontrolling interest to a financial investor in SEA-Vista, which owns and operates the Jones Act tanker fleet. On August 2, 2019, SEACOR acquired our partner's 49% ownership position in SEA-Vista. SEA-Vista's consolidated results are included in operating income, depreciation and amortization, and the amortization of deferred gains.

[2] SEACOR defines OIBDA, a non-GAAP financial measure, as operating income plus depreciation and amortization.

[3] For the twelve months ended December 31, 2019, amortization of deferred gains is included in gains on asset dispositions. For the twelve months ended December 31, 2018, amortization of deferred gains may be included in operating expenses as a reduction to rental expense and/or included in gains on asset dispositions.

[4] Reflects our partner's portion of OIBDA less the amortization of deferred gains related to SEA-Vista. On August 2, 2019, SEACOR acquired our partner's 49% ownership position in SEA-Vista.

[5] "Cash" OIBDA is defined as OIBDA less the amortization of deferred gains in the period less our partner's portion of OIBDA less the amortization of deferred gains for SEA-Vista.

[6] Amount is net of interest income, excludes capitalized interest, and is net of our partner's portion of SEA-Vista net interest expense of $1.2 million and $2.7 million for the twelve months ended December 31, 2019 and 2018, respectively.

[7] Cash profit from the sale of SEACOR's 34.2% interest in Hawker Pacific Airservices, Limited in April 2018. Our book gain was slightly more at $53.9 million as a result of recording net equity losses during our ownership.

APPENDIX II: Owned Fleet Profile as of December 31, 2019

	Owned Fleet (Count)	Average Age (Years)	Estimated Useful Life of New Equipment (Years)	Average Remaining Useful Life for Property & Equipment (Years)	Historical Cost[1] ($000s)	Net Book Value ($000s)
OCEAN TRANSPORTATION & LOGISTICS SERVICES						
Petroleum and chemical carriers - U.S.-flag	7	17	25	11	$ 649,795	$ 381,901
Harbor and offshore tugs - U.S.-flag	21	20	25	10	133,419	85,782
Harbor tugs - Foreign-flag	6	9	25	13	45,379	29,312
Ocean liquid tank barges - U.S.-flag	5	12	25	14	39,238	23,067
Short-sea container/RORO - Foreign-flag	8	15	20	7	27,073	15,083
Bulk carriers - U.S.-flag	2	40	25	-	13,000	3,200
INLAND TRANSPORTATION & LOGISTICS SERVICES						
Dry-cargo barges	611	11	20	8	$ 225,278	$ 106,663
Specialty barges	5	38	20	3	3,828	1,484
Liquid tank barges	20	16	25	13	19,784	16,100
Towboats	8	17	25	19	62,207	57,226
Harbor boats	18	41	25	4	19,296	9,972

[1] Includes property and equipment acquired in business acquisitions at acquisition date fair value.

APPENDIX III: Corporate Performance

Year	Return on Equity [1]	Total Debt to Total Capital [2]	Net Debt to Total Capital [3,4]	Book Value Per Share [5]	Market Price Per Share [6]	Market High Price Per Share [7]	Market Low Price Per Share [8]	Book Value Per Share with Dividends Included [9]	Market Price Per Share with Dividends Included	S&P 500 Index with Dividends Included
								Annual Percentage Change		
1992	-	-	-	$ 7.84	$ 9.50	$ 9.67	$ 9.50	-	-	-
1993	11.0%	51.6%	31.9%	8.72	15.33	18.50	8.67	11.2%	61.4%	10.1%
1994	10.4%	47.3%	22.4%	9.81	13.00	15.83	11.83	12.5%	(15.2)%	1.3%
1995	11.9%	40.9%	31.6%	12.27	18.00	18.17	12.08	25.1%	38.5%	37.5%
1996	21.8%	38.5%	12.4%	16.92	42.00	43.50	17.58	37.9%	133.3%	22.9%
1997	33.9%	41.5%	(2.6)%	22.74	40.17	47.25	26.67	34.4%	(4.4)%	33.3%
1998	26.6%	45.2%	3.4%	28.55	32.96	41.29	21.50	25.5%	(17.9)%	28.5%
1999	5.7%	46.2%	19.2%	29.97	34.50	37.71	26.25	5.0%	4.7%	21.0%
2000	6.7%	40.7%	3.6%	32.28	52.63	44.71	37.75	7.7%	52.5%	(9.1)%
2001	12.8%	28.0%	3.1%	37.03	46.40	54.00	35.10	14.7%	(11.8)%	(11.9)%
2002	6.3%	33.3%	(10.2)%	40.41	44.50	50.80	37.11	9.1%	(4.1)%	(22.1)%
2003	1.5%	30.1%	(9.6)%	41.46	42.03	44.20	33.95	2.6%	(5.6)%	28.7%
2004	2.6%	39.4%	3.4%	45.20	53.40	55.75	37.35	9.0%	27.1%	10.9%
2005	20.1%	40.3%	11.4%	56.04	68.10	73.90	52.90	24.0%	27.5%	4.9%
2006	16.5%	37.0%	0.3%	64.52	99.14	101.48	68.11	15.1%	45.6%	15.8%
2007	15.0%	35.7%	(3.4)%	72.73	92.74	102.81	81.60	12.7%	(6.5)%	5.6%
2008	13.3%	36.4%	10.9%	81.44	66.65	97.35	53.40	12.0%	(28.1)%	(37.0)%
2009	8.8%	28.7%	(2.4)%	86.56	76.25	91.09	53.72	6.3%	14.4%	26.4%
2010	12.5%	28.6%	(5.4)%	83.52	101.09	114.80	67.59	13.8%	52.5%	15.1%
2011	2.3%	36.6%	7.9%	85.49	88.96	112.43	78.31	2.0%	(12.0)%	2.1%
2012	3.4%	35.5%	16.8%	86.17	83.80	99.31	82.11	5.7%	(0.1)%	16.0%
2013	2.2%	38.2%	2.3%	68.73	91.20	98.45	68.17	3.2%	40.3%	32.4%
2014	7.1%	36.8%	4.0%	77.15	73.81	90.05	68.56	7.7%	(19.1)%	13.5%
2015	(4.9)%	43.5%	6.0%	74.08	52.56	77.65	50.40	(2.6)%	(28.8)%	1.4%
2016	(17.0)%	46.3%	16.1%	60.97	71.28	72.97	42.35	(11.4)%	35.6%	11.8%
2017	5.8%	43.5%	18.2%	34.77	46.22	75.47	32.06	5.1%	3.8%	21.9%
2018	9.3%	29.3%	14.3%	38.41	37.00	58.75	35.07	3.4%	(19.9)%	(4.4)%
2019	**3.8%**	**27.9%**	**20.3%**	**40.23**	**42.99**	**51.42**	**36.32**	**1.6%**	**16.6%**	**31.5%**
Overall Return (1992-2019)								1,435.6%	1,043.5%	1,167.4%
Compounded Annual Return (1992-2019)								10.4%	9.4%	9.9%

[1] Return on equity is calculated as net income (loss) attributable to SEACOR Holdings Inc. divided by SEACOR Holdings Inc. stockholders' equity at the beginning of the year.

[2] Total debt to total capital is calculated as total debt divided by the sum of total debt, including capital leases, and total equity. Total equity is defined as SEACOR Holdings Inc. stockholders' equity plus noncontrolling interests in subsidiaries. Amounts presented do not exclude discontinued operations of National Response Corporation and certain affiliates, SEACOR Energy Inc., and Era Group Inc. prior to 2013. It also does not exclude SEACOR Marine Holdings Inc. and Illinois Corn Processing LLC prior to 2017. Amounts presented for total debt from 2015 to 2019 include debt issuance costs.

[3] Net debt to total capital is calculated as total debt less cash and near cash assets divided by the sum of total debt and total equity. Total equity is defined as SEACOR Holdings Inc. stockholders' equity plus noncontrolling interests in subsidiaries. Amounts presented do not exclude discontinued operations of National Response Corporation and certain affiliates, SEACOR Energy Inc., and Era Group Inc. prior to 2013. It also does not exclude SEACOR Marine Holdings Inc. and Illinois Corn Processing LLC prior to 2017. Amounts presented for total debt from 2015 to 2019 include debt issuance costs.

[4] The long-term operating lease obligations (in excess of one year) were $144.3 million as of December 31, 2019. If we include future lease obligations to the net debt to total capital computation, the percentage changes to 29.3% for 2019. For additional information on operating leases, see Note 8 to our Consolidated Financial Statements in our 2019 Form 10-K.

[5] Total book value per common share is calculated as SEACOR Holdings Inc. stockholders' equity divided by common shares outstanding at the end of the period. Amounts presented from 1992 to 1999 have been adjusted for the three-for-two stock split effected on June 15, 2000. Book value per share from 2010 to 2019 was impacted by the Special Cash Dividends of $15.00 per common share and $5.00 per common share paid to stockholders on December 14, 2010, and December 17, 2012, respectively. Book value per share from 2013 to 2019 was also impacted by the spin-off of Era Group Inc. on January 31, 2013, amounting to $20.88 per common share. Book value per share in 2017 and 2019 was impacted by the spin-off of SEACOR Marine Holdings Inc. on June 1, 2017, amounting to $29.69 per common share, and a dividend of Dorian LPG Ltd. shares, amounting to $1.75 per common share.

[6] This represents closing prices at December 31. Amounts presented from 1992 to 1999 have been adjusted for the three-for-two stock split effected on June 15, 2000. Market price per share was impacted by the Special Cash Dividends of 2010 and 2012, the spin-off of Era Group Inc. on January 31, 2013 (closing price of $20.39), the spin-off of SEACOR Marine Holdings Inc. on June 1, 2017 (closing price of $20.59), and the dividend of Dorian LPG Ltd. shares in 2017.

[7] This represents the high closing prices during the period. Amounts presented from 1992 to 2000 have been adjusted for the three-for-two stock split effected on June 15, 2000. Market price per share was impacted by the Special Cash Dividends of 2010 and 2012, the spin-off of Era Group Inc. on January 31, 2013 (closing price of $20.39), the spin-off of SEACOR Marine Holdings Inc. on June 1, 2017 (closing price of $20.59), and the dividend of Dorian LPG Ltd. shares in 2017.

[8] This represents the low closing prices during the period. Amounts presented from 1992 to 1999 have been adjusted for the three-for-two stock split effected on June 15, 2000. Market price per share was impacted by the Special Cash Dividends of 2010 and 2012, the spin-off of Era Group Inc. on January 31, 2013 (closing price of $20.39), the spin-off of SEACOR Marine Holdings Inc. on June 1, 2017 (closing price of $20.59), and the dividend of Dorian LPG Ltd. shares in 2017.

[9] The annual percentage changes from 2009 to 2019 were adjusted to add back the Special Cash Dividends of 2010 and 2012. The annual percentage changes from 2012 to 2019 were adjusted to add back the spin-off of Era Group Inc. of $20.88 per common share in 2013. The annual percentage change from 2016 to 2019 was adjusted to add back the the spin-off of SEACOR Marine Holdings Inc. of $29.69 per common share in 2017, and the dividend of Dorian LPG Ltd. shares, amounting to $1.75 per common share in 2017. The compounded annual return has also been adjusted accordingly.